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Abstract
School choice is becoming increasingly popular around the globe. Broadly the term
‘school choice’ is used to describe the options available for families to send children to
school(s) other than the one they are residentially assigned to. Private school choice
interventions known as ‘school vouchers,’ offer public or private funding to enable families to
send their children to private school.
Research in 1970s and 80s by James Coleman and his colleagues showed a private
school advantage in student achievement and graduation rates, in comparison to traditional
public schools. Competing evidence was presented by Christopher Lubienski and Sarah
Lubienski in 2013, claiming a public school advantage in student achievement. The debates
surrounding a particular school sector advantage can be better addressed using causal evidence
and using large datasets to understand possible mechanisms that differentiate the school sectors.
This dissertation reports on four analyses of the possibility of a private school
advantage, using a variety of data. The first study looks at overall evidence on student
achievement in math and reading scores from causal studies on private school vouchers around
the globe. The second study offers a supplemental cost-effectiveness evaluation of the same set
of voucher programs.
In the third study, nationally representative data on public and private school principals
is analyzed to study principal autonomy over seven school-level activities across school sectors.
Using the same dataset, the fourth study examines the determinants of principal attrition across
school sectors. Principals’ stated responses to stay in the profession in the baseline year are
compared to their revealed status a year later.

Some contributions of this dissertation are evidence of vouchers increasing reading test
scores more in comparison to math test scores and a larger test score impact in developing
countries than in the U.S. The dissertation finds more autonomy over school-level activities and
more likelihood to remain in the profession for the private school principal in comparison to the
traditional public school principal. Hence, future studies may test the role of principal autonomy
and principals’ remaining in the profession as a mediator of school choice outcomes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
My research in Kenya suggested that these poor families had always been able to afford
private schools. Before free primary education, they were already in private schools. The
real conundrum for me was why the development experts hadn’t already figured this out.
James Tooley, 2009, p. 125.
In the U.S., the status quo in traditional public education is to assign students to schools
based on where they reside. School choice is the practice of letting parents choose schools rather
than residentially assign them. School voucher programs are scholarship initiatives – frequently
government funded or incentivized – that pay for students to attend private schools of their
choice. America’s first private school voucher initiative was launched in Milwaukee in 1991
(Witte, 2000). Private school choice programs provide public or private funds for families within
the jurisdiction of the program to send their children to private schools. In 2018, 54 private
school choice programs exist in the United States. Such programs extend beyond vouchers and
also comprise education savings accounts (ESAs), tax-credit scholarships and town-tuition
options for families living in rural areas (EdChoice, 2018). Inside the U.S., disadvantaged
families are the main participant and beneficiary of voucher programs (Wolf, 2018).
Outside the U.S., private schooling is on the rise in developing countries despite
increased spending on public education and near-universal access to free of cost public primary
schools (Glewwe & Muralidharan, 2016). Indeed, the private school share accounts for a fifth of
primary school enrollment in the developing world (Baum et al., 2014). Research attributes this
demand for fee charging low-cost private schools among poor families to the low academic
quality of public education and high rate of teacher absenteeism in government operated schools
(Dixon, 2013; Shakeel & Wolf, 2018; Tooley, 2009).

1

It is argued that school choice can improve education systems through academic
competition among schools and also by providing families a better match between their needs
and schools’ quality (DeAngelis & Erickson, 2018). Studying school choice is becoming
increasingly common and more data about choice programs are available (EdChoice, 2018). In
the 1970s and 80s, sociologists James Coleman and Thomas Hoffer (1987) reported a private
school advantage in student achievement and graduation rates relative to traditional public
schools. Competing evidence claims a public school achievement advantage relative to private
schools (Lubienski & Lubienski, 2013). Several studies argue for advantages in student success
(over a variety of outcomes such as achievement, attainment, civic values and non-cognitive
skills) for one form of schooling over the other. Arguments for advantages of private over public
schools are purely philosophical (Mill, 1962[1869]; Paine, 1791), rely on qualitative evidence
(Stewart & Wolf, 2016), rely on quantitative evidence (Coleman & Hoffer, 1987), are based on
literature reviews (Ashley & Wales, 2015; Coulson, 2009; Morgan, Petrosino, & Fronius, 2015),
are based on field work (Dixon, 2013; Tooley, 2009) and are meta-analytic (Anderson, Guzman,
& Ringquist, 2013; Fryer, 2017). Other arguments for advantages of private over public schools
are based on economics (Friedman, 1955), a theory of bureaucracy and autonomy of private
institutions (Chubb & Moe, 1988, 1990), degree of family involvement in schools (HiattMichael, 2017), civic values (Wolf, 2007) and religion (Bryk, Lee, & Holland, 1993). Competing
arguments exist for advantages of public schools over private schools (Bowles & Gintis, 2002;
Gutmann, 1987; Lubienski & Lubienski, 2013). Some commentators argue for accommodating
private interests publicly through pluralism in public institutions (Berner, 2017) while other
commentators highlight that for-profit private enterprise may provide public education (Hess &
Horn, 2013).
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This dissertation reports four analyses to determine if private schooling enjoys an
advantage over public schools in student success. Chapter 2 presents a first analysis that relies on
causal evidence around the globe of the effect of using a school voucher on student achievement
in math and reading. Chapter 3 presents a cost-effectiveness analysis to evaluate the program
impacts beyond the perspective of student achievement. However, merely looking at limited
evidence from student achievement may understate the impact of private schools. Therefore,
Chapter 4 looks at the issue of a private school advantage in student success over public schools
from the perspective of educational leadership. Using a nationally representative dataset, chapter
4 examines in which sector principals enjoy relatively more autonomy – i.e. if school principals
can run schools without taking orders from higher-level authorities. Increased autonomy for
school principals may incentivize them to be more innovative, adapt to changing needs of
students and staff within schools and influence school-level activities that matter for student
success (Hess, 2013; Ouchi, 2009). Private school principals may have an advantage over public
school principals, due to the former’s more autonomy in influencing school-level activities such
as hiring and firing teachers, shaping the schools’ curriculum and setting their schools’ discipline
policies. Finally, chapter 5 examines the determinants of principals staying in or leaving their
profession in both school sectors. The analysis tests if principals are more likely to stay in the
profession in either school sector. Private school principals do not have tenure, have lower
salaries on average and less opportunities for professional development in comparison to public
school principals. Yet, the existence of an increased likelihood of principals in private schools
remaining in the profession in comparison to principals in public schools may indicate principal
satisfaction that may be correlated with student success.

3

The first study is a meta-analytic consolidation of the evidence from all Randomized
Control Trials (RCTs) on school vouchers evaluating the student-level achievement test score
effects in math and reading. Reading and math test scores are available and known with
acceptable reliability in the analyzed voucher programs. English test score impacts are analyzed
as a subcomponent of reading results for developing countries due to the importance parents in
developing countries assign to English as a medium of instruction (Azam, Aimee, & Prakash,
2010; Mitra et al., 2003; Sen and Blatchford, 2001; Tooley & Dixon, 2002). The results of this
meta-analysis indicate that voucher programs globally tend to increase test scores over time,
particularly in developing countries like Colombia and India with a large private-public school
quality gap. Generally, the achievement impacts are positive and small but larger for reading
than for math and for programs outside the US relative to those within the US.
Inside the US, a major proportion of increase in the public school expenditures comprise
the cost of staffing and infrastructure (Scaffidi, 2017). In developing nations, often the private
schools operate with limited infrastructure and lower teacher salaries than comparison public
schools (Dixon, 2013; Tooley, 2009). The participating private schools in the voucher programs
generally have lower per-student expenses in comparison to public schools within the
jurisdiction of the same voucher interventions. A global assessment of the cost-effectiveness of
private school choice has never been done. Chapter 3 uses a variety of data from state, national
and international-level sources to analyze the cost-effectiveness of the causal evidence on private
school vouchers internationally. Results from the cost-effectiveness analysis of the experimental
evidence on school vouchers around the globe establish that vouchers are generally cost-effective
and even null impacts in a voucher program, obtained at a lower cost than education in a public

4

school setting, may have a net benefit for society. More research is needed to study the
scalability of private school choice programs.
While substantial school choice research focuses on student achievement outcomes, little
has explored the mechanisms involved in producing such outcomes. The roles of school
principals, for example, may vary between public and private schools. This could be important
because principals should have an effect on school environment/quality. School principals
possess superior knowledge of and an ability to influence school culture and learning practices
(Hess, 2013; Ouchi, 2009). Chubb and Moe (1988) theorize the existence of greater autonomy in
private schools related to structure, goals and school operations. Increased autonomy over school
level activities such as curriculum, budget and personnel may allow principals to be more
innovative and influence student learning positively. Highly effective principals increase student
learning by two to seven months within a single school year (Branch, Hanushek, & Rivkin,
2013).
The third study presents a comparative analysis of the autonomy of private and public
school principals using data from the School and Staffing Survey (SASS) 2011–2012. Chapter 4
adds to the literature on educational leadership and school choice by examining the differences in
private and public school principals’ abilities to influence important decisions at their schools
from a nationally representative sample of 9,230 school principals. The self-reported influence of
principals on seven school-related activities are analyzed: setting performance for students,
establishing curriculum, determining the content of in-service professional development
programs for teachers, evaluating teachers, hiring new full time teachers, setting discipline
policies and deciding how school budgets will be spent.
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Results from logistic regressions indicate that private school principals exhibit more
autonomy in influencing school level policies, perhaps explaining private school advantages. In
particular, private school principals have a higher likelihood of reporting major influence over
performance standards, curriculum, professional development, hiring teachers, discipline policy,
and budget decisions. Conversely, private school principals have a lower likelihood of reporting
having a major influence on the evaluation of teachers. Principals are those administrators most
aware of the daily issues at the school level: more autonomy may help them address the issues
faster. Perhaps, due to the heavy bureaucratization and centralized functioning of the public
school system, principal autonomy is more robust in private schools.
The final study in my dissertation compares principal attrition rates between the public
and private sectors. School principals play a key role in determining school quality and a
school’s academic outcomes. Principal attrition poses a challenge in maintaining a school’s
academic environment. Principal turnover likely generates short-term shocks into the school
system which may affect the school environment and student learning negatively (Branch,
Hanushek, & Rivkin, 2013; Burkhauser et al., 2012; Mascall & Leithwood, 2010; Miller, 2013).
Earlier research has explored the determinants of principal turnover in traditional public
schools using nationally representative samples (Boyce, & Bowers, 2016; Mitani, 2017; Sun &
Ni, 2016; Tekleselassie & Villarreal, 2010). A comparative analysis of the attrition patterns of
public and private school principals using nationally representative samples does not exist
(Rangel, 2018). A comparative analysis of attrition patterns of school principals may be
informative of the underlying school-level mechanisms that differentiate public schools from
private schools, thus offering possible explanations for intersectoral differences in student
learning.
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Using data from the School and Staffing Survey 2011-2012 and the Principal Follow-up
Survey 2012, the final study in the dissertation compares principal attrition between public and
private schools. Principals’ stated preferences on a prior year baseline survey are compared to
their revealed status a year later on a follow-up survey. The research presented in chapter 5
reports significant differences in principal attrition between public and private schools. Results
show that private school principals are significantly more likely than their public school peers to
intend to stay in the principal profession. The chapter reports that principals stated preferences a
year before stand in contrast to their revealed status a year later. Although privately school
principals are significantly more likely to intend to stay in the profession in comparison to their
public counterparts at the baseline year survey, at the follow-up year, the results do not reveal a
statistically significant difference. As most private school principals teach at their schools, they
may be utilizing principalship to gain teaching experience and later return to teaching in the
same schools (Chubb & Moe, 1988). Such a change from principalship to teaching is less likely
for principals in public schools, probably because of bureaucratic rules and specialization (Gerth
& Mills, 1946), and a greater social distance between teachers and principals in public schools in
comparison to private schools (Ingersoll, 2003).
The contributions of this dissertation are: a) establishing that private school vouchers tend
to increase reading score more in comparison to math test scores, b) establishing modest
advantages of private schooling on student achievement, particularly outside the US, c)
establishing that vouchers are generally cost-effective and even null impacts, if obtained at a
lower per-student cost in comparison to public school settings, may yield a net benefit for
society, d) presence of more autonomy for private school principals over school-level activities
in comparison to public school principals and e) an increased likelihood to remain in the
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profession for the private school principal in comparison to their public counterparts, with
evidence of a disconnect between principals’ stated preferences versus their revealed status.
These findings should be taken with caution, however, as merely 11 voucher programs have been
analyzed causally around the globe, and data from studies on school principals are not connected
to student outcomes.
The next chapter investigates the experimental evidence on the use of private school
vouchers around the globe. Chapter 3 explores the cost-effectiveness of the aforementioned
experimental evidence on vouchers. Thereafter, comparative principal autonomy in the public
and private school sectors is studied in chapter 4 using a nationally representative dataset.
Chapter 5 analyzes the same nationally representative dataset to study comparative principal
attrition from the principal profession in public and private schools. Lastly, chapter 6 concludes
the dissertation by summarizing the overall findings.
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1. Introduction
In the United States, families are typically residentially assigned to schools. School
choice is the practice to let parents choose schools for their children rather than residentially
assign them. School choice is a salient market-based school reform globally. School vouchers are
a mechanism by which resources are provided to families that enable them to attend a private
school of their choosing (Wolf, 2008a). Strictly speaking, a private school choice initiative is
only a “voucher program” if the government funds the program directly out of an appropriation
and the “voucher” only purchases educational services from a single provider. Other private
school choice initiatives are funded indirectly, through tax credits provided to businesses or
individuals who contribute to nonprofit scholarship-granting organizations. Such arrangements
are commonly called tax-credit or opportunity scholarship programs. This study is the first metaanalytic consolidation of the evidence from all Randomized Control Trials (RCTs) evaluating the
student-level achievement test score effects of school vouchers internationally. Our search
process turned up 9,443 potential studies, 20 of which ultimately were included. These 20 studies
represent 11 different voucher programs, eight in the U.S. and three in non-U.S. countries. We
present math and reading outcomes when available, and present English results as a
subcomponent of the reading effects in the international context to account for differences
between English and the local language.
The funding structure of a voucher program in Colombia involved the use of student
performance incentives, and the voucher program in Louisiana contained test-based
accountability provisions not found in any of the other programs included in our study. We
provide meta-analytic results that exclude these two outlier programs as a robustness check.
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Economist Milton Friedman (1955) put forth the first concrete school voucher proposal.
He argued that government should provide funds in support of compulsory education but need
not deliver the schooling itself. Vouchers are a form of government outsourcing wherein the
government provides funds to socioeconomically disadvantaged families to select private schools
for educating their children. Supporters of vouchers claim that participating students will learn
more, either by accessing higher-quality schools, or because the chosen private school will be a
better match for the student’s particular needs. It is expected that parents of these children are
motivated to figure out their child’s needs.
Whether or not students benefit from school vouchers is a fiercely contested empirical
question (Doolittle & Connors, 2001). For example, education historian Diane Ravitch describes
school vouchers as a “hoax” that has failed to benefit participants (Ravitch, 2014). Richard
Murnane (2005, p. 181), in contrast, argues: “Providing families who lack resources with
educational choices makes sense. The consequences of attempting to do this through a largescale voucher…system are unknown. Carefully designed experiments could provide critical
knowledge.”
Experimental design is critical to evaluating school voucher programs because of
concerns about selection bias. Some families may be more educationally motivated to find a
better match between their child’s needs and the chosen private school. Additionally, some
families may seek quality education in accord with a religious nature and mission orientation of
the chosen private school. Generally, we expect that more motivated and able families self-sort
into private schools and/or voucher programs, though some within-study comparisons indicate
this is not always the case (e.g. Anderson & Wolf, 2017). Fortunately, much of the research on
school vouchers in the U.S., and some of the evaluations abroad, has involved random
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assignment experiments that control for self-selection in expectation. Random assignment
assumes that assignment of a private school to a family is no longer due to selection by a family
but rather due to chance. Thus, any effect of private schooling is causal in theory. However, the
caveat is that families who apply to such voucher programs may be motivated differently than
families that do not apply for the voucher programs. Similarly private schools that participate in
voucher programs may be different than private schools that choose not to participate in voucher
programs. Both of these factors limit the external validity of experimental voucher findings.
In this meta-analysis we consolidate the evidence from 20 experimental evaluations of
the achievement impacts of private school choice programs in the U.S., India, and Colombia. We
primarily focus on estimates of the effect of using a voucher to attend a private school, referred
to as the Treatment on the Treated (TOT) program effect, for several reasons. First, expanding
access to private schools of choice is the key purpose of school voucher programs. The effects of
private schooling specifically on the kinds of students who will access it with the support of
vouchers is the most policy-relevant piece of information regarding school choice programs.
Thus, the TOT effect of private school voucher use is considered by some analysts to be the
policy-relevant effect parameter for school-choice interventions (Bifulco, 2012; Cowen, 2008;
Howell, Wolf, Campbell, & Peterson, 2002). Second, the TOT effect is less sensitive to the rate
at which voucher recipients use a voucher when offered and the rate at which control group
students “crossover” to private schooling in the experiment. As such, the TOT estimate of the
effect of private schooling is more consistent across programs. We also report in the appendices
the experimental results for the mere offer of a voucher through winning a lottery, referred to as
the Intent-to-Treat (ITT) effect, which is the pure experimental impact from the evaluations but
lacks the advantages of the TOT effect described above.
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We focus on reading and mathematics achievement for three reasons. First, they are
measures of academic achievement. Schools are charged with enhancing student learning, so
test-score outcomes are a proper measure of the effect of an intervention like school choice that
expands the schooling options of students. Second, measures of reading and math achievement
with known and acceptable reliability1 are available around the globe. Third, the reading and
math effects of private school choice programs are the only types of program effects that are
sufficiently common to provide the foundation for a meta-analysis.
Very few voucher RCTs have systematically evaluated non-math and non-reading test
score or even non-achievement outcomes. The evaluation of the PACES program in Colombia
showed that lottery winners were ten percentage points more likely to finish 8th grade after three
years. Lottery winners were also less likely to marry or cohabit as teenagers (Angrist, Bettinger,
Bloom, King, & Kremer, 2002). Wolf et al. (2013) reported a positive impact on high school
graduation in the evaluation of the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP). The Louisiana
Scholarship Program (LSP) showed statistically significant negative impacts of voucher usage on
student achievement in science and social studies in its first (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak & Walters,
2015) and second (Mills & Wolf, 2016) years. By its third year, the LSP negative effect was
statistically significant only for social studies (Mills & Wolf, 2017). Bettinger and Slonim (2006)
reported positive and statistically significant effects of a voucher intervention on students’
altruism towards charitable organizations but not towards their peers. The Andhra Pradesh
school choice experiment showed no difference between test scores of lottery winners and losers
on science and social studies after two and four years of the program (Muralidharan &
Sundararaman, 2015). Although these non-reading and non-math experimental outcomes from

1

Reliability of a test refers to the extent to which the test is stable and consistent in measuring the intended
outcome(s).
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voucher studies are interesting, there are too few of them to consolidate into our formal metaanalysis without introducing a substantial amount of statistical noise due to the diversity in
distinctive outcomes and their associated measurement issues. Thus, we focus on reading and
math test scores here.
Additionally, we examine English impacts as a subcomponent of reading results for
developing countries. We do so because parents in developing countries assign high importance
to English during the school selection process due to its likely association with increased
academic opportunities and a higher economic return from the job market (Azam, Aimee, &
Prakash, 2013; Mitra, Tooley, Inamdar, & Dixon, 2003; Sen and Blatchford, 2001; Tooley &
Dixon, 2002).
2. Private school choice programs around the world
Government or philanthropic efforts providing greater access to private schools of choice
are common around the world (e.g. Glenn, De Groof, & Candal, 2012a; 2012b; 2012c; 2012d;
Wolf & Macedo, 2004). Voucher programs are either universal or targeted. Universal programs
offer funding to all school-age children in a jurisdiction.
Universal private school choice programs operate in the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark,
Sweden, France, and other European and Commonwealth countries, mainly based on a
constitutional right for parents to educate their children within a particular religious,
philosophical, or pedagogical tradition (Glenn, 1989). A universal school voucher program has
operated in Chile since the 1980s (Mizala & Romaguera, 2000). Of the 54 private school choice
programs in 28 U.S. states plus the District of Columbia, nine are universal or nearly universal in
design, only limited in scope due to funding amounts (EdChoice, 2017). The universal programs
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in the U.S. are in the states of Arizona (2 programs), Georgia, Montana, and Nevada; the rural
areas of Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont; and the urban area of Cleveland, Ohio.
Targeted programs have eligibility requirements that limit private school choice to certain
disadvantaged populations of students, typically those with low family incomes or disabilities.
Private school choice programs targeted to low-income students operate in Colombia, regions of
India and Pakistan, and several developing countries in Africa. Many of these initiatives provide
the equivalent of around $200/year to fund schooling at very low-cost private schools operated
by education entrepreneurs (Dixon, 2013; Tooley, 2009). The U.S. is home to 45 targeted private
school choice programs, of which 23 are means-tested, 17 are limited to students with
disabilities, one is restricted to students attending failing public schools in Ohio, and four are
doubly-targeted to low-income students in low-performing schools (EdChoice, 2017). The
means-tested private school choice programs in the U.S. provide scholarships that range widely
in size from around $1,000 to $13,000, with the lower-cost scholarship programs typically
requiring families to contribute to the cost of private schooling. Vouchers for students with
disabilities are typically larger, cover the full cost of educating the child, and in some cases are
priced on a sliding scale based on the severity of the child’s disability.
Private school choice is increasingly common throughout the U.S.2 and the world. The
research base on the effectiveness of voucher programs has been reviewed by multiple scholars
over the past nine years, but those reviews do not render a clear judgment regarding whether
students are helped or harmed academically by access to private school choice. In the next

2

The newest form of private school choice in the U.S., education savings accounts (ESAs), permit parents to secure
educational services from multiple private providers (Butcher & Burke, 2016). Other programs, in the U.S. and
globally, use scholarships funded through private donations and philanthropy, with no extra government tax
incentive involved. This study does not cover ESAs, because no experimental evaluations of their effects on student
outcomes yet exist. Since privately-funded scholarships, tax-credit scholarships and school vouchers accomplish the
same general purpose of expanding access to private schooling, we generally treat all three types of programs as
equivalent within this study.
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section, we review the systematic reviews of voucher effectiveness to evaluate if they reveal a
clear, consistent and indisputable judgement on the achievement effect of vouchers.
3. A review of the systematic reviews of voucher effectiveness
From 2008 through 2017, 15 reviews of the achievement effects of private school choice
in the U.S. have been published as reports, working papers, or journal articles. This plethora of
school voucher research reviews underscores the salience of the topic. A meta-analysis is a
statistical method to combine evidence from several studies on a chosen topic to develop an
overall conclusion on the effectiveness of the evidence on the selected topic. Often, a metaanalysis combines the effect sizes on a selected outcome across several studies based on a similar
methodology to evaluate if the overall evidence on the topic is statistically significant. Without
methodological coherence, one cannot tell if the findings from different studies vary because the
intervention truly had heterogeneous effects or simply because some of the research designs
were biased in estimating the effect. The ideal meta-analysis is up-to-date, includes only studies
with similar methodologies, is comprehensive, and provides a specific and verifiable
determination of the average effect of an intervention on an important outcome (Hedges &
Olkin, 1985; Hunter & Schmidt, 1990; Rossi, Lipsey, & Freeman, 2004, pp. 324-328). Private
schools account for at least a fifth of the share of total primary school enrollment in developing
countries (Baum et al., 2014). The private school sector has witnessed continuous growth in the
last two decades in the developing world, despite near-universal access to free public primary
schools and increases in government spending on public education (Glewwe & Muralidharan,
2016). Thus, an ideal meta-analysis on the effectiveness of private school vouchers should
incorporate studies from around the globe. We add to the standard set of four desirable metaanalytic features a fifth one: that the review be global if programs operate in multiple countries.
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None of the 15 existing reviews, however, satisfies even three of the five criteria for an ideal
meta-analysis, and seven satisfy none of them (Table 1).
Although some of these reviews are nearly current (Egalite & Wolf, 2016; Forster, 2016;
Fryer, 2017; Lubienski & Brewer, 2016), none of them include the two most recent experimental
studies of school vouchers (Dynarski, Rui, Webber, Gutmann, & Bachman, 2017; Mills & Wolf,
2017). Only seven of the reviews are methodologically coherent, restricting their scope to
evaluations with experimental designs (Egalite & Wolf, 2016; Forster, 2011; 2013; 2016; Fryer,
2017; Morgan, Petrosino & Fronius, 2015; Wolf, 2008b). Only two reviews (Egalite & Wolf,
2016; Forster, 2016) include all studies available at the time of publication that fit the inclusion
category of the authors of these reviews, described in Section 4 and Appendix A. Only two
reviews (Anderson, Guzman & Ringquist, 2013; Fryer, 2017) are formal meta-analyses that
include overall effect point estimates and confidence levels, with the other 13 studies being only
literature reviews. The Anderson, Guzman, and Ringquist (2015) meta-analysis includes 17 U.S.
school voucher studies of widely varying methodological designs. The Fryer (2017) metaanalysis is limited to school choice experiments but mixes RCTs of public school choice in with
those of private school choice.
A final limitation of 13 of the existing reviews of voucher studies is their geographic
focus. Eleven of them limit their consideration to the U.S. while Morgan, Petrosino and Fronius
(2015) restrict their scope to developing countries and Fryer (2017) restricts its scope to
developed countries. Epple, Romano, & Urquiola (2015) and Coulson (2009) are the only
reviews to include both U.S. and non-U.S. studies.
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Table 1. Extent to Which Previous Voucher Reviews Satisfy the Conditions for an Ideal MetaAnalysis (an “X” indicates it satisfies the condition)
Review

Miron,
Evergreen &
Urschel (2008)
Lubienski &
Weitzel (2008)
Wolf (2008b)
Rouse &
Barrow (2009)
Coulson
(2009)
Usher &
Kober (2011)
Forster (2011)
Forster (2013)
Anderson,
Guzman &
Ringquist
(2013)
Epple,
Romano &
Urquiola
(2015)
Morgan,
Petrosino &
Fronius (2015)
Forster (2016)
Lubienski &
Brewer (2016)
Egalite &
Wolf (2016)
Fryer (2017)

Up-to- MethodoDate
logically
Coherent

Compre- Specifies
hensive Average
Effect

Global Conclusions

Null to positive,
encouraging

X

X

X
X

Consistently positive
Consistently positive
Null to positive,
discouraging

X

X

X

Null to positive,
encouraging

Consistently positive

X

X

X

X

X

Null to positive,
discouraging
Null to positive,
encouraging
Null to positive,
encouraging
Null to positive,
encouraging
No effect

X

Consistently positive
Null to positive,
discouraging
Null to positive,
encouraging
Null to positive,
encouraging

Previous selective reviews vary greatly in their conclusions regarding the effectiveness of
vouchers. Based on these reviews, school vouchers have no effect on student achievement
(Usher & Kober, 2011), consistently improve achievement (Forster, 2011; 2013; 2016; Morgan,

22

Petrosino & Fronius, 2015) or produce some mix of null to positive effects that are either
encouraging to the authors (Egalite & Wolf, 2016; Epple, Romano, & Urquiola, 2015; Coulson,
2009; Fryer, 2017; Rouse & Barrow, 2009; Miron, Evergreen, & Urschel, 2008; Wolf, 2008b) or
discouraging to them (Anderson, Guzman, & Ringquist, 2013; Lubienski & Brewer, 2016;
Lubienski & Weitzel, 2008). Most of the individual studies covered in the reviews are only
modestly powered to detect voucher effects, having analytic samples of less than 1,000 students
in the final evaluation year. The many findings of “no significant effects” could be due to either
limited power of studies to detect a significant effect, noisy data or the absence of a true school
voucher effect. None of the reviews includes recent studies from 2017 that have generated
extensive policy and media interest. Given the lack of any contemporary, complete, statistical
meta-analysis of the effect of private school vouchers on student achievement around the world,
this study offers a clear contribution to the literature on private school choice.
4. Method
4-A. Search strategy
For this meta-analysis, we identified publications from systematic computer and
networked searches primarily through the EBSCO, JSTOR, and ProQuest databases, with
Google Scholar used for additional checks. Lastly, we utilized subject matter experts in the field
and snowballing techniques to find additional relevant studies missed by the systematic search.
We identified 9,443 articles which ultimately produced 20 qualified RCTs meeting our key
inclusion criteria. Specifically, to be included, a study had to be an experimental evaluation
based on random assignment, include as an outcome individual student-level test scores in either
math, reading, or both, and be available in English (see Section 4-B and Appendix A for details).
Only studies of the participant effects of voucher programs were included; for example, we did
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not include studies of the competitive effects of vouchers on traditional public school students or
papers focusing on fiscal outcomes. Similarly, studies on participant effects of other private
school choice programs like Tax Credit Scholarship programs were excluded, as those programs
are not relevant to this review. Studies were not limited by publication date or publication status.
The initial search process began in mid-2015 and yielded 16 qualified RCTs, after which we
relied on network searches that identified four additional studies (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, &
Walters, 2015; Dynarski, Rui, Webber, Gutmann, & Bachman, 2017; Mills & Wolf, 2017; Wolf,
Egalite, & Dixon, 2015). The network searches involved contacting scholars who had produced
experimental voucher studies previously and asking them if we were missing any unpublished or
contemporary studies. We also monitored a daily Google alert list generated by the keywords
“school choice.”
We focused on identifying RCT (a.k.a. experimental) studies for several reasons. First,
RCTs are the “gold standard” of program evaluation in terms of assessing causal relationships
(e.g. Mosteller & Boruch, 2002; Pirog, Buffardi, Chrisinger, Singh, & Briney, 2009; Rossi,
Lipsey, & Freeman, 2004). The random assignment of subjects in RCTs creates a treatment
group (in this case, those receiving the offer of a voucher) and a control group (those who did not
receive the offer of a voucher) that are similar to each other in expectation regarding all
measurable and unmeasurable characteristics. This similarity is important when evaluating
private school choice programs, since families who self-select into private schools likely differ
from other families in unmeasurable ways that affect subsequent student achievement. In RCTs,
access to private schooling through a voucher is random, solving the selection bias problem in
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expectation. Thus, random assignment of a voucher generates strong internal validity, which is
the confidence that any observed differences actually are due to the program.
Other voucher studies have been conducted using quasi-experimental methods such as
Regression Discontinuity Design, propensity score matching, or use of control variables to try to
minimize selection bias. The results from these non-experimental studies range from positive in
some subject areas and years (Witte, Wolf, Cowen, Carlson, & Fleming, 2014) to consistently
null (Witte, 2000) to negative in some subject areas (Figlio & Karbownik, 2016). While welldesigned quasi-experimental school choice studies can approximate the results of experimental
evaluations under certain conditions (Bifulco, 2012; Fortson, Verbitsky-Savitz, Kopa, &
Gleason, 2012), at least sometimes they fail to reveal the true causal effects of attending private
school (Anderson & Wolf, 2017; Betts, Tang, & Zau, 2010; Cowen, 2008). Moreover, it is often
difficult to measure how much bias is present when relying on quasi-experimental approaches
instead of experimental ones (Pirog, Buffardi, Chrisinger, Singh, & Briney, 2009). On the other
hand, some quasi-experimental approaches tend to have greater external validity and
generalizability than experimental ones. However, since the quasi-experimental approaches do
not rely on distinctive randomly-assigned samples of students in a single location, our study
compensates at least partially for the limited external validity of individual voucher experiments
by systematically compiling the experimental results across varied student populations. The RCT
approach generates the internal validity or causality of our study while the meta-analytic
approach provides some external validity as the contexts vary across studies.
Compliance in RCTs refers to program participants who continue to remain in their
originally assigned treatment or control groups. Control crossover refers to program participants
who switch to the treatment group experience after being initially assigned to the control group.
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The evidence from RCTs is more reliable under conditions with strong compliance, as control
crossover or treatment non-compliance reintroduces selection bias if analysts merely compare
the outcomes from voucher users with those from the subgroup of control group students who
remained in public schools. Explicit TOT estimation methods eschew that simple but
problematic approach and are designed to recover unbiased estimates of the effect of actually
experiencing the intended school voucher treatment when some students randomly assigned to
the treatment group fail to use their voucher and some students randomly assigned to the control
group attend private school without a voucher. The three TOT strategies used in the studies that
inform this meta-analysis were calculation of the Complier Average Causal Effect (CACE)
(Cowen, 2008), Instrumental Variables (IV) analysis (Heckman, 1996), and the Bloom
adjustment (Bloom, 1984). All three of these approaches seek to construct comparisons of the
average outcomes for program participants compared to the outcomes those same students would
have experienced if not for participation in the program. The RCT studies recover unbiased
estimates by utilizing the underlying random assignment of access to the voucher. Original
voucher RCT studies that did not provide the information required for us to judge the
appropriateness of the use of the specific TOT method in that case (e.g. Greene, Peterson, & Du,
1999; Rouse, 1998) were excluded from the TOT calculations for the meta-analysis. Whenever
the original voucher RCT report did not include TOT estimates (probably due to their emphasis
on ITT impacts over TOT impacts of the voucher programs) but did include sufficient
information for us to calculate the TOT, we did so using a Bloom adjustment because it requires
fewer assumptions than CACE or IV approaches.3

3

For example, CACE estimates of the TOT are only unbiased if the characteristics of treatment decliners are
accurate predictors of which members of the control group similarly would have declined a voucher if they had won
the lottery (Cowen, 2008). Instrumental variables estimates of the TOT are only unbiased if the effects of winning or
losing a voucher lottery on student outcomes come solely through greater access to private schooling and not
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Our second reason to focus on RCTs is because Anderson, Guzman, & Ringquist (2013)
established that the conclusion one draws about the efficacy of vouchers is heavily influenced by
which studies are selected for review. Quasi-experimental voucher studies have produced smaller
voucher effect sizes and fewer statistically significant results, arguably because weaknesses in
the research design and comparison groups biased the impact estimates towards zero. If one has
to believe either the results from RCTs or the results from non-RCTs regarding the effects of a
given intervention, then one should believe the results from RCTs because they have much
stronger internal validity.
Third, we expected there would be a sufficient number of voucher effect estimates from
RCTs to produce a reliable estimate of voucher impacts. Since the geographical scope of our
search was global, and the temporal scope of our search was unrestricted, we assumed that we
would identify many voucher achievement studies, even restricting our sample to gold standard
experiments. Despite setting up a broad search, we only recovered 20 studies with 260 effect
estimates. RCTs of private school choice outside of the U.S. are still relatively rare.
4-B. Selection Process
Each of the 9,443 collected sources was reviewed by two separate team members based
on its title and abstract in order to determine whether it justified a full review. To be included in
the meta-analysis, studies had to include student-level test score achievement effects of a private
school voucher program in at least math or reading. Studies dealing with other impacts of
vouchers such as competitive effects or fiscal impacts were excluded. We did not include

through an emotional response to the lottery outcome (e.g. Rhinesmith, 2017). Bloom adjustments generate their
TOT simply by dividing the average difference in outcomes between all treatment and all control group members by
the proportion of treatment students who ever used their private school voucher. This approach relies upon the
simple assumption that any differences between the average outcomes of the treatment and control group students
must have been produced solely by treatment uses, since non-users could have not been affected by the treatment
(Bloom, 1984).
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graduation rate, college attainment, or civic values outcomes in the current study as the focus of
this study is only on achievement impacts in math and reading scores. Most of the articles
excluded were theoretical discussions or opinion pieces without quantitative evidence, were
focused on other issues such as competitive or fiscal rather than student achievement effects, or
were merely quasi-experimental.4 We only included studies published in English or with English
translations.
A total of 6,549 sources were excluded based on title and/or abstract reviews. In some
cases, the two coders initially disagreed over whether or not to include a particular study. When
that happened, the two coders came to a consensual conclusion. Unless there was a clear reason
to exclude a study, it was included in the full article review round, when more information would
be available to judge its merits. Our full-article review process resulted in 16 studies remaining
in the sample.
Our supplemental network search resulted in four additional articles added to the sample
– two of the recently implemented Louisiana voucher program (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, &
Walters, 2015; Mills & Wolf, 2017),5 one of a philanthropic voucher program in Delhi, India
(Wolf, Egalite, & Dixon, 2015), and one of a recent evaluation of the federal voucher program in
Washington, D.C. (Dynarski, Rui, Webber, Gutmann, & Bachman, 2017). The four studies
found in the network search did not show up in our computerized search as the four studies were
either not in wide circulation on internet search engines or were not publicly available during the
initial phase of our computerized search. In total, 20 RCT studies met the qualifications for

A surprising number of education evaluations are described as “experimental” via keywords or in their abstracts
but, upon a closer reading, actually do not create their comparison groups via random assignment and therefore are
merely quasi-experimental.
5
A third study of the LSP, Mills and Wolf (2016), is not reported separately, as Mills and Wolf (2017) includes the
same effect sizes after years one and two, as well as an additional impact estimate after three years.
4
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inclusion. Appendix A contains the details regarding the studies that were identified and
eliminated at each stage. In Table 2 we summarize the studies, presenting attrition rates in terms
of both sample attrition (the percent of study participants who are not observed in the final year)
and program attrition (the percent of students offered a voucher who were not using the voucher
in the final year). The program attrition rate is the additive inverse of the voucher take-up rate,
which is also reported for other years, when available. The level of randomization of each study
was at the child/family level.6 Table 2 also indicates how the TOT effects were estimated or
calculated, if applicable.

6

One study (Muralidharan, & Sundararaman, 2015) involved randomization at two stages (randomly assigned
students within randomly assigned villages); the two-stage randomization allows for higher external validity of the
findings to the larger sample. As the randomization in the studies occurred at the child/family level, the studies can
be combined for obtaining a meta-analytic estimate.
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Table 2: Description of 20 RCT Studies included in Meta-Analysis
Program
Evaluated

Publication

Years of
Treatment

Study
Duration

Grades

Sample
Size (First
Outcome
Year)

Program
Attrition
(Final
Year)

Sample
Attrition
(Final Year)

Control
Crossover
Rate

Voucher Takeup Rate

TOT method

Andhra
Pradesh (AP)
School Choice
Experiment

Muralidharan &
Sundararaman
(2015)

4

2008-2012
(4 years)

1 to 5

4,620

49%

20.7% English;
68.1% Hindi;
17.5% Telugu;
17.5% Math

Not provided

61% (initial) or
51% (final year)

Original research
team used Bloom
(1984) adjustment

Charlotte
Children’s
Scholarship
Fund

Greene (2000)

1

1999-2000
(1 year)

2 to 8

357

51.60%

60%

Not provided

48.40%

N/A

Cowen (2008)

1

1999-2000
(1 year)

2 to 8

347

25.50%

70%

Not provided

74.50%

Complier average
causal effect
(CACE), the mean
treatment outcome
across compliers

Children's
Scholarship
Fund (Toledo,
OH)

Bettinger &
Slonim (2006)

3

1998-2001
(4 years)

K to 8

186

43%

92%

21% (at time of
survey) but
39% of control
units attended
private school
at some point
post-lottery

57% (at time of
survey) but 65%
of winners
attended private
school at some
point post-lottery

Meta-analytic team
estimated TOT
using Bloom (1984)
adjustment

District of
Columbia
Opportunity
Scholarship
Program (OSP)

Wolf, Kisida,
Gutmann,
Puma, Eissa, &
Rizzo (2013)

4

2004-2009
(6 years)

K to 12

1,649

28.7%

37.8%
Treatment,
48.5% Control

23.10%

74.3% (first
year), 71.3%
(final year)

Original research
team used Bloom
(1984) adjustment

Dynarski, Rui,
Webber,
Gutmann, &
Bachman
(2017)

1

2012-2015
(3 cohorts,
1 outcome
yr. each)

K to 12

1,077

30%

24% Reading;
25% Math

10% (first year)

70% (initial)

Original research
team used Bloom
(1984) adjustment

Wolf, Egalite,
& Dixon (2015)

2

2011-2013
(2 years)

K to 2

1,306

11%

N/A

25% in total (or
30% of controls
with outcome
data)

89% (among
students with
second year
outcome data)

Instrumental
Variables analysis

Ensure Access
to Better
Learning
Experiences
(ENABLE)
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Table 2 Cont’d: Description of 20 RCT Studies included in Meta-Analysis

Grades

Sample
Size (First
Outcome
Year)

Program
Attrition
(Final
Year)

Sample
Attrition (Final
Year)

2012-2013
(1 year)

3 to 8

N/A

27%

N/A

5%

73%

Instrumental
Variables analysis

3

2012-2015
(3 years)

3 to 8

1,184

46%

10%

6% (Year 1),
15% (Year 2),
14% (Year 3)

80% (Year 1),
64% (Year 2),
54% (Year 3)

Instrumental
Variables analysis

Rouse (1998)

4

1990-1994
(5 years)

K to 8

1,343

64.7%

N/A

Not provided

86.5% (initial
fall), 35.3%
(final spring)

Insufficient
Information

Greene,
Peterson, & Du
(1999)

4

1990-1994
(5 years)

K to 8

816

N/A

60% Treatment,
52% Control

Not provided

Not provided

N/A (TOT in paper
was nonexperimental)

Parents
Advancing
Choice in
Education
(Dayton, OH)

Peterson,
Howell, Wolf,
& Campbell
(2003)

2

1998-2000
(2 years)

K to 12

404

N/A

51%

18% (first
year) or 10%
(first and
second years)

78% (first
year), 60%
(second year)

Instrumental
Variables analysis

Programa de
Ampliacion de
Cobertura de la
Educacion
Secundaria
(PACES)

Angrist,
Bettinger,
Bloom, King, &
Kremer (2002)

3

1995-1999
(4 years)

6 to 9

283

43%

75.30%

Majority of
controls went
to private
school at least
one year*

By survey year,
about 57% still
using
voucher**

Meta-analytic team
Bloom (1984)
adjusted

Angrist,
Bettinger, &
Kremer (2006)

7

1994-2001
(8 years)

6 to 11

3,541

50%
(after
three
years)

12.40%

Majority of
controls went
to private
school at least
one year*

50% after three
years

Meta-analytic team
Bloom (1984)
adjusted

Program
Evaluated

Publication

Years of
Treatment

Study
Duration

Louisiana
Scholarship
Program (LSP)

Abdulkadiroglu,
Pathak, &
Walters (2015)

1

Mills & Wolf
(2017)
Milwaukee
Parental
Choice
Program
(MPCP)

Control
Crossover
Rate

Voucher
Take-up Rate

TOT Method
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Table 2 Cont’d: Description of 20 RCT Studies included in Meta-Analysis

Program
Evaluated

School Choice
Scholarships
Foundation
Program
(NYC)

Washington
Scholarship
Fund (WSF)

Publication

Years of
Treatment

Study
Duration

Grades

Sample
Size
(First
Outcome
Year)

Program
Attrition
(Final
Year)

Sample Attrition
(Final Year)

Control
Crossover Rate

Voucher
Take-up
Rate

TOT Method

Barnard,
Frangakis, Hill,
& Rubin (2003)

1

1997-2000
(4 years)

1 to 4

525

20% to
27%
(overall,
not final
year)

22.30%

6% to 10%***

73% to
80%***

CACE

Peterson,
Howell, Wolf,
& Campbell
(2003)

3

1997-2000
(4 years)

1 to 4

1,434

30%

33%

5% (first) or 3%
(both first and
second years)

82% (first
year), 79%
(both years),
70% (final
year)

Instrumental
Variables analysis

Krueger & Zhu
(2004)

3

1997-2000
(4 years)

K to 4

2,080

41.3%
(from
Bitler et
al.)

36.20%

77% used
voucher at
least one year

Instrumental
Variables analysis

Jin, Barnard, &
Rubin (2010)

1

1997-2000
(4 years)

1 to 4

525

20%
(overall,
not final)

22.30%

11% of control
students
attended private
school at least
one year
10%

About 80%
overall

CACE

Bitler, Domina,
Penner, &
Hoynes (2015)

3

1997-2000
(4 years)

K to 4

2,080

41.3%

34.6% Reading;
35.0% Math

5% (first year),
6% (second),
8% (third)

74% (first
year), 65%
(second),
55% (third)

Meta-analytic team
Bloom (1984)
adjusted

Peterson,
Howell, Wolf,
& Campbell
(2003)

3

1998-2001
(3 years)

K to 8

930

71%

40%

11% (first year),
8% (both first
and second
years)

68% (first
year), 47%
(two years),
29% (final
year)

Instrumental
Variables analysis

Notes: The sample size and attrition rates are based on the estimates from ITT Reading with the exception of Bettinger & Slonim (2006) which had only math impacts. The actual
sample sizes for calculating the ITT and TOT Reading and Math impacts may differ slightly.
* Voucher eligibility was conditional on admission to a participating school)
** The 57% not using the voucher is based on 15% not in school, 16% in public school, and 12% that lost the voucher for other reasons.
***Control cross-over and take-up rates from Barnard et al. (2003) are reported for single-child families, depending on time of application and background strata.
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Table 2 also includes the control cross-over rate, generally defined as the percent of
voucher applicants randomly assigned to the control group that still attended a private school. In
the U.S. voucher programs in our meta-analysis, students who lost the voucher lotteries often
found other ways to access school choices. In the experimental evaluation in Dayton, Ohio, 18%
of the control group students enrolled in a private school even without the assistance of a
voucher (Howell & Peterson, 2006, p. 44). In the first evaluation of the D.C. OSP, 12% of the
students that lost the lottery subsequently enrolled in a private school and 35% attended an
independent public charter school, leaving just 53% of the control group students in traditional
public schools (Wolf et al., 2013, p. 257). In the more recent D.C. OSP study, after one year,
10% and 42% of control group students attended private schools or charter schools, respectively
(Dynarski, Rui, Webber, Gutmann, & Bachman, 2017). The New York City program achieved
the clearest treatment-control contrast in type of school attended, as only 4% of the students that
lost the lottery attended a private school and public charter schools were uncommon in NYC at
the time; thus, almost all of the control group attended traditional public schools (Howell &
Peterson, 2006, p. 44). In the experimental studies included in this meta-analysis, students
remained in the control group and their outcomes counted towards the control group average for
the ITT impact estimates even if they attended a private school. The rates at which control-group
students crossed over to private schooling factored into the TOT effect calculations. Appendix D
provides assumptions and calculations by study.
Our search recovered several studies unexamined by prior systematic reviews and metaanalyses. The global scope of our search added important data to our meta-analysis. Two studies
of a large voucher program in Bogota, Colombia (Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King, & Kremer,
2002, Angrist, Bettinger, & Kremer, 2006), and two studies of different programs in separate
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regions of India (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2015; Wolf, Egalite, & Dixon, 2015) were
included. Our combined computerized and networked search also identified an RCT of a small
privately-funded voucher program in Toledo (Bettinger & Slonim, 2006) that had been missed
by all previous systematic reviews. Finally, we included four recent experimental evaluations of
voucher programs (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & Walters, 2015; Bitler, Domina, Penner, &
Hoynes, 2015; Dynarski, Rui, Webber, Gutmann, & Bachman, 2017; Mills & Wolf, 2017). This
meta-analysis represents a new look at a more comprehensive body of rigorous research on
private school vouchers than ever before.
Many of the published reports of experimental evaluations of school voucher programs
were nested in ways that affected how much independent information they contributed to the
meta-analysis. In particular, at least six different research teams have published more than two
dozen reports or articles analyzing the experimental data from the New York City Children’s
Scholarship Fund evaluation, 1998-2002. Including all 24 of those reports would generate
substantial spatial auto-correlation due to repeated counting of the same finding. To ensure that
the meta-analysis accounts for this nesting, we treated as a single study any group of publications
of the same results, using the same methodology, by essentially the same research team. Any
variation on that, such as publication of different results, using the same methodology, by a
different research team (e.g. a failed replication), represented a different study even though it
drew upon the same data. That determination reduced the number of New York City studies to
five (Barnard, Frangakis, Hill, & Rubin, 2003; Bitler, Domina, Penner, & Hoynes, 2015; Jin,
Barnard, & Rubin, 2010; Krueger, & Zhu, 2004; Peterson, Howell, Wolf, & Campbell, 2003).
We then extracted data primarily from the final publication, unless an earlier publication
contained more complete information, and supplemented those data with descriptive information
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from other studies in the “nest” as needed. A study in our meta-analysis is the final and most
complete presentation of a specific set of findings from a specific research team using a
particular analytic method.
4-C. Programs included in the meta-analysis
The 20 RCTs identified by our search represent 11 separate school voucher programs
(Table 3). Five programs – in Andhra Pradesh and Delhi, India; Toledo and Dayton, Ohio; and
the D.C. Washington Scholarship Fund7 – were each subject to a single experimental evaluation.
Four programs – in Charlotte, NC; Louisiana; Milwaukee, WI; and Bogota, Colombia – were
each the focus of both an original experimental study and one replication study. The New York
City program was the subject of five different experimental analyses. The D.C. OSP was the
subject of two different evaluations involving different samples of students.
In Table 3 each program is categorized as either privately or publicly funded, with either
fully or partially funded vouchers. Fully funded vouchers must be accepted by participating
private schools as the full cost of educating the student while partially funded vouchers require
an additional payment from the student’s family. In general, the fully funded vouchers were
publicly funded, and the partially funded vouchers were privately funded. Funding for the
programs in India and Colombia, whether “full” or “partial,” was extremely low in nominal U.S.
Dollars, ranging from about $117 in India to $190 in Colombia (Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom,
King, & Kremer, 2002; Wolf, Egalite & Dixon, 2015). These low voucher amounts in India and
Colombia are also reflective of lower educational costs in these areas. Comparable average costs
of education in the public schools is $350 for Colombia (Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King, &

7

The Washington Scholarship Fund (WSF) was a privately-funded scholarship program that preceded the
government-funded Opportunity Scholarship (voucher) Program (OSP). The WSF was phased out in 2009, five
years after the OSP was launched.
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Kremer, 2002, pp. 1537-1538) and $1,963 for Delhi, India.8 For Andhra Pradesh, Muralidharan
and Sundararaman (2015, pp. 1031, 1058) report that the voucher amount was 40 percent of the
average public school expenditure per child. The fully funded programs in the U.S. provided
vouchers with maximum values that ranged from around $5,000 in Louisiana to over $13,000 for
high school students in D.C. (Dynarski, Rui, Webber, Gutmann, & Bachman, 2017; Mills &
Wolf, 2016). Fully funded programs provide all or nearly all of the state government funding that
normally would go to the child’s public school but do not include any of the federal or local
education formula funding for the child. Partially funded programs in the U.S. provided about
$2,000 in tuition support to families (Peterson, Howell, Wolf, & Campbell, 2003). Regardless of
jurisdiction and full or partial funding, the maximum voucher amount allotted for all the
programs in this meta-analysis generally represented less than half of the amount being spent
per-pupil on students in area public schools.
All programs were targeted to low-income students through either income limits or
program location, but usually both. The voucher initiatives in India and Colombia served
students living in abject poverty either in cities (Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King, & Kremer,
2002; Wolf, Egalite, & Dixon, 2015) or villages (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2015). The
U.S. programs were limited to students with family incomes near or below the cut-off for the
federal lunch program,9 almost entirely in cities. Almost all U.S. voucher participants were either
African American or Hispanic. As a result, this meta-analysis is a study of the achievement
effects of low-cost private school vouchers on low-income, primarily urban minority children.

8

Per-pupil expenditure in public schools for Delhi, India was obtained from an Economic Survey of Delhi, 20162017. Source: http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/category/15375/publisher/government-of-nct-of-delhi/. We
converted the per-pupil expenditure for public schools (rupees 29,641) to U.S. dollars for the year 2013 for
comparison with the voucher amount (rupees 7,300). The comparable inflation adjusted voucher amount is $483.
9
The federal lunch program provides low-cost or free lunches to children from low-income families in public and
nonprofit private schools for each school day.
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The private schools participating in some of these voucher programs (D.C. and
Louisiana) were found to charge modest tuition and have experience serving disadvantaged
student populations (Sude, DeAngelis & Wolf, 2017). Religious schools in general, and Catholic
schools in particular, were the main participants in voucher programs in the U.S. In the first
evaluation of the D.C. OSP, 80% of the participating students attended a religious school with
their voucher, and 53% of them specifically enrolled in a Catholic school (Wolf et al. 2013, p.
257). Across programs, the private schools serving students with vouchers tended to have modest
school facilities and few special programs for differentiating instruction to students (e.g. Dixon,
2013; Wolf et al., 2013). School-level quality measures based on test scores generally are not
available for private schools participating in voucher programs because private schools are
seldom required to report school-wide test scores publicly.
The counterfactual condition for control group students varied across the programs. In
India and Colombia, almost all the students who lost the voucher lotteries attended local
government-run schools. In India especially, public schools have many more resources than lowcost private schools but are plagued by teacher daily absenteeism rates of around 30% (Probe
Team, 1999). When public school teachers in developing countries fail to show up for work,
typically the children are on their own and are not supervised by substitute teachers. The
counterfactual condition for students participating in voucher programs in the U.S. are traditional
public schools that are free to attend and residentially assigned. Unlike their counterparts in
developing countries, the public schools in the U.S. do not face the problems of teacher
absenteeism or lack funds for school infrastructure and staff salaries.
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Table 3: Description of 11 Voucher Programs included in Meta-Analysis

Program Evaluated
Andhra Pradesh (AP) School
Choice Experiment
Charlotte Children’s
Scholarship Fund
Children's Scholarship Fund
District of Columbia
Opportunity Scholarship
Program (OSP)
Ensure Access to Better
Learning Experiences
(ENABLE)
Louisiana Scholarship
Program (LSP)
Milwaukee Parental Choice
Program (MPCP)
Parents
Advancing
Choice in
Education
Programa de Ampliacion de
Cobertura de la Educacion
Secundaria (PACES)

Funding
Source

Location
Andhra
Pradesh, India Private
Charlotte, NC
(USA)
Private
Toledo, OH
(USA)
Private
Washington,
DC (USA)

Public

Delhi, India
Private
Louisiana
(USA)
Public
Milwaukee, WI
(USA)
Public

Dayton, OH
(USA)

Bogota,
Colombia

Funding
Amount (Full
or Partial)

Grades

Studies Cited

Full

1 to 5

Muralidharan & Sundararaman (2015)

Partial

2 to 8

Greene (2000); Cowen (2008)

Partial

K to 8

Bettinger & Slonim (2006)

Full

K to 12

Wolf, Kisida, Gutmann, Puma, Eissa, & Rizzo (2013);
Dynarski, Rui, Webber, Gutmann, & Bachman (2017)

Full

K to 2

Full

3 to 8

Wolf, Egalite & Dixon (2015)
Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & Walters (2015); Mills &
Wolf (2016); Mills & Wolf (2017)

Full

K to 8

Rouse (1998); Greene, Peterson, & Du (1999)

Private
Partial
Public
(partly
funded by
World
Bank)
Partial

K to 12
Peterson, Howell, Wolf, & Campbell (2003)
6 to 9 (2002
paper) and 6
to 11 (2006 Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King, & Kremer (2002);
paper)
Angrist, Bettinger, & Kremer (2006)
Peterson, Howell, Wolf, & Campbell (2003); Barnard,
Frangakis, Hill, & Rubin (2003); Krueger & Zhu (2004);
Jin, Barnard, & Rubin (2010); Bitler, Domina, Penner, &
1 to 4
Hoynes (2015)

School Choice
Scholarships
New York,
Foundation Program
NY (USA)
Private
Partial
Washington
Scholarship
Washington,
Fund
DC (USA)
Private
Partial
K to 8
Peterson, Howell, Wolf, & Campbell (2003)
Note: Studies do not necessarilly contain all years of a program. See Table 2 for more details at the study level.

4-D. Data extraction
The 20 included studies were coded in Microsoft (MS) Excel for details on author,
publication year, location, funding type (public/private), years of evaluation, duration of study,
grades analyzed, outcome (math and reading in English or local language), size of treatment and
control group and overall sample size. Some studies had multiple evaluation years. Each
evaluation year, type of impact estimate (TOT or ITT), and subject was treated as a separate
observation in the database. A study that reported results in each of three years, in both reading
and math, that included both TOT and ITT estimates, contributed 12 observations to the database
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(3 x 2 x 2). The 12 observations that a given study might produce were only analyzed within a
specific meta-analytic estimate of effect, such as the TOT estimate of the voucher effect in math
in Year 2 after random assignment. When the authors provided results from multiple estimation
models or from robustness checks, we only extracted the estimates from the final or most
preferred model as signaled by the authors.
The extracted data filled 260 rows of an MS Excel spreadsheet, meaning 260 distinct
effect estimates informed our meta-analysis (67 reading TOT estimates, 59 math TOT estimates,
71 reading ITT estimates, and 63 math ITT estimates). The extraction process was performed by
two team members to minimize human error.10 When necessary, we made assumptions to derive
accurate sample sizes for the treatment and control groups. Appendix D provides assumptions
and calculations by study.
4-E. Data synthesis
Meta-analysis combines results from several studies which individually have relatively
small sample sizes and low precision. The fixed effects meta-analysis of the RCTs created an
overall effect size by combining the effect sizes extracted from each study in standard deviation
(SD) units. Effect sizes were analyzed separately for math and reading/English outcomes. All
reading impacts were measured in the native language of the students and also some additional
languages. The non-English languages specified in the reading results are presented in the figure
notes. Both TOT and ITT effects were calculated, when possible. We focus on reporting the TOT
impacts of voucher programs as the kinds of students who will actually use the vouchers to
attend private schools may provide the most policy relevant information regarding these

10

Inter-rater reliability is the extent to which researchers agree on the aspects of ratings and decisions. For the
current study, the two members fully agreed on the data extraction and assumptions.
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programs. The ITT effects are reported in the Appendix C. The overall effect size was a
weighted average of the individual effect sizes extracted from the studies. Each observation’s
weight was the inverse of the variance around the effect size, so more precise effects were
weighted more heavily in the meta-analysis (Borenstein, Hedges, & Rothstein, 2007).
The effect size and standard errors were extracted directly from the source if available. If
necessary, they were calculated by the team using available data and the formulas in Appendix
B. We calculated11 the effect size and pooled standard deviation using Hedges’ g (Hedges &
Olkin, 1985). Lastly, the grand effect size and lower and upper bound of the overall 95%
confidence interval were determined. Bettinger & Slonim (2006) had only math test outcomes
while the other 20 studies included both math and reading/English.
The entire analysis was performed in two meta-analytic steps using a fixed effects metaanalysis. In the first step, we estimated an overall TOT and ITT effect for each year of the
outcomes available for reading/English and math for each program by combining estimates
reported across different studies for the same program in the same year. The program/year
estimates vary slightly across the programs studied by multiple research teams due to
methodological differences such as which baseline control variables are included in the
estimation model, how missing data challenges are addressed, and even how students are
classified by race. In the cases of the New York City studies, what might seem to be minor
methodological variations produced substantively different interpretations of the results of
hypothesis tests (Krueger & Zhu, 2004; Peterson & Howell, 2004), thereby underscoring the

The calculated Hedges’ g effect sizes and associated standard errors may differ from the effect sizes and standard
errors reported in the studies. For comparability across studies, we estimate Hedges’ g, relying on all available
evidence and the formulas in Appendix B, instead of merely relying on the reported statistics in the papers.
11
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importance of our meta-analytic approach to move beyond the peculiarities of individual voucher
studies.
This mini “meta-analysis” of findings by site-year reduced the total number of effect size
estimates to 96: 23 reading and English TOT estimates, 24 math TOT estimates, 24 reading and
English ITT estimates, and 25 math ITT estimates. These 96 estimates represent the independent
observations that inform our meta-analysis, as the actual set of student data used for each of the
96 estimates was unique in terms of the set of students involved, the year of evaluation, or the
outcomes estimated (reading or math, ITT or TOT). We report all 96 effect sizes and their
standard errors in Appendix E.
In the second step, we estimated overall voucher effects for 11 programs using a fixed
effects meta-analysis. Use of random effects would not result in precise estimates12 as the
between-studies variance cannot be estimated with precision with our limited number of studies
(in this case 11 programs) (Borenstein, Hedges, & Rothstein, 2007). The voucher effects in
reading/English and math were estimated overall and separately based on geography (U.S. vs.
non-U.S.), funding type (publicly vs. privately funded programs) and years of treatment (one,
two, three, and four or more). The analysis for years of treatment used all 96 effect size estimates
(which themselves represent a consolidation of the 260 extracted estimates) and all other
analyses used the 46 effect size estimates for the last year covered by each study (12 estimates
for reading/English TOT and 11 estimates for math TOT). We highlight the effects from the last
study year because they represent the cumulative effects of the school voucher intervention
across all years of the evaluations. We also report the overall variation in impacts across studies
as well as the impacts across the subgroups analyzed. In addition to describing the statistical

12

A caveat with the use of fixed effects meta-analysis is that it assumes that the estimates for all voucher programs
are drawn from the same population. Such an assumption is likely unrealistic.
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significance of the findings from each individual study, we present the p-value of the 𝐼 2 statistic,
which measures whether there is sufficient study heterogeneity to eliminate sampling error as a
likely cause of the observed results. All analyses have been carried out using a pre-coded
worksheet in MS-Excel that implements the meta-analysis effect formula in Appendix B. The
forest plots were generated using STATA.
5. Results
First, we present the global results for reading and math with English results as a
subcomponent of the reading effects where English was taught in schools and tested. For each
effect, we compare U.S. and non-U.S. programs. Next, we split the findings into effects from
publicly funded versus privately funded programs. For those comparisons, the results are
restricted to the final year of the evaluations. Finally, we present the results by years of
treatment, which relaxes that condition.
To present our results we use forest plots which show the effect size and confidence
interval for each study, for the U.S. and non-U.S. components, and overall. Individual studies are
represented by box and whisker plots where the size of the gray square represents the relative
weighting for the study and the whiskers represent the 95% confidence interval around a point
estimate. The diamonds represent composite effects across all observations. Any confidence
interval that includes zero indicates that an effect is not statistically significant. In the discussion
that follows, we only present the forest plots for the TOT analysis. The forest plots for the ITT
analysis are available in Appendix C. In general, the TOT results mirror the ITT results except
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that the TOT effects, whether positive or negative, tend to be larger in magnitude because they
adjust for noncompliance with random assignment.13
5-A. Overall impacts
Figures 1 and 2 present forest plots for the effects for reading and English globally. In
addition, composites of the U.S. and non-U.S. effects are provided. The overall effects of the
voucher programs are gains of 0.28 SD in reading and 0.08 SD in English, when English was not
the language of the reading test and was assessed separately. The effect in reading is dominated
by a large positive effect in the PACES program in Bogota, Colombia (1.4 SD). Comparing the
seven U.S. and three non-U.S. programs with reading impacts, we see that the U.S. programs had
an overall effect in reading (all of which was in English) of 0.03 SD that is small in size and
barely missed statistical significance [95% CI: -0.00, 0.07]. The programs outside of the U.S. had
a more definitive positive impact on reading scores of 0.51 SD (0.25 SD excluding Bogota,
Colombia) and on English scores of 0.23 SD.

Milwaukee, WI does not contribute to TOT effects as Greene’s (1999) TOT in paper was non-experimental and
Rouse’s (1998) paper does not provide sufficient details to compute TOT effects. Louisiana was a placement lottery
and it only contributes to TOT estimates.
13
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TOT Reading — Global
Years of
Location

%

Treatment

ES (95% CI)

Weight

Charlotte, NC

1

0.22 (0.07, 0.37)

2.94

NYC

3

0.01 (-0.04, 0.06)

27.49

Dayton, OH

2

0.17 (-0.05, 0.39)

1.35

Washington, DC - WSF

3

-0.06 (-0.22, 0.09) 2.83

Washington, DC - OSP I

4

0.13 (0.02, 0.24)

USA

5.19

Washington, DC - OSP II 1

-0.12 (-0.24, 0.00) 4.43

Louisiana

0.08 (-0.04, 0.20)

4.90

0.03 (-0.00, 0.07)

49.13

3

Subtotal (I-squared = 68.6%, p = 0.004)

International
Bogota, Colombia

7

1.40 (1.33, 1.47)

11.84

Andhra Pradesh, India

4

0.27 (0.22, 0.32)

30.18

Delhi, India

2

0.16 (0.07, 0.25)

8.85

0.51 (0.48, 0.55)

50.87

0.28 (0.25, 0.30)

100.00

Subtotal (I-squared = 99.7%, p = 0.000)

Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.000
Overall (I-squared = 99.2%, p = 0.000)

-1.4

0

1.4

Figure 1: Overall Global impacts – TOT Reading.
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on the final year effect size calculated for each study.
The diamonds show overall estimates for USA, International (outside USA) and Global (red
dotted line). The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study (inverse of
variance). No reading estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test outcomes.
Reading estimate for Delhi, India includes an overall estimate for English and Hindi. Reading
estimate for Andhra Pradesh, India includes an overall estimate for English, Hindi, and Telugu.
Reading estimate for Bogota, Colombia is for Spanish. Overall effect size for US studies
excluding Louisiana is 0.03 (-0.01, 0.07). Overall effect size for non-U.S. studies excluding
Bogota, Colombia is 0.25 (0.20, 0.29) and overall global average excluding Louisiana and
Bogota, Colombia is 0.13 (0.10, 0.16).
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TOT English — Global
Years of
Location

%

Treatment

ES (95% CI)

Weight

Charlotte, NC

1

0.22 (0.07, 0.37)

4.47

NYC

3

0.01 (-0.04, 0.06) 41.88

Dayton, OH

2

0.17 (-0.05, 0.39) 2.06

Washington, DC - WSF 3

-0.06 (-0.22, 0.09) 4.32

Washington, DC - OSP I 4

0.13 (0.02, 0.24)

Washington, DC - OSP II 1

-0.12 (-0.24, 0.00) 6.75

Louisiana

0.08 (-0.04, 0.20) 7.46

USA

3

Subtotal (I-squared = 68.6%, p = 0.004)

7.90

0.03 (-0.00, 0.07) 74.85

International
Andhra Pradesh, India

4

0.23 (0.16, 0.30)

18.47

Delhi, India

2

0.25 (0.13, 0.37)

6.68

0.23 (0.17, 0.30)

25.15

0.08 (0.05, 0.11)

100.00

Subtotal (I-squared = 0.0%, p = 0.774)

Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.000
Overall (I-squared = 83.6%, p = 0.000)

-1.4

0

1.4

Figure 2: Overall Global impacts – TOT English.
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on the final year effect size calculated for each study.
The diamonds show overall estimates for USA, International (outside USA) and Global (red
dotted line). The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study (inverse of
variance). No reading estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test outcomes.
Bogota, Colombia did not have an English estimate as the tests were administered in Spanish.
Overall effect size for U.S. studies excluding Louisiana is 0.03 (-0.01, 0.07) and overall global
average excluding Louisiana is 0.08 (0.05, 0.12).
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The global effects in math are in Figure 3. Using a voucher improves math scores by 0.15
SD, on average [95% CI: 0.12, 0.18]. The U.S. programs, overall, have an insignificant effect of
0.01 [95% CI: -0.03, 0.05]. The non-U.S. programs have a positive effect of about 0.35 SD [95%
CI: 0.30, 0.39]. The large effects for the non-U.S. programs are driven by the Bogota, Colombia
study. Excluding Bogota, the non-U.S. studies had an overall insignificant effect on math test
scores.
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TOT Math — Global
Years of
Location

%

Treatment

ES (95% CI)

Weight

Charlotte, NC

1

0.16 (0.01, 0.31)

4.03

NYC

3

0.04 (-0.02, 0.10)

27.23

Dayton, OH

2

0.12 (-0.10, 0.34)

1.86

Washington, DC - WSF

3

0.04 (-0.12, 0.19)

3.88

Washington, DC - OSP I 4

0.03 (-0.08, 0.14)

7.12

Washington, DC - OSP II 1

-0.17 (-0.29, -0.05) 6.04

Toledo, OH

3

0.01 (-0.28, 0.30)

Louisiana

3

-0.14 (-0.26, -0.02) 6.68

USA

Subtotal (I-squared = 66.5%, p = 0.004)

1.06

0.01 (-0.03, 0.05)

57.90

18.62

International
Bogota, Colombia

7

0.80 (0.73, 0.87)

Andhra Pradesh, India

4

-0.06 (-0.13, 0.01) 17.31

Delhi, India

2

0.12 (-0.00, 0.24)

6.18

0.35 (0.30, 0.39)

42.10

0.15 (0.12, 0.18)

100.00

Subtotal (I-squared = 99.3%, p = 0.000)

Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.000
Overall (I-squared = 97.7%, p = 0.000)

-1.4

0

1.4

Figure 3: Overall Global impacts – TOT Math.
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on the final year effect size calculated for each study.
The diamonds show overall estimates for USA, International (outside USA) and Global (red
dotted line). The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study (inverse of
variance). Overall effect size for US studies excluding Louisiana is 0.03 (-0.02, 0.07). Overall
effect size for non-U.S. studies excluding Bogota, Colombia is -0.01 (-0.08, 0.05) and overall
global average excluding Louisiana and Bogota, Colombia is 0.01 (-0.02, 0.05).
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So far we have presented the results globally, as well as specifically inside and outside of
the U.S. School vouchers have positive effects in reading, but these impacts are largest outside of
the U.S., while the U.S. programs, as a subgroup, had insignificant impacts on reading. Overall,
there is a positive impact on math test scores, but this result is entirely driven by one program in
Bogota, Colombia. Next, we separate the effects by funding type (private or public).
5-B. Overall impacts by funding type
Figure 4 presents the results in reading, by funding type. For the purposes of this
distinction, we define publicly funded programs as those with any amount of public funding, and
privately funded programs as those that are exclusively privately funded through development or
philanthropic funds. Both the publicly and privately funded voucher programs have positive
effects on reading, overall. The average impact of using a voucher in privately funded programs
is a gain in reading of 0.14 SD. The impact of voucher use in publicly funded programs is much
larger, averaging reading gains of 0.65 SD. This large effect of publicly funded programs is
primarily driven by the PACES program in Bogota, Colombia (1.4 SD).14 In fact, excluding this
Colombia based program indicates that publicly funded programs had a smaller (null) effect than
privately funded programs. Due to the sensitivity of this result to the inclusion of PACES, we do
not place much emphasis on this result.

14

ITT results are provided in the Appendix C.
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TOT Reading — Funding Type
Years of
Location

%

Treatment

ES (95% CI)

Weight

NYC

3

0.01 (-0.04, 0.06)

27.49

Delhi, India

2

0.16 (0.07, 0.25)

8.85

Dayton, OH

2

0.17 (-0.05, 0.39)

1.35

Washington, DC - WSF

3

-0.06 (-0.22, 0.09) 2.83

Charlotte, NC

1

0.22 (0.07, 0.37)

2.94

Andhra Pradesh, India

4

0.27 (0.22, 0.32)

30.18

0.14 (0.11, 0.17)

73.64

Private

Subtotal (I-squared = 92.2%, p = 0.000)

Public
Washington, DC - OSP II 1

-0.12 (-0.24, 0.00) 4.43

Louisiana

3

0.08 (-0.04, 0.20)

4.90

Bogota, Colombia

7

1.40 (1.33, 1.47)

11.84

Washington, DC - OSP I

4

0.13 (0.02, 0.24)

5.19

0.65 (0.60, 0.70)

26.36

0.28 (0.25, 0.30)

100.00

Subtotal (I-squared = 99.6%, p = 0.000)

Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.000
Overall (I-squared = 99.2%, p = 0.000)

-1.4

0

1.4

Figure 4: Overall impacts by Funding Type – TOT Reading.
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on the final year effect size calculated for each study.
The diamonds show overall estimates for privately and publicly (having received any public
funds) funded programs. The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study
(inverse of variance). No reading estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test
outcomes. Reading estimate for Delhi, India includes an overall estimate for English and Hindi.
Reading estimate for Andhra Pradesh, India includes an overall estimate for English, Hindi, and
Telugu. Reading estimate for Bogota, Colombia is for Spanish. Overall effect size for publicly
funded programs excluding Louisiana and Bogota, Colombia is 0.01 (-0.07, 0.10).
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Figure 5 presents the results in math, by funding type. The impact in math for privately
funded programs, on average, is null, but the impact for publicly funded programs is an increase
of 0.34 SD [95% CI: 0.29, 0.18], or null when excluding PACES in Bogota, Colombia.
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TOT Math — Funding Type
Years of
Location

%

Treatment

ES (95% CI)

Weight

Washington, DC - WSF

3

0.04 (-0.12, 0.19)

3.88

Toledo, OH

3

0.01 (-0.28, 0.30)

1.06

Andhra Pradesh, India

4

-0.06 (-0.13, 0.01) 17.31

Dayton, OH

2

0.12 (-0.10, 0.34)

1.86

NYC

3

0.04 (-0.02, 0.10)

27.23

Delhi, India

2

0.12 (-0.00, 0.24)

6.18

Charlotte, NC

1

0.16 (0.01, 0.31)

4.03

0.03 (-0.01, 0.07)

61.54

Private

Subtotal (I-squared = 49.5%, p = 0.064)

Public
Louisiana

3

-0.14 (-0.26, -0.02) 6.68

Bogota, Colombia

7

0.80 (0.73, 0.87)

18.62

Washington, DC - OSP I 4

0.03 (-0.08, 0.14)

7.12

Washington, DC - OSP II 1

-0.17 (-0.29, -0.05) 6.04

Subtotal (I-squared = 99.1%, p = 0.000)

0.34 (0.29, 0.39)

38.46

0.15 (0.12, 0.18)

100.00

Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.000
Overall (I-squared = 97.7%, p = 0.000)

-1.4

0

1.4

Figure 5: Overall impacts by Funding Type – TOT Math.
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on the final year effect size calculated for each study.
The diamonds show overall estimates for privately and publicly (having received any public
funds) funded programs. The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study
(inverse of variance). Overall effect size for publicly funded programs excluding Louisiana and
Bogota, Colombia is -0.06 (-0.14, 0.02).
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5-C. Overall impacts by years of treatment
The last set of effects we present are the impacts on reading and math by years of
treatment. If there is a cumulative positive effect of voucher treatment over time, we would
expect impacts to increase15 with the number of years of voucher use. The results are presented
for eight programs with effects after one year, seven programs with effects after two years, six
programs with effects after three years in math (five in reading), and three programs with effects
of four or more years of treatment. All the estimates for years of treatment presented in this study
are cumulative effects and do not represent annual estimates of the program effects.
Figure 6 shows the reading impacts by years of treatment. As expected, treatment effects
increase with time of exposure. There is a null effect associated with one year of treatment, small
positive effects for two and three years (0.07 SD and 0.06 SD, respectively), and a large positive
effect (0.54 SD, [95% CI: 0.50, 0.58]) for four or more years.

15

If compliance is changing over time, with the lowest performers dropping out, ITT analysis may be preferred over
TOT analysis.
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TOT Reading — Years of Treatment
Location

ES (95% CI)

%
Weight

1
Charlotte, NC
NYC
Dayton, OH
Washington, DC - WSF
Washington, DC - OSP I
Washington, DC - OSP II
Louisiana
Delhi, India
Subtotal (I-squared = 77.6%, p = 0.000)

0.22 (0.07, 0.37)
0.01 (-0.04, 0.06)
0.01 (-0.21, 0.22)
-0.16 (-0.29, -0.03)
0.04 (-0.06, 0.14)
-0.12 (-0.24, 0.00)
-0.15 (-0.23, -0.07)
0.01 (-0.07, 0.09)
-0.02 (-0.05, 0.01)

1.22
12.98
0.58
1.62
2.76
1.84
4.64
4.55
30.18

2
NYC
Dayton, OH
Washington, DC - WSF
Washington, DC - OSP I
Louisiana
Andhra Pradesh, India
Delhi, India
Subtotal (I-squared = 82.2%, p = 0.000)

0.03 (-0.03, 0.09)
0.17 (-0.05, 0.39)
0.17 (0.02, 0.32)
0.11 (0.01, 0.21)
-0.18 (-0.28, -0.08)
0.10 (0.05, 0.15)
0.16 (0.07, 0.25)
0.07 (0.04, 0.10)

7.72
0.56
1.22
2.63
2.57
10.88
3.67
29.26

3
NYC
Washington, DC - WSF
Washington, DC - OSP I
Louisiana
Bogota, Colombia
Subtotal (I-squared = 73.8%, p = 0.004)

0.01 (-0.04, 0.06)
-0.06 (-0.22, 0.09)
0.15 (0.04, 0.25)
0.08 (-0.04, 0.20)
0.17 (0.08, 0.25)
0.06 (0.02, 0.10)

11.39
1.17
2.46
2.03
3.94
21.00

4 or more
Washington, DC - OSP I
Bogota, Colombia
Andhra Pradesh, India
Subtotal (I-squared = 99.7%, p = 0.000)

0.13 (0.02, 0.24)
1.40 (1.33, 1.47)
0.27 (0.22, 0.32)
0.54 (0.50, 0.58)

2.15
4.91
12.51
19.56

Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.000
Overall (I-squared = 98.4%, p = 0.000)

0.13 (0.12, 0.15)

100.00

-1.4

0

1.4

Figure 6: Overall impacts by Years of Treatment – TOT Reading.
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are effect sizes for one, two, three, and four or more years. The
diamonds show overall yearly (dosage) estimates. The gray area around each point (effect size)
is the study weight (inverse of variance). Toledo, OH only had math outcomes. Reading estimate
for Delhi, India includes an overall estimate for English and Hindi. Reading estimate for Andhra
Pradesh, India includes an overall estimate for English, Hindi, and Telugu. Reading estimate for
Bogota, Colombia is for Spanish. Overall effect size with Louisiana removed is 0.00 (-0.03,
0.04) for one year and 0.09 (0.06, 0.13) for two years. Overall effect size with Louisiana and
Bogota, Colombia removed is 0.03 (-0.01, 0.07) for three years and with Bogota, Columbia
removed is 0.25 (0.21, 0.29) for four or more years. The overall estimate treats each effect size as
independent and we do not focus on it due to spatial auto-correlation among different years of
treatment within the same program.
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The math results in Figure 7 show null effects after the first year and after three years, a
negative effect after two years, and positive effects after four or more years. The average
negative effect of two years of treatment is small (-0.05 SD), and primarily driven by the
Louisiana Scholarship Program (-0.34 SD) and the program in Andhra Pradesh, India (-0.10 SD).
The positive math effect of four or more years of treatment is large (0.33 SD) and precisely
estimated [95% CI: 0.28, 0.37]). This longer-term outcome is primarily driven by the PACES
program in Bogota, Colombia (0.80 SD).16

16

The large jump in treatment effects in Bogota, Columbia between three years of treatment and seven years of
treatment may be partly related to a change in examination and data-collection methods. The outcomes after three
years are based on La Prueba de Realizaciόn, a grade-specific multiple-choice achievement test, and the outcomes
after seven years are based on the ICFES, Colombia’s centralized college entrance examinations.
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TOT Math — Years of Treatment
Location

ES (95% CI)

%
Weight

1
Charlotte, NC
NYC
Dayton, OH
Washington, DC - WSF
Washington, DC - OSP I
Washington, DC - OSP II
Louisiana
Delhi, India
Subtotal (I-squared = 96.8%, p = 0.000)

0.16 (0.01, 0.31)
0.07 (0.02, 0.11)
0.01 (-0.21, 0.23)
0.14 (0.01, 0.27)
0.11 (0.01, 0.20)
-0.17 (-0.29, -0.05)
-0.54 (-0.62, -0.46)
0.13 (0.02, 0.24)
-0.03 (-0.06, 0.00)

1.54
16.36
0.74
2.05
3.61
2.31
5.68
2.87
35.15

2
NYC
Dayton, OH
Washington, DC - WSF
Washington, DC - OSP I
Louisiana
Andhra Pradesh, India
Delhi, India
Subtotal (I-squared = 89.4%, p = 0.000)

-0.04 (-0.10, 0.02)
0.12 (-0.10, 0.34)
0.23 (0.08, 0.37)
0.01 (-0.09, 0.11)
-0.34 (-0.44, -0.23)
-0.10 (-0.17, -0.03)
0.12 (-0.00, 0.24)
-0.05 (-0.09, -0.02)

9.74
0.71
1.54
3.34
3.21
6.97
2.36
27.87

3
NYC
Washington, DC - WSF
Washington, DC - OSP I
Toledo, OH
Louisiana
Bogota, Colombia
Subtotal (I-squared = 54.6%, p = 0.051)

0.04 (-0.02, 0.10)
0.04 (-0.12, 0.19)
0.03 (-0.07, 0.13)
0.01 (-0.28, 0.30)
-0.14 (-0.26, -0.02)
0.12 (0.01, 0.24)
0.03 (-0.01, 0.07)

10.40
1.48
3.13
0.40
2.55
2.55
20.53

4 or more
Washington, DC - OSP I
Bogota, Colombia
Andhra Pradesh, India
Subtotal (I-squared = 99.4%, p = 0.000)

0.03 (-0.08, 0.14)
0.80 (0.73, 0.87)
-0.06 (-0.13, 0.01)
0.33 (0.28, 0.37)

2.72
7.11
6.61
16.45

Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.000
Overall (I-squared = 97.1%, p = 0.000)

0.03 (0.02, 0.05)

100.00

-1.4

0

1.4

Figure 7: Overall impacts by Years of Treatment – TOT Math.
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on one year, two year, three year, and four or more year
effect sizes for each study. The diamonds show overall estimates for yearly (dosage) effect of
programs. The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study (inverse of
variance). Overall effect size with Louisiana removed is 0.07 (0.03, 0.10) for one year and -0.01
(-0.05, 0.02) for two years. Overall effect size for programs with Louisiana and Bogota,
Colombia removed is 0.04 (-0.01, 0.09) for three years and with Bogota, Columbia removed is 0.03 (-0.10, 0.03) for four or more years. The overall estimate treats each effect size as
independent and we do not focus on it due to spatial auto-correlation among different years of
treatment within the same program.
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Overall TOT Impacts by Year — US
Math
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Years of Treatment

Figure 8: Overall TOT impacts by Year – US.
Note: Hedges’ g estimates are based on one year effect, two year effect, three year effect and
four or more year effect size calculated for each study. The effect size and confidence interval
for each year are plotted vertically.
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Overall TOT Impacts by Year — Global
Math
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Years of Treatment

Figure 9: Overall TOT impacts by Year – Global.
Note: Hedges’ g estimates are based on one year effect, two year effect, three year effect and
four or more year effect size calculated for each study. The effect size and confidence interval
for each year are plotted vertically.
These results indicate generally neutral to positive effects of school vouchers that vary by
subject (math or reading), location (U.S. vs. non-U.S.), and dosage. The impacts of private
school vouchers tend to be larger for reading than for math. Impacts generally are larger for
programs outside the U.S. relative to those within the U.S. Impacts tend to grow from small to
moderately large after four or more years. Unfortunately, a meta-regression to analyze the ceteris
paribus relationships of each of these variables to voucher impacts from only 20 studies (11
programs) would be underpowered.
5-D. Robustness of the results
Sample attrition poses a challenge to our confidence in the true impacts of the 11
programs. Hence, we categorized the program impacts as either “low” or “high” risk of attrition
bias in accordance with Cochrane’s risk of bias tool (Cochrane Handbook, Chapter 8:
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http://handbook-5-1.cochrane.org/). We classified individual studies as “low” risk for bias if they
either met the What Works Clearinghouse (WWC) standards for acceptable and non-differential
sample attrition levels or passed an appropriate robustness test for sample attrition bias. The
checks for robustness to attrition used by the authors of the original studies included testing for
baseline equivalence between treatment and control group students after program attrition had
occurred and analyzing the sensitivity of the impact estimates to artificial truncations in the
respondent samples for the treatment and control groups. In some cases, the authors conducted
various bounding analyses such as inverse probability weighting or Lee bounds to check for the
robustness of the results to differential attrition. For multiple studies that analyzed the same
sample (such as the studies for NYC; Milwaukee, WI; and Charlotte, NC), if one of the studies
was labelled as “low” risk, the other studies were read to check if they contradicted this
classification. If no discrepancy was found, the overall impacts for a particular program were
labelled “low” risk for attrition bias. With this categorization, only the program impacts for
Delhi, India were labelled “high” risk for attrition bias, as the authors did not carry out any
robustness checks for sensitivity of the results to sample attrition. Excluding the results for Delhi,
India yields overall TOT global reading impacts of 0.29 (0.26, 0.32) and overall TOT math
impacts of 0.15 (0.12, 0.18) which are essentially identical to the estimates that include the Delhi
study. Thus, the meta-analytic estimates are robust to possible attrition bias.
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TOT Reading — Global (Colombia and Louisiana excluded)
Years of
Location

%

Treatment

ES (95% CI)

Weight

Charlotte, NC

1

0.22 (0.07, 0.37)

3.53

NYC

3

0.01 (-0.04, 0.06)

33.01

Dayton, OH

2

0.17 (-0.05, 0.39)

1.63

Washington, DC - WSF

3

-0.06 (-0.22, 0.09)

3.40

Washington, DC - OSP I

4

0.13 (0.02, 0.24)

6.23

Washington, DC - OSP II

1

-0.12 (-0.24, 0.00)

5.32

0.03 (-0.01, 0.07)

53.12

USA

Subtotal (I-squared = 72.8%, p = 0.002)

International
Andhra Pradesh, India

4

0.27 (0.22, 0.32)

36.25

Delhi, India

2

0.16 (0.07, 0.25)

10.63

0.25 (0.20, 0.29)

46.88

0.13 (0.10, 0.16)

100.00

Subtotal (I-squared = 80.1%, p = 0.025)

Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.000
Overall (I-squared = 91.4%, p = 0.000)

-1.4

0

1.4

Figure 10: Overall Global impacts – TOT Reading (Colombia and Louisiana excluded).
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on the final year effect size calculated for each study.
The diamonds show overall estimates for USA, International (outside USA) and Global (red
dotted line). The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study (inverse of
variance). No reading estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test outcomes.
Reading estimate for Delhi, India includes an overall estimate for English and Hindi. Reading
estimate for Andhra Pradesh, India includes an overall estimate for English, Hindi, and Telugu.
Estimates for Colombia and Louisiana are excluded.
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TOT Reading — Global (Colombia excluded)
Years of
Location

%

Treatment

ES (95% CI)

Weight

Charlotte, NC

1

0.22 (0.07, 0.37)

3.33

NYC

3

0.01 (-0.04, 0.06)

31.18

Dayton, OH

2

0.17 (-0.05, 0.39)

1.54

Washington, DC - WSF

3

-0.06 (-0.22, 0.09)

3.21

Washington, DC - OSP I

4

0.13 (0.02, 0.24)

5.88

Washington, DC - OSP II

1

-0.12 (-0.24, 0.00)

5.03

Louisiana

3

0.08 (-0.04, 0.20)

5.56

0.03 (-0.00, 0.07)

55.72

USA

Subtotal (I-squared = 68.6%, p = 0.004)

International
Andhra Pradesh, India

4

0.27 (0.22, 0.32)

34.24

Delhi, India

2

0.16 (0.07, 0.25)

10.04

0.25 (0.20, 0.29)

44.28

0.13 (0.10, 0.15)

100.00

Subtotal (I-squared = 80.1%, p = 0.025)

Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.000
Overall (I-squared = 90.3%, p = 0.000)

-1.4

0

1.4

Figure 11: Overall Global impacts – TOT Reading (Colombia excluded).
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on the final year effect size calculated for each study.
The diamonds show overall estimates for USA, International (outside USA) and Global (red
dotted line). The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study (inverse of
variance). No reading estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test outcomes.
Reading estimate for Delhi, India includes an overall estimate for English and Hindi. Reading
estimate for Andhra Pradesh, India includes an overall estimate for English, Hindi, and Telugu.
Estimate for Colombia is excluded.
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TOT Math — Global (Colombia and Louisiana excluded)
Years of
Location

%

Treatment

ES (95% CI)

Weight

Charlotte, NC

1

0.16 (0.01, 0.31)

5.39

NYC

3

0.04 (-0.02, 0.10)

36.45

Dayton, OH

2

0.12 (-0.10, 0.34)

2.49

Washington, DC - WSF

3

0.04 (-0.12, 0.19)

5.19

Washington, DC - OSP I

4

0.03 (-0.08, 0.14)

9.54

Washington, DC - OSP II

1

-0.17 (-0.29, -0.05)

8.09

Toledo, OH

3

0.01 (-0.28, 0.30)

1.41

0.03 (-0.02, 0.07)

68.56

USA

Subtotal (I-squared = 56.9%, p = 0.031)

International
Andhra Pradesh, India

4

-0.06 (-0.13, 0.01)

23.17

Delhi, India

2

0.12 (-0.00, 0.24)

8.27

-0.01 (-0.08, 0.05)

31.44

0.01 (-0.02, 0.05)

100.00

Subtotal (I-squared = 84.3%, p = 0.011)

Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.299
Overall (I-squared = 62.6%, p = 0.006)

-1.4

0

1.4

Figure 12: Overall Global impacts – TOT Math (Colombia and Louisiana excluded).
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on the final year effect size calculated for each study.
The diamonds show overall estimates for USA, International (outside USA) and Global (red
dotted line). The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study (inverse of
variance). Estimates for Colombia and Louisiana are excluded.
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TOT Math — Global (Colombia excluded)
Years of
Location

%

Treatment

ES (95% CI)

Weight

Charlotte, NC

1

0.16 (0.01, 0.31)

4.95

NYC

3

0.04 (-0.02, 0.10)

33.45

Dayton, OH

2

0.12 (-0.10, 0.34)

2.28

Washington, DC - WSF

3

0.04 (-0.12, 0.19)

4.77

Washington, DC - OSP I

4

0.03 (-0.08, 0.14)

8.75

USA

Washington, DC - OSP II 1

-0.17 (-0.29, -0.05) 7.42

Toledo, OH

3

0.01 (-0.28, 0.30)

Louisiana

3

-0.14 (-0.26, -0.02) 8.21

Subtotal (I-squared = 66.5%, p = 0.004)

1.30

0.01 (-0.03, 0.05)

71.14

International
Andhra Pradesh, India

4

-0.06 (-0.13, 0.01)

21.27

Delhi, India

2

0.12 (-0.00, 0.24)

7.59

-0.01 (-0.08, 0.05)

28.86

0.00 (-0.03, 0.03)

100.00

Subtotal (I-squared = 84.3%, p = 0.011)

Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.586
Overall (I-squared = 67.4%, p = 0.001)

-1.4

0

1.4

Figure 13: Overall Global impacts – TOT Math (Colombia excluded).
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on the final year effect size calculated for each study.
The diamonds show overall estimates for USA, International (outside USA) and Global (red
dotted line). The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study (inverse of
variance). Estimate for Colombia is excluded.
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The effect size estimates for Louisiana17 and Bogota, Colombia regularly appear as
outliers in our forest plots. We repeat the meta-analysis (Figures 10, 11, 12 and 13), excluding
the results from these two potential outliers which contribute the most extreme negative and
positive effect estimates in our study. The resulting overall estimates shrink in size but some of
them retain statistical significance. We provide these results in the footnotes to each figure. With
Louisiana and Bogota excluded, the math estimates have an overall null effect globally. The
reading estimates are smaller but still positive and statistically significant even with these outlier
findings removed.
We also conduct this same robustness test (removing outlier effects for Louisiana and
Bogota) and assess whether the effect sizes for various years of treatment change. The reading
estimates remain null for one year of treatment and increase slightly (from 0.07 SD to 0.09 SD)
for two years of treatment. However, the estimates shrink from 0.06 SD to null for three years of
treatment and from 0.54 SD to 0.25 SD for four or more years of treatment. In all of these cases,
the confidence intervals still overlap, so there is no conclusive evidence that the results from the
robustness check themselves are significantly different than the results from the main analysis.
With the outliers omitted, the math estimates of positive effects increase substantially for one
year of treatment, increase slightly but remain substantively similar for two and three years of
treatment, and shrink dramatically for four or more years (from 0.33 SD to null).
From this robustness check, it seems that the magnitude of the overall reading impacts is
reduced, but the overall conclusion of positive reading impacts is not affected by the Louisiana
and Bogota outliers, as the reading impacts remain positive and significant. Math impacts are
affected negatively by the exclusion of the outlier cases, becoming null overall. The LSP

17

Louisiana was the only program that used criterion references tests. The treatment effects may be sensitive to the
sampling of questions and test format.
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evaluation was the only voucher RCT to use state criterion-referenced tests to measure program
impact. Since the curricula used in the private schools in Louisiana are not necessarily aligned to
the state test the way that they are in Louisiana public schools, it is possible that using the state
test biased the Louisiana voucher impacts negatively, especially in math, which relies upon a
specific sequencing of topics and skills. The results for Bogota, Colombia represent a blend of
student incentives (to continue receiving the voucher, the students had to maintain minimum
academic standards), additional education spending (through top up by parents) and private
school productivity (Glewwe & Muralidharan, 2016). The fact that the Bogota program was a
blend of school vouchers and other reforms could explain its status as an outlier in our metaanalysis.
5-E. Heterogeneity of the results
Testing for heterogeneity of effect sizes in a meta-analytic estimate allows for
determination if the studies reasonably share a common effect size (Hedges & Olkin, 1985). We
are interested in testing if our meta-analytic estimates have more variation than would be
expected simply due to sampling error. The existence of significant heterogeneity between study
subgroups (U.S. vs. non-U.S. programs, publicly vs. privately funded programs, and various
years of treatment) would indicate true differences between the effects of vouchers on distinct
subgroups that are not due to sampling error.
The forest plots provide an estimate of the percentage of variation in the meta-analytic
effect sizes derived from within and across subgroup comparisons. The 𝐼 2 statistic in the forest
plots provides a p-value. The null hypothesis for the underlying test assumes homogeneity across
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the analyzed studies. A higher value of the 𝐼 2 statistic18 resulting in a significant p-value suggests
that the variation in the results of the studies are due to underlying heterogeneity rather than due
to chance alone (Higgins, Thompson, Deeks, & Altman, 2003). The tests for heterogeneity in the
figures show that they are statistically significant in both math and reading for the total sample of
studies. Generally, there is statistically significant heterogeneity between subgroups (U.S. vs.
non-U.S. programs, publicly vs. privately funded programs and between years of treatment).
However, within the privately funded programs there is a lack of significant heterogeneity for
math impacts. With that one exception, the heterogeneity analysis indicates that variation in
effect sizes across subgroups reflects a true underlying variation and not statistical noise. The
within subgroup analysis also reflects statistically significant heterogeneity in most cases—we
do not observe significant heterogeneity in some cases probably due to small subgroup sample
sizes.
6. Discussion
This meta-analysis contributes to the field of private school choice by combining and
systematically evaluating rigorous evidence from all RCT studies of the effects of private school
vouchers on student achievement. This review provides an up-to-date, methodologically coherent
and comprehensive overview of all the rigorous experimental findings and yields important
policy implications about the effectiveness of voucher programs.
Our search process turned up 9,443 potential studies, 20 of which ultimately were
included. These 20 studies represent 11 different voucher programs, eight in the U.S. and three in

18

In a fixed effects meta-analysis, the studies are assumed to have been carried out under similar conditions with
similar study participants. Thus, one true effect size is shared by all the studies included in the meta-analysis. In
contrast, in a random effects meta-analysis, the true effect size could vary across studies. Hence, the random effects
meta-analysis estimates the mean of a distribution of true effects of all the studies. Thus, 𝐼 2 statistic has a lower
value under a fixed-effects meta-analysis in comparison to a random effects meta-analysis.
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non-U.S. countries. A total of 260 effect sizes are included, with a two-stage consolidation of
those estimates yielding a total of 46 average findings drawn from the last year of the studies.
We report 10 meta-analytic TOT effect sizes for reading (seven in the U.S. and three outside of
the U.S.). In reading, we find an overall positive effect of about 0.28 SD with null effects in the
U.S. and large positive effects (0.51 SD) outside of the U.S., primarily driven by PACES, in
Bogota, Colombia. A much larger gap in the quality of public and private schools in countries
like Colombia than in the U.S. may explain this finding (Angrist, Bettinger, & Kremer, 2006). In
addition, the PACES program was distinctive in providing individual student incentives for
academic achievement. Excluding this outlier, the overall impact on reading was still significant
(0.13 SD). The overall impact on reading remains same (0.13 SD) when both Colombia and
Louisiana outliers are excluded.
For math scores, we report 11 meta-analytic TOT effect sizes (eight in the U.S. and three
outside of the U.S.). The math effects (0.15 SD overall) are large for the non-U.S. studies (0.35
SD) and null for the U.S. studies. Again, this is driven primarily by the PACES program –
excluding this outlier results in a null overall impact on math test scores. Excluding both
Colombia and Louisiana outliers yields a null overall impact on math test scores. A large-scale
meta-analysis of all education RCTs from 1995 to 2010 has shown that the average impact of an
intervention on test scores is 0.08 SD at the elementary level and 0.15 SD at the middle school
level (Lipsey et al. 2012). Hence, our meta-analysis shows that voucher interventions produce
positive test scores outcomes chiefly in reading, that are comparable in size to outcomes from
other education interventions, but that there is heterogeneity within the set of programs.
The overall results just described are for the final year of data in each study. It could be
that these effects do not represent the initial effects one might expect from a new program. In
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fact, our analysis of the effects by years of treatment indicates that the effects of private school
voucher programs often start out null initially and then turn positive. Longer-term achievement
effects are much more salient than immediate achievement effects whenever longer-term effects
are available (Das et al., 2013; Glewwe & Muralidharan, 2016). The general pattern of results
also indicates that voucher interventions tend to increase reading scores more than math scores.
The results of this meta-analysis indicate that voucher programs globally tend to
moderately increase test scores, particularly in countries like Colombia with a large privatepublic school quality gap. Although the scope of our search process was global, more
international RCTs are needed to reach definitive conclusions about the impacts of voucher
programs around the globe. Our search process yielded RCTs on private school vouchers only in
U.S., India and Colombia. In addition, many of the programs included here are still relatively
small-scale, and more experimental work should be done on larger programs to understand
whether the potential benefits of private school vouchers would replicate at scale. We cannot
learn much from even large-scale programs if they are not implemented alongside an
experimental evaluation. Further, more experimental evaluations that consider the impacts of
vouchers on key non-cognitive outcomes such as educational attainment and civic values (e.g.
Angrist, Bettinger, & Kremer, 2006; Wolf, 2007; Wolf et al., 2013) would be of great value to
the field. We hope that our study motivates researchers to pursue experimental evaluations of
voucher impacts whenever feasible.
Additionally, it is critical to consider the cost-benefit tradeoffs associated with voucher
programs. Numerous studies find that vouchers are cost effective, since they tend to generate
achievement outcomes that are as good or better than traditional public schools but at a fraction
of the cost (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2015; Wolf & McShane, 2013). Therefore, even null
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impacts in a voucher program, if obtained at a lower cost than education in a public school
setting, may have a net benefit for society. The average per-pupil spending in the public school
jurisdictions covered in our meta-analysis was higher than the voucher amounts. For programs
where the voucher covered the full amount of private school tuition, the average school funding
in private vs. public sectors in the same geographic location19 was $255 vs. $636 for Andhra
Pradesh, India, $483 vs. $1,963 for Delhi, India, $4,817 vs. $11,846 for Milwaukee, WI, $5,456
vs. $10,853 for Louisiana, $7,761 vs. $21,081 for D.C. OSP I, and $12,306 vs. $20,577 for D.C.
OSP II. The partially funded programs required parents to top up the voucher amounts. The data
indicate that the partially funded programs in Charlotte, NC, Dayton and Toledo, OH, NYC,
Washington, D.C. and Bogota, Colombia had much lower voucher amounts – less than half of
the per-pupil expenditures in the neighborhood public schools. A cost-effectiveness analysis of
the 20 studies included in this study may inform us about the savings from the experimental
interventions of 11 voucher programs.
When taking into account the total costs and benefits of these types of programs, it is
important to also study the impacts on the students who remain in the traditional public school
(TPS) system. A voucher program in place may generate competitive effects for comparison TPS
system as the school systems would compete for academic efficiency and for drawing children
and financial resources towards the schools. Four of the voucher programs in our meta-analysis
of participant test-score effects also have been evaluated regarding their systemic effects on the
test scores of students who remained in public schools. The Louisiana (Egalite, 2014) and
Milwaukee (Carnoy, Adamson, Chudgar, Luschei, & Witte, 2007; Chakrabarti, 2008; Greene &

19

We calculated the numbers from the data provided in the papers, department of education websites and reports
from sources such as EdChoice. For India, the rupees have been converted to dollars. All amounts are based off the
last year of evaluation of a program and weighted averages are taken across cohorts in D.C. OSP II. The numbers
have been inflation adjusted to 2013 dollars for comparison.
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Forster, 2002; Hoxby, 2003) voucher programs have been found to have a positive effect on the
subsequent test scores of affected public schools. The Washington, DC (Greene & Winters,
2007) and Andhra Pradesh (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2015) programs have been found to
have no significant effects on the achievement of the students who remained in public schools.
Thus, the research to date suggests that the modest average achievement benefits from private
school choice for participants are not coming at the expense of achievement declines for nonchoosing students. It is practically difficult to randomly assign school systems to a treatment
group comprising of choice-based competition and a control group that is isolated from the
choice-based competitive forces. Due to the nature of the question concerning how expanding
private school choice and competition affects the performance of traditional public schools, the
systemic effects of private school choice have been evaluated almost exclusively using merely
quasi-experimental methods. Still, such studies in the U.S. consistently report effects that range
from null to positive (Egalite & Wolf, 2016).
This meta-analysis provides a systematic summary of the generally modest positive
effects of private school choice programs around the globe on the test scores of participating
students. With time and more years of outcome data from voucher interventions, a better
understanding of voucher impacts may be obtained.
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Identification

Appendix A. Details on Search and Exclusion Process

Records identified through
database searching
(n = 9,443 )

Additional records identified
through other sources
(n = 4 )

Records screened
(n = 8,904 )

Records excluded
(n = 8,624 )

Full-text articles
assessed for eligibility
(n = 280 )

Full-text articles
excluded, with
reasons
(n = 260 )

Eligibility

Screening

Records after duplicates removed
(n = 8,904 )

Included

Studies included in
qualitative synthesis
(n = 20 )

Studies included in
quantitative synthesis
(meta-analysis)
(n = 20 )
Figure A1: PRISMA Flow Diagram
From: Moher D, Liberati A, Tetzlaff J, Altman DG, The PRISMA Group (2009).
Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses: The
PRISMA Statement. PLoS Med 6(6): e1000097. For more information, visit
www.prisma-statement.org.
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Table A1: Overview of Article Sources and Exclusions
Number of Articles
Search 1 (University Library)
Three library sources (EBSCO, JSTOR, ProQuest)
Duplicates Removed
Unique articles (EBSCO, JSTOR, ProQuest)
Excluded Based on Title and/or Abstract
Remaining Articles (EBSCO, JSTOR, ProQuest)

2,737
-534
2,203
-2,075
128

Search 2 (Google Scholar)
Number of Google Scholar Sources Initially Found
Excluded Based on Title and Abstract
Remaining Google Articles
Duplicates Removed

6,706
-6,549
157
-9

Remaining Articles (Google Scholar)

148

Sum of Remaining Articles (Both Searches)

276

Excluded Based on Full Article

-260

Studies added through networked search

+4

Total search results (RCTs)

20
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Table A2: Reason for Exclusion - for 260 papers were excluded at full article phase
Not a quantitative analysis

69

Not related to educational vouchers for K-12 students (housing vouchers, etc.)

30

Private schooling in general (not voucher specific)

7

Religious schooling in general (not voucher specific)

1

Different question related to vouchers (e.g. competitive effects, cost efficiency,
segregation/stratification, school participation, parental preferences, etc.)

63

Earlier version of an included study

24

Not randomly assigned

63

Methodology fails to utilize available lottery to conduct RCT

3

Lack of information necessary to be included*

1

Total Excluded

260

*Attempted to find author to obtain this information, but was unable to.

Details on Search Strategy
Our search process was comprised of two stages. Our initial search focused on only the
studies published since 2005 or later, but due to a lack of RCT studies identified during this
process, we added a second search, including all years, but narrowing the search criteria to only
include studies that included text related to randomization. The study selection was based on
systematic search procedures. Keywords and phrases were chosen to be as inclusive as possible
for our preliminary search.
The search criteria were as follows:
Initial Search: 2005 or later
EBSCO Search 1
Search terms: school voucher* OR education* voucher*
Time period: 2005 or later
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Types of sources included: Academic Journals, Journals, and Reports
Total number of results: 765
EBSCO Search 2
Search terms: opportunity scholarship
Time period: 2005 or later
Types of sources included: Academic Journals, Journals, and Reports
Total number of results: 48
JSTOR Search 1
Search terms: voucher* AND education* or school AND research AND experiment* or
“randomized controlled trial”
Time period: 2005 or later
Language: English
Included only Articles related to: Business and Economics, Economics, Education, Political
Science, Public Policy & Administration, Social Sciences
Total number of results: 853 search results
JSTOR Search 2
Search terms: “opportunity scholarship”
Time period: 2005 or later
Language: English
Included only Articles related to: Business and Economics, Economics, Education, Political
Science, Public Policy & Administration, Social Sciences.
Total number of results: 30 search results
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ProQuest Search 1
Search terms: all(voucher) AND all(school*) AND all(research*)
Time period: 2005 or later
Excludes: Wire Feeds, Magazines, and Newspapers
Total number of results: 603 results
ProQuest Search 2
Search terms: all(“opportunity scholarship”)
Time period: 2005 or later
Excludes: Wire Feeds, Magazines, and Newspapers
Total number of results: 122 results
The searches of the three library databases (EBSCO, JSTOR, and ProQuest) resulted in a total of
1,934 unique papers, after removing duplicates.

Secondary Search: All RCTs (including prior to 2005)
Since RCTs or experiments are especially prized as education evaluations, we decided to extend
our meta-analysis to any RCTs we could find on the topic, regardless of when they were
conducted or published. In order to find these, a secondary search was conducted.
EBSCO Search 3 (for all RCTs)
Search terms: school voucher* OR education* voucher* AND AB: random*
Time period: No restriction
Types of sources included: Academic Journals, Journals, and Reports
Total number of results: 85
Note: AB: random* means that the abstract had to include a stem of the word random*
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EBSCO Search 4 (for all RCTs)
Search terms: opportunity scholarship AND AB: random*
Time period: No restriction
Types of sources included: Academic Journals, Journals, and Reports
Total number of results: 9
Note: AB: random* means that the abstract had to include a stem of the word random*
JSTOR Search 3
Search terms: voucher* AND education* or school AND ab(random*)
Time period: No restriction
Language: English
Included only Articles related to: Business and Economics, Economics, Education, Political
Science, Public Policy & Administration, Social Sciences
Total number of results: 116 search results
JSTOR Search 4
Search terms: “opportunity scholarship” AND ab(random*)
Time period: No restriction
Language: English
Included only Articles related to: Business and Economics, Economics, Education, Political
Science, Public Policy & Administration, Social Sciences.
Total number of results: 2 search results
ProQuest Search 3
Search terms: all(voucher) AND all(school*) AND all(research*) AND ab(random*)
Time period: No restriction
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Excludes: Wire Feeds, Magazines, and Newspapers
Total number of results: 95 results
Note: ab(random*) means that the abstract had to include a stem of the word random*
ProQuest Search 4
Search terms: all(“opportunity scholarship”) AND ab(random*)
Time period: No restriction
Excludes: Wire Feeds, Magazines, and Newspapers
Total number of results: 9 results
Note: ab(random*) means that the abstract had to include a stem of the word random.
This secondary search of the three library databases (EBSCO, JSTOR, and ProQuest) resulted in
a total of 269 additional unique papers, after removing duplicates.
Google Scholar and Other Website Searches
In addition to the three main library databases, we searched a variety of other sources.
First, using the first search criteria, we searched Google Scholar for articles from 2005 or later
using the search terms “school voucher” OR “voucher school” to find the maximum number of
results. The search returned approximately 4,000 results including patents and citations. Other
places we searched, due to their interest in school vouchers, were the websites of the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), University of Chile, Uppsala University in Sweden, and
the Poverty Action Lab at MIT.
Using the second search criteria in Google Scholar: (("opportunity scholarship" OR
"education* voucher*" OR "school voucher*") AND random*), we found 2,570 results including
citations. Apart from importing the references in Refworks, we also did individual Google
Scholar searches of the imported references whose titles did not end up in Refworks.
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Details on Selection Process and Coding
After our title/abstract review, 148 sources remained from the Google and snowball
search along with 128 sources from the library searches. Two members of our team reviewed
each of these 276 sources in their entirety to determine if they met our inclusion criteria. In some
cases, the researchers initially disagreed on the inclusion decision, in which case they met to
discuss and come to a consensus. 260 papers were excluded at the full article phase. The reasons
for exclusion of the 260 papers have been provided above in Appendix A, Table A2. Additional
efforts were made to ensure our results are not affected by publication bias (described in the
following section).
The remaining 20 studies were coded using a predesigned format in MS-Excel. The
coding format included information on authors, publication year, years of treatment, program
evaluated by the study, location of the study, source of funding, duration of study, grades
analyzed, sample sizes of treatment and control groups, total sample sizes and information on
program and sample attrition. All information was collected separately for different years of
treatment reported in the studies and separately by TOT/ITT and separately by math/reading
(information for effect sizes in English and local languages were coded for international studies).
Statistical details such as mean test scores (treatment/control), differences in means
(treatment – control), standard deviation (treatment/control), treatment effect sizes (in standard
deviations), standard error of Cohen’s d, treatment effect and standard error in other units (such
as National Percentile Rank (NPR)), t-statistic, p-values, upper/lower 95% confidence intervals
were coded into the excel sheets. Every detail entered into the excel sheet had to be finally
agreed upon by two of the coauthors to reduce human error. Lastly the information was used to
arrive at Hedge’s g and standard error of Hedge’s g for carrying out the meta-analysis. The excel
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sheet also contained information on comments/assumptions made for each row as well as mini
meta-analytic estimates for multiple studies that reported an effect of the same program for the
same year. For example, a mini meta-analysis was carried out to obtain an overall ITT effect for
reading estimates for one year of treatment from two studies related to the Charlotte, NC
program: Greene (2000) and Cowen (2008). The mini-meta analysis relied on a fixed effects
strategy (Borenstein Hedges, & Rothstein, 2007) due to small sample size in all cases, and a precoded excel sheet was used to arrive at these mini meta-analytic estimates using the formula
described in Appendix B. As a robustness check, STATA software was also used to check the
accuracy of the estimates obtained using the pre-coded excel sheet in Excel.
Robustness check for unpublished literature
Tables in Appendix A include details of the literature identified through the computerized
and network search described above. The final 20 studies included for meta-analysis are either a
published study (when a study actually got published; this forms the majority of studies
included), a working paper (when the paper did not yet get published; an example is
Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & Walters, 2015) and a book chapter (Wolf, Egalite, & Dixon, 2015).
Wherever necessary, supplementary details were added through other supporting documents
available including direct contact with the authors if required.
To ensure our findings were not affected by publication bias, we conducted a variety of
additional searches for unpublished documents such as working papers, conference drafts, and
technical reports. Also, multiple versions of the same study published elsewhere in book chapters
and different formats of publication were read for details. We manually searched known websites
of universities and research institutes such as University of Chile, Uppsala University in Sweden,
Poverty Action Lab at MIT, national Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), Department For
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International Development (DFID) in UK, Center for Civil Society in New Delhi, India etc. Our
team members also utilized Google translator in some cases where it appeared to the team
member that a document in foreign language may tell us something about a voucher RCT. To
look for possible ongoing evaluations of school vouchers, a hand search of journals that publish
studies on school choice such as the Journal of School Choice were carried out.
As a last robustness check, a separate search was carried out for master’s and doctoral
theses in EBSCO, JSTOR, and ProQuest databases using the same search terms as described in
above sections of Appendix A. Finally, one of the coauthors of this study is an internationally
known expert in school choice and has a well-connected network of leading researchers in the
area. The coauthor independently did a search in his contacts to find past or ongoing projects
without publicly available results. No study or unpublished document found in the robustness
checks was an additional experimental evaluation of school vouchers. Thus, no further studies
contribute to the meta-analysis.
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Appendix B: Formula used during meta-analysis

1. Mean differences:

𝑋̅𝑇 − 𝑋̅𝐶

2. SD Pooled :

𝑆𝑡𝑑(𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙) = √

3. Cohen’s D:

𝑑 = 𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑇

4. Lower bound ES (95%):

LB = 𝐸𝑆 − (𝑆𝐸𝑑 ∗ 1.96)

5. Upper bound ES (95%):

UB= 𝐸𝑆 + (𝑆𝐸𝑑 ∗ 1.96)

6. Effect Size by correlation:

𝐸𝑆 = √1−𝑟2

7. Effect Size by t ratio:

𝑑 = 𝑡√ 𝑛1 𝑛 2

8. Hedges’ g (Unbiased D):

𝐸𝑆(𝑑 ′ ) = [1 − 4𝑁−9] 𝑑

9. Standard error for effect size:

𝑆𝐸𝑑′ = √ 𝑛1 𝑛 2 + 2(𝑛

10. Inverse Variance (w)

𝑤 = (𝑆𝐸)2

11. Grand Effect size:

∑(𝑤×𝐸𝑆)
̅̅̅̅
𝐸𝑆 = ∑ 𝑤

𝑆12 (𝑛1 −1)+𝑆22 (𝑛2 −1)
𝑛1 +𝑛2 −2

𝑋̅ −𝑋̅𝐶
(𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙)

2𝑟

𝑛 +𝑛

1 2

3

𝑛 +𝑛

1 2

𝑑′

2

1 +𝑛2 )

1

Where ES is effect size of each study, and w is the inverse variance weight.
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Appendix C: Intent to treat (ITT) analysis

ITT Reading — Global
Years of
Location

%

Treatment

ES (95% CI)

Milwaukee, WI

4

-0.00 (-0.14, 0.13) 3.38

Charlotte, NC

1

0.17 (0.02, 0.32) 2.76

NYC

3

0.02 (-0.04, 0.08) 19.07

Dayton, OH

2

0.17 (-0.05, 0.39) 1.30

Washington, DC - WSF 3

-0.06 (-0.21, 0.09) 2.71

Washington, DC - OSP I 4

0.11 (-0.00, 0.22) 4.97

Washington, DC - OSP II 1

-0.09 (-0.21, 0.03) 4.25

Subtotal (I-squared = 50.8%, p = 0.058)

0.03 (-0.01, 0.07) 38.45

Weight

USA

International
Bogota, Colombia

7

0.70 (0.63, 0.77) 13.25

Andhra Pradesh, India

4

0.13 (0.09, 0.17) 39.79

Delhi, India

2

0.09 (0.01, 0.18) 8.50

Subtotal (I-squared = 99.1%, p = 0.000)

0.25 (0.22, 0.28) 61.55

Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.000
Overall (I-squared = 96.9%, p = 0.000)

-1.4

0.16 (0.14, 0.19) 100.00

0

1.4

Figure C1: Overall Global impacts – ITT Reading.
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on last year effect size calculated for each study. The
diamonds show overall estimates for USA, International (outside USA) and Global (red dotted
line). The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study (inverse of
variance). No reading estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test outcomes.
Reading estimate for Delhi, India includes an overall estimate for English and Hindi. Reading
estimate for Andhra Pradesh, India includes an overall estimate for English, Hindi, and Telugu.
Reading estimate for Bogota, Colombia is for Spanish. Louisiana voucher program did not have
ITT estimates as it was a placement lottery. Overall effect size for non-U.S. studies with Bogota,
Colombia removed is 0.12 (0.09, 0.16) and overall global average is 0.08 (0.05, 0.11).
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ITT Reading — Global (Colombia and Louisiana excluded)
Years of
Location

%

Treatment

ES (95% CI)

Milwaukee, WI

4

-0.00 (-0.14, 0.13) 3.90

Charlotte, NC

1

0.17 (0.02, 0.32)

NYC

3

0.02 (-0.04, 0.08) 21.99

Dayton, OH

2

0.17 (-0.05, 0.39) 1.50

Washington, DC - WSF

3

-0.06 (-0.21, 0.09) 3.13

Washington, DC - OSP I 4

0.11 (-0.00, 0.22) 5.73

Washington, DC - OSP II 1

-0.09 (-0.21, 0.03) 4.90

Subtotal (I-squared = 50.8%, p = 0.058)

0.03 (-0.01, 0.07) 44.33

Weight

USA

3.18

International
Andhra Pradesh, India

4

0.13 (0.09, 0.17)

45.87

Delhi, India

2

0.09 (0.01, 0.18)

9.80

0.12 (0.09, 0.16)

55.67

0.08 (0.05, 0.11)

100.00

Subtotal (I-squared = 0.0%, p = 0.445)

Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.000
Overall (I-squared = 68.4%, p = 0.001)

-1.4

0

1.4

Figure C1.1: Overall Global impacts – ITT Reading (Colombia and Louisiana excluded).
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on the final year effect size calculated for each study.
The diamonds show overall estimates for USA, International (outside USA) and Global (red
dotted line). The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study (inverse of
variance). No reading estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test outcomes. .
Reading estimate for Delhi, India includes an overall estimate for English and Hindi. Reading
estimate for Andhra Pradesh, India includes an overall estimate for English, Hindi, and Telugu.
Reading estimate for Bogota, Colombia is for Spanish. Louisiana voucher program did not have
ITT estimates as it was a placement lottery. Estimates for Colombia and Louisiana are excluded.
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ITT English — Global
Years of
Location

%

Treatment

ES (95% CI)

Milwaukee, WI

4

-0.00 (-0.14, 0.13) 5.75

Charlotte, NC

1

0.17 (0.02, 0.32)

NYC

3

0.02 (-0.04, 0.08) 32.39

Dayton, OH

2

0.17 (-0.05, 0.39) 2.20

Washington, DC - WSF 3

-0.06 (-0.21, 0.09) 4.61

Washington, DC - OSP I 4

0.11 (-0.00, 0.22) 8.44

Washington, DC - OSP II 1

-0.09 (-0.21, 0.03) 7.22

Subtotal (I-squared = 50.8%, p = 0.058)

0.03 (-0.01, 0.07) 65.29

Weight

USA

4.69

International
Andhra Pradesh, India

4

0.12 (0.05, 0.18)

27.54

Delhi, India

2

0.15 (0.03, 0.27)

7.17

0.12 (0.07, 0.18)

34.71

0.06 (0.03, 0.09)

100.00

Subtotal (I-squared = 0.0%, p = 0.627)

Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.006
Overall (I-squared = 59.9%, p = 0.010)

-1.4

0

1.4

Figure C2: Overall Global impacts – ITT English.
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on last year effect size calculated for each study. The
diamonds show overall estimates for USA, International (outside USA) and Global (red dotted
line). The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study (inverse of
variance). No reading estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test outcomes.
Bogota, Colombia did not have an English estimate as the tests were administered in Spanish.
Louisiana voucher program did not have ITT estimates as it was a placement lottery.
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ITT Math — Global
Years of
Location

%

Treatment

ES (95% CI)

Weight

Milwaukee, WI

4

0.26 (0.13, 0.40)

4.54

Charlotte, NC

1

0.13 (-0.02, 0.28) 3.73

NYC

3

0.04 (-0.02, 0.10) 25.69

Dayton, OH

2

0.12 (-0.10, 0.34) 1.75

Washington, DC - WSF 3

0.02 (-0.14, 0.17) 3.66

Washington, DC - OSP I 4

0.02 (-0.09, 0.13) 6.72

Washington, DC - OSP II 1

-0.12 (-0.24, 0.00) 5.71

Toledo, OH

0.00 (-0.29, 0.30) 1.00

USA

3

Subtotal (I-squared = 63.0%, p = 0.008)

0.05 (0.01, 0.09)

52.80

18.57

International
Bogota, Colombia

7

0.40 (0.33, 0.47)

Andhra Pradesh, India

4

-0.03 (-0.09, 0.03) 22.79

Delhi, India

2

0.07 (-0.05, 0.19) 5.84

Subtotal (I-squared = 97.7%, p = 0.000)

0.15 (0.11, 0.19)

47.20

0.10 (0.07, 0.12)

100.00

Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.000
Overall (I-squared = 91.7%, p = 0.000)

-1.4

0

1.4

Figure C3: Overall Global impacts – ITT Math.
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on last year effect size calculated for each study. The
diamonds show overall estimates for USA, International (outside USA) and Global (red dotted
line). The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study (inverse of
variance). Louisiana voucher program did not have ITT estimates as it was a placement lottery.
Overall effect size for non-U.S. studies excluding Bogota, Colombia is -0.01 (-0.06, 0.04) and
overall global average is 0.03 (-0.01, 0.06).
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ITT Math — Global (Colombia and Louisiana excluded)
Years of
Location

%

Treatment

ES (95% CI)

Weight

Milwaukee, WI

4

0.26 (0.13, 0.40)

5.57

Charlotte, NC

1

0.13 (-0.02, 0.28)

4.58

NYC

3

0.04 (-0.02, 0.10)

31.55

Dayton, OH

2

0.12 (-0.10, 0.34)

2.15

Washington, DC - WSF

3

0.02 (-0.14, 0.17)

4.50

Washington, DC - OSP I

4

0.02 (-0.09, 0.13)

8.26

USA

Washington, DC - OSP II 1

-0.12 (-0.24, 0.00) 7.01

Toledo, OH

0.00 (-0.29, 0.30)

1.22

0.05 (0.01, 0.09)

64.84

3

Subtotal (I-squared = 63.0%, p = 0.008)

International
Andhra Pradesh, India

4

-0.03 (-0.09, 0.03) 27.99

Delhi, India

2

0.07 (-0.05, 0.19)

Subtotal (I-squared = 53.5%, p = 0.142)

7.17

-0.01 (-0.06, 0.04) 35.16

Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.105
Overall (I-squared = 62.0%, p = 0.005)

-1.4

0.03 (-0.01, 0.06)

0

100.00

1.4

Figure C3.1: Overall Global impacts – ITT Math (Colombia and Louisiana excluded).
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on last year effect size calculated for each study. The
diamonds show overall estimates for USA, International (outside USA) and Global (red dotted
line). The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study (inverse of
variance). Louisiana voucher program did not have ITT estimates as it was a placement lottery.
Estimates for Colombia and Louisiana are excluded.
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ITT Reading — Funding Type
Years of
Location

%

Treatment

ES (95% CI)

Weight

Washington, DC - WSF

3

-0.06 (-0.21, 0.09) 2.71

Andhra Pradesh, India

4

0.13 (0.09, 0.17)

39.79

Dayton, OH

2

0.17 (-0.05, 0.39)

1.30

NYC

3

0.02 (-0.04, 0.08)

19.07

Charlotte, NC

1

0.17 (0.02, 0.32)

2.76

Delhi, India

2

0.09 (0.01, 0.18)

8.50

0.09 (0.06, 0.12)

74.14

Private

Subtotal (I-squared = 67.4%, p = 0.009)

Public
Milwaukee, WI

4

-0.00 (-0.14, 0.13) 3.38

Washington, DC - OSP I

4

0.11 (-0.00, 0.22)

4.97

Washington, DC - OSP II 1

-0.09 (-0.21, 0.03) 4.25

Bogota, Colombia

0.70 (0.63, 0.77)

13.25

0.36 (0.32, 0.41)

25.86

0.16 (0.14, 0.19)

100.00

7

Subtotal (I-squared = 98.4%, p = 0.000)

Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.000
Overall (I-squared = 96.9%, p = 0.000)

-1.4

0

1.4

Figure C4: Overall impacts by Funding Type – ITT Reading.
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on last year effect size calculated for each study. The
diamonds show overall estimates for privately and publicly (having received any public funds)
funded programs. The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study
(inverse of variance). No reading estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test
outcomes. Reading estimate for Delhi, India includes an overall estimate for English and Hindi.
Reading estimate for Andhra Pradesh, India includes an overall estimate for English, Hindi, and
Telugu. Reading estimate for Bogota, Colombia is for Spanish. Louisiana voucher program did
not have ITT estimates as it was a placement lottery. Overall effect size for publicly funded
programs excluding Bogota, Colombia is 0.01 (-0.06, 0.08).
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ITT Math — Funding Type
Years of
Location

%

Treatment

ES (95% CI)

Charlotte, NC

1

0.13 (-0.02, 0.28) 3.73

Dayton, OH

2

0.12 (-0.10, 0.34) 1.75

Washington, DC - WSF 3

0.02 (-0.14, 0.17) 3.66

Andhra Pradesh, India

4

-0.03 (-0.09, 0.03) 22.79

Toledo, OH

3

0.00 (-0.29, 0.30) 1.00

NYC

3

0.04 (-0.02, 0.10) 25.69

Delhi, India

2

0.07 (-0.05, 0.19) 5.84

Weight

Private

Subtotal (I-squared = 9.0%, p = 0.360)

0.02 (-0.01, 0.06) 64.46

Public
Washington, DC - OSP II 1

-0.12 (-0.24, 0.00) 5.71

Bogota, Colombia

7

0.40 (0.33, 0.47)

18.57

Milwaukee, WI

4

0.26 (0.13, 0.40)

4.54

Washington, DC - OSP I 4

0.02 (-0.09, 0.13) 6.72

Subtotal (I-squared = 95.7%, p = 0.000)

0.23 (0.18, 0.28)

35.54

0.10 (0.07, 0.12)

100.00

Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.000
Overall (I-squared = 91.7%, p = 0.000)

-1.4

0

1.4

Figure C5: Overall impacts by Funding Type – ITT Math.
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on last year effect size calculated for each study. The
diamonds show overall estimates for privately and publicly (having received any public funds)
funded programs. The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study
(inverse of variance). Louisiana voucher program did not have ITT estimates as it was a
placement lottery. Overall effect size for publicly funded programs excluding Bogota, Colombia
is 0.04 (-0.03, 0.11).
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ITT Reading — Years of Treatment
Location

ES (95% CI)

%
Weight

1
Milwaukee, WI
Charlotte, NC
NYC
Dayton, OH
Washington, DC -WSF
Washington, DC - OSP I
Washington, DC - OSP II
Delhi, India
Subtotal (I-squared = 58.1%, p = 0.019)

0.07 (-0.02, 0.16)
0.17 (0.02, 0.32)
-0.01 (-0.06, 0.04)
0.14 (-0.08, 0.35)
-0.15 (-0.28, -0.02)
0.03 (-0.07, 0.13)
-0.09 (-0.21, 0.03)
0.00 (-0.07, 0.08)
0.00 (-0.03, 0.04)

3.34
1.17
10.87
0.57
1.59
2.69
1.80
4.45
26.48

2
Milwaukee, WI
NYC
Dayton, OH
Washington, DC - WSF
Washington, DC - OSP I
Andhra Pradesh, India
Delhi, India
Subtotal (I-squared = 35.4%, p = 0.158)

0.05
0.03
0.17
0.17
0.09
0.01
0.09
0.04

2.93
7.55
0.55
1.20
2.57
14.91
3.59
33.30

3
Milwaukee, WI
NYC
Washington, DC - WSF
Washington, DC - OSP I
Bogota, Colombia
Subtotal (I-squared = 43.3%, p = 0.133)

0.07 (-0.04, 0.18)
0.02 (-0.04, 0.08)
-0.06 (-0.21, 0.09)
0.13 (0.02, 0.23)
0.20 (-0.03, 0.44)
0.05 (0.00, 0.09)

2.16
8.06
1.15
2.41
0.48
14.26

4 or more
Milwaukee, WI
Washington, DC - OSP I
Bogota, Colombia
Andhra Pradesh, India
Subtotal (I-squared = 98.6%, p = 0.000)

-0.00 (-0.14, 0.13)
0.11 (-0.00, 0.22)
0.70 (0.63, 0.77)
0.13 (0.09, 0.17)
0.24 (0.21, 0.28)

1.43
2.10
5.60
16.82
25.96

Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.000
Overall (I-squared = 94.0%, p = 0.000)

0.08 (0.07, 0.10)

100.00

-1.4

0

(-0.04, 0.15)
(-0.03, 0.09)
(-0.05, 0.39)
(0.02, 0.32)
(-0.01, 0.19)
(-0.03, 0.05)
(0.01, 0.18)
(0.01, 0.07)

1.4

Figure C6: Overall impacts by Years of Treatment – ITT Reading.
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are one year, two year, three year, and four or more year effect
sizes for each study. The diamonds show overall yearly (dosage) effect estimates. The gray area
around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study (inverse of variance). No reading
estimates were reported for Toledo, OH. Reading estimate for Delhi is an overall estimate for
English and Hindi. Reading estimate for Andhra Pradesh is an overall estimate for English,
Hindi, and Telugu. Reading estimate for Bogota is for Spanish. Louisiana uses a placement
lottery and thus does not have ITT estimates. Overall effect sizes with Bogota, Colombia
removed are 0.04 (-0.00, 0.08) for three years and 0.12 (0.08, 0.16) for four or more years. The
overall estimate treats each effect size as independent and we do not focus on it due to spatial
auto-correlation among different years of treatment within the same program.
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ITT Math — Years of Treatment
Location

ES (95% CI)

%
Weight

1
Milwaukee, WI
Charlotte, NC
NYC
Dayton, OH
Washington, DC - WSF
Washington, DC - OSP I
Washington, DC - OSP II
Delhi, India
Subtotal (I-squared = 46.3%, p = 0.071)

0.09 (0.01, 0.18)
0.13 (-0.02, 0.28)
0.04 (-0.01, 0.09)
0.01 (-0.21, 0.22)
0.14 (0.02, 0.27)
0.08 (-0.02, 0.18)
-0.12 (-0.24, 0.00)
0.11 (0.00, 0.22)
0.06 (0.03, 0.09)

4.27
1.47
13.64
0.72
1.99
3.51
2.25
2.79
30.64

2
Milwaukee, WI
NYC
Dayton, OH
Washington, DC - WSF
Washington, DC - OSP I
Andhra Pradesh, India
Delhi, India
Subtotal (I-squared = 65.1%, p = 0.009)

0.08 (-0.01, 0.18)
-0.02 (-0.08, 0.04)
0.12 (-0.10, 0.34)
0.23 (0.08, 0.38)
0.01 (-0.09, 0.11)
-0.05 (-0.11, 0.01)
0.07 (-0.05, 0.19)
0.01 (-0.03, 0.04)

3.66
9.48
0.69
1.50
3.24
9.48
2.30
30.35

3
Milwaukee, WI
NYC
Washington, DC - WSF
Washington, DC - OSP I
Toledo, OH
Bogota, Colombia
Subtotal (I-squared = 0.0%, p = 0.705)

0.12
0.04
0.02
0.03
0.00
0.15
0.05

2.70
10.11
1.44
3.04
0.39
0.60
18.30

4 or more
Milwaukee, WI
Washington, DC - OSP I
Bogota, Colombia
Andhra Pradesh, India
Subtotal (I-squared = 96.8%, p = 0.000)

0.26 (0.13, 0.40)
0.02 (-0.09, 0.13)
0.40 (0.33, 0.47)
-0.03 (-0.09, 0.03)
0.15 (0.11, 0.19)

1.79
2.65
7.31
8.97
20.72

Heterogeneity between groups: p = 0.000
Overall (I-squared = 84.8%, p = 0.000)

0.06 (0.04, 0.08)

100.00

-1.4

0

(0.01, 0.23)
(-0.02, 0.10)
(-0.14, 0.17)
(-0.07, 0.13)
(-0.29, 0.30)
(-0.08, 0.39)
(0.01, 0.09)

1.4

Figure C7: Overall impacts by Years of Treatment – ITT Math.
Note: The Hedges’ g estimates are based on one year, two year, three year, and four or more year
effect sizes calculated for each study. The diamonds show overall estimates for yearly (dosage)
effect of programs. The gray area around each point (effect size) is the weight of each study
(inverse of variance). Louisiana voucher program did not have ITT estimates as it was a
placement lottery. Overall effect size for programs with Bogota, Colombia removed is 0.05
(0.00, 0.09) for three years of treatment and 0.02 (-0.03, 0.07) for four or more years of
treatment. The overall estimate treats each effect size as independent and we do not focus on it
due to spatial auto-correlation among different years of treatment within the same program.
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Appendix D: Assumptions and Calculations for Studies, by Program
Andhra Pradesh (AP) School Choice Experiment
Muralidharan & Sundararaman (2015)
•

ITT effects from Table VI, Panel A. Two languages impacts were meta-analyzed into one
overall for two years, and three impacts for three years.

•

TOT effects from Table VI, Panel B. Two languages impacts were meta-analyzed into
one overall for two years, and three impacts for three years.

•

2 year program attrition: 39%: 39% of those offered did not use the voucher (p.10).

•

4 year program attrition: 49.2%: 39% of those offered did not use the voucher (p.10), but
at the end of four years only 1,005 out of the 1,980 original treatment group were still
using it. (1,980-1,005)/1980 = 49.2%.

•

Sample attrition rates differ by year and test but are based on Table A.2 and Table VI.
For example, the year 2 English sample attrition is 14.9%: (5,316 – 4,525/5,316) where
5,316 is the sum of the 1,980 + 3,336 in Table A.2 and 4,525 is the sample size in Table
VI.

•

Control crossover rates not provided.

•

Voucher take-up rates were initially 61% (p. 1026), and 51% at the end of the project (p.
1038).

Charlotte Children’s Scholarship Fund
Greene (2000)
•

Program attrition calculated as the percent of students who were offered a voucher but
did not attend divided by the total who were offered a voucher (413/ (413+388)) = 51.6%
(p. 3).
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•

Sample attrition: Overall sample attrition 60% (p. 3).

•

TOT estimates are IV results from Table 3. T-statistic was calculated using a p-value of
0.05 and degrees of freedom of 350 (N=357 – 7 variables including constant).

•

Treatment/control split was based on the ratio of Choice students to Public students in
Table 2 (Choice = 145, Public is 197), applied to the total N of 357.

•

ITT estimates were calculated from the TOT estimates using the following Bloom
adjustment:
𝑇𝑂𝑇 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 =

𝐼𝑇𝑇 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒

Usage rate for was 48.4% (1-program attrition rate of 51.6%).
•

Control crossover rate not provided.

•

Voucher take up rate was based on statistics from p. 56 (388/(388+413)) where 388 was
the number of students who were offered a voucher that attended private school, and 413
was the number of students offered a voucher who did not use it to attend a private
school.

Cowen (2008)
•

Program attrition: 25.5% (54/212 of those offered voucher declined it), Table 1 (p. 307).

•

Sample attrition: 70% based on 30% of participants with outcome testing (Table 1, p.
307).

•

ITT sample sizes from Table 1.

•

ITT effects from Table 2.

•

TOT in this case is the Complier Average Casual Effect (CACE), the mean treatment
outcome across the subpopulation of compliers.

•

TOT treatment group sample size (N = 212, number of users, p. 307).
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•

TOT control group sample size (From Table 1: N = “Total” minus “Choice” = 347 –
158).

•

Control crossover rate not provided.

•

Voucher take up rate was based on statistics in Table 1.

Children's Scholarship Fund (Toledo, OH)
Bettinger & Slonim (2006)
•

Math effects only. ITT effect size from Table 3.

•

Used some information from Bettinger & Slonim (2003) as needed.

•

Sample size reported in Table 3 (N=349) was based on stacking two sets of math test
scores, but this overstates the actual number of students. The footnote indicated 163
students who took both parts of the test, and 23 who took one part of the test, so we used
a total sample size of 163 + 23 = 186.

•

Control group is calculated as 58% of the 186 total sample, where 58% is the number of
lottery losers (1,416 from p. 30), divided by the difference between the number of
applicants (2,424) from p. 7 of Bettinger & Slonim (2003) and 39 “mystery winner”
students who were excluded from the analysis. 58% = 1,416/(2,424-39).

•

Program attrition: N/A. Table 1 on p. 30 indicates that the total number of winners was
2,385 (1,126 + 1,259). The number of losers was 1,416 (331 + 1085), but no indication of
how many lottery winners actually used the vouchers.

•

Sample attrition: 186 tested out of 2,385, indicates sample attrition of 92% (Table 1).

•

TOT math effect was calculated from the ITT estimate using the following Bloom
adjustment:

𝑇𝑂𝑇 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 =

𝐼𝑇𝑇 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
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where usage rate is 43% (p. 12).
•

Voucher take-up rates and control crossover rates from p. 12.

District of Columbia Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP)
•

This is the only program having two different evaluations for two distinct samples.

Wolf, Kisida, Gutmann, Puma, Eissa, & Rizzo (2013)
•

ITT reading effects from Table 3-2 and Figure 3-1.

•

ITT math effects from Tables 3-2 and 4-1 and Figure 3-2.

•

Program attrition: Based on p. 67-67 (year 1), p. A-34 (year 2), p. A-32 (year 3), and p.
A-41 (year 4).

•

TOT effects after year one and two were calculated from the ITT estimates using the
following Bloom adjustment:

𝑇𝑂𝑇 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 =

𝐼𝑇𝑇 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒

where usage rates for year one and two rare based on p. 67-68.
•

TOT effects after year three and four were based on percent of “never users.”

•

Control crossover rates from p. 225.

•

Voucher take-up rate from Table 1 (using just cohorts 1 and 2, which represent the
analytic sample).

Dynarski, Rui, Webber, Gutmann, & Bachman (2017)
•

Program attrition rate from Table 1 (p. 4).

•

Sample attrition rates from p. 8.

•

Control crossover rates from p. 5 and voucher-take up rate from p. 4.

Ensure Access to Better Learning Experiences (ENABLE)
Wolf, Egalite & Dixon (2015)
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•

Year 1 ITT: treatment-control means, difference, effect size, and p-value taken from
Tables 1, 2, and 3.

•

Year 2 ITT: treatment-control means, difference, effect size, and p-value taken from
Table 25.2. All other statistics acquired from data output obtained directly from the
authors.

•

TOT effects were calculated from the ITT estimate using the following Bloom
adjustment:
𝑇𝑂𝑇 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 =

𝐼𝑇𝑇 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒

where the usage rate is 0.8678.
•

Control crossover rate from p. 12-13 and voucher take up rate from p. 13.

Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP)
Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & Walters (2015)
•

No ITT effects because it was a placement lottery.

•

Sample attrition was 17% for lottery losers (p. 13), and Table 10 indicates the probability
of observing a score is about 8 percentage points higher for lottery winners than lottery
losers, so we assume 9% sample attrition rate for lottery winners. Overall sample attrition
is calculated as the number of attriters divided by the assumed beginning N (1,456) where
the assumed beginning N = (treatment N/(1-attrition rate of treatment group) + (control
N/(1-attrition rate of control group)). Overall sample attrition, therefore, is (1,4561,248)/1,456 = 14.3%.

•

Treatment and control splits is based the following: Control group sample size is equal to
the total sample size from Table 4 (1,247 in Math or 1,248 in Reading) times the loser
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rate from Table 10 (903/1412 or about 64%). Then the treatment group size is the Total N
– Control N.
•

Control crossover rate and voucher take up rate from Table 10.

Mills & Wolf (2017)
•

Control crossover rate is based on control “non-compliers” in Table 8.

•

Voucher take up rates are the “complier” rates for the treatment group from Table 8

Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP)
Rouse (1998)
•

Treatment and control group sample sizes are based on Table 1, p. 555. Assumption is
that reading analytic samples are identical to math analytic samples.

•

TOT effect not calculated as the necessary information to compute TOT effects for each
year is not available.

•

Control crossover rates not available.

•

Voucher take up rates are based on the “ever in fall” rates in Table II.

Greene, Peterson, & Du (1999)
•

Sample attrition was calculated as the 1 – proportion of each group with test outcomes
available. For example, 40% of the treatment group had test data available by the third
and fourth year, so sample attrition was 60%. 48% of the control group had test data
available by the third and fourth year, so sample attrition was 52%.

•

Table 6 was used to calculate treatment/control splits for the ITT estimates. For example,
for Reading ITT, Control N= 48/(48+63) or 43.2% of the total sample.

•

TOT estimates are not calculated and the method used to derive at TOT estimates is nonexperimental.
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•

Control crossover and voucher take-up rates not available.

Parents Advancing Choice in Education (Dayton, OH)
Peterson, Howell, Wolf & Campbell (2003)
•

ITT effects: combined African-American and Other Ethnic Group results from Table
4B.3 in Peterson, Howell, Wolf & Campbell (2003) using meta-analytic average.

•

TOT effects: combined African-American and Other Ethnic Group results from Table 4.3
in Peterson, Howell, Wolf & Campbell (2003) using meta-analytic average.

•

ITT treatment and Control group sample sizes after years 1 and 2 based on response rate
in each year times number of vouchers offered. For example: first year treatment group
sample size is the total number of offers times the response rate (515 x 56%) from p. 195
of Howell, Wolf, Campbell, & Peterson (2002).

•

Response rates between treatment and control assumed to be the same according to
Peterson, Howell, Wolf & Campbell (2003), p. 197.

•

Voucher take up rate from Peterson, Howell, Wolf & Campbell (2003).

•

Control crossover rate from Table 6. (p. 2014) in Howell, Wolf, Campbell, & Peterson
(2002).

Programa de Ampliacion de Cobertura de la Educacion Secundaria (PACES)
Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King, & Kremer (2002)
•

ITT reading effect from Table 5.

•

Control group sample size from Table 2, total ITT sample size from Table 5.

•

TOT sample sizes from Table 7 (Control = 562, N of “Loser Means’; Total = 1,147)

•

Sample attrition (year 3) is based on 283 students who took the test (Table 2) out of the
total 1,147 (Table 3).
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•

Program attrition estimated to be 43% from p. 1543, which stated: "Not all winners were
using their PACES vouchers in the survey year. This is because 15 percent of winners
were not in school at all, and another 16 percent were in public schools, and therefore
ineligible for scholarships. Some lottery winners also lost their voucher after repeating a
grade (7 percent), while 5 percent switched to nonparticipating private schools or failed
to complete the paperwork for a transfer. Others attended schools that stopped accepting
vouchers or lost their vouchers for unreported reasons.” The sum of 15%, 16%, 7%, and
5% is 43%.

•

TOT effects were bloom adjusted using the voucher take up rate of 57%:
𝑇𝑂𝑇 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 =

𝑇𝑂𝑇 𝑀𝑎𝑡ℎ =

𝐼𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡
𝑉𝑜𝑢𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑢𝑝 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒

𝐼𝑇𝑇 𝑀𝑎𝑡ℎ 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡
𝑉𝑜𝑢𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑢𝑝 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒

•

Voucher take-up rate from p. 1543 (see program attrition calculation above).

•

Control crossover rate is somewhat different from other studies, because what is reported
is the percent of control group that received scholarships from other sources (p. 1536).

Angrist, Bettinger, & Kremer (2006)
•

ITT effects for year 7 (ICFES exam scores) are the Tobit 10% results on p. 853.

•

Total sample size (3,541) from footnote in Table 3. Treatment group was 58.5% of total
sample size (Table 1, p. 850)

•

Program attrition: 50% within three years (p. 854). Voucher take-up rate based on this as
well.

•

Sample attrition Table 1 as:
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𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
•

𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒−𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑑 (𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑 𝐼𝐷 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑔𝑒)
𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒

=

4,044−3,542
4,044

= 12.4%

TOT effects were calculated from the ITT estimate using the following Bloom
adjustment:

𝑇𝑂𝑇 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 =

𝐼𝑇𝑇 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒

where the usage rate is 1- program attrition = 1 - .5 = .5
School Choice Scholarships Foundation Program (NYC)
Barnard, Frangakis, Hill, & Rubin (2003)
•

Sample attrition: Utilized Table 1 for total number at randomization (676+676 = 1352),
and 1,050 as the observed sample, to calculate attrition rate of 22%: (1,352-1,050)/1,352

•

Program attrition: Midpoint of 20% and 27%, the percentage of children who won
scholarships and did not use them (p. 301).

•

ITT effects: overall estimate based on a meta-analytic average of the “Low School” and
“High School” impacts presented in Table 4. “Overall” impacts (combination of different
grades at application) were used.

•

There was a lack of detail on sample sizes, so treatment and control group sample sizes
were based on a 50/50 split of the total number of single-child families included in the
analysis (p. 301).

•

Voucher take-up rates and control crossover rates from p. 301.

Peterson, Howell, Wolf & Campbell (2003)
•

ITT effects: combined African-American and Other Ethnic Group results from Table
4B.1 in Peterson, Howell, Wolf & Campbell (2003) using meta-analytic average.
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•

TOT effects: combined African-American and Other Ethnic Group results from Table 4.2
in Peterson, Howell, Wolf & Campbell (2003) using meta-analytic average.

•

ITT treatment and Control group sample sizes after years 1 and 2 based on response rate
in each year times number of vouchers offered. For example: first year treatment group
sample size is the total number of offers times the response rate (1,300 x 82% = 1,066)
from p. 195 of Howell, Wolf, Campbell, & Peterson (2002). first year control group
sample size is total N from Peterson, Howell, Wolf & Campbell (2003) of 1,434 minus
the 1,066 treatment units.

•

Response rates between treatment and control assumed to be the same according to
Peterson, Howell, Wolf & Campbell (2003), p. 197, with the exception of in year 2. In
year 2, the response rate was 7 percentage points higher in the treatment group than in the
control group. Treatment and control split in year 2 was generated so that this differential
was approximately 7 percentage points (912/1300 = 70.2% is the treatment group
response rate and 284/449 = 63.3% is the control group response rate).

•

Control crossover rate from Table 6, p. 2014 oh Howell et al. (2002). No data reported
for third year control crossover rate.

•

Voucher take-up rate from p. 110 of Peterson et al. (2003).

Krueger & Zhu (2004)
•

Assumed to be same data as Bitler et al. (2015) so if statistics were not available in
Krueger & Zhu (2004), we referenced Bitler et al. (2015).

•

ITT treatment effects from Table 3b (with revised weights and without controls for
baseline scores).
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•

For year three sample sizes, 2,770 is assumed to be the original all inclusive sample,
because 1,801 was reportedly left after roughly 35% attrition. Half each of 2,770 is
assumed to be treatment and control (1,385 each). Treatment and Control attrition rates
(p. 638) were then used to calculate the number of treatment and control units in the
analytic sample. For example 35.4% of the control group attrite, so the remaining is 895,
and the remaining 906 in the total sample size are assumed to be treatment units.

•

Year 1 and 2 treatment and control splits were assumed to be in the same ratio in year
three.

•

Sample attrition rates for each year were then calculated based on the observed sample
size in a given year and the original sample size (2,770).

•

Program attrition rates in each year are assumed to be the same as Bitler et al. (2015),
from Table A2, Panel B.

•

TOT effects from Table 6 2SLS results.

•

TOT samples sizes: assumed to be the same as ITT, because not enough information.

•

Control crossover rate from p. 695 (percent of students in control group who attended
private school in at least one year).

•

Voucher-take up rate from Table 1.

Jin, Barnard, & Rubin (2010)
•

No ITT effects, because this is just using a different TOT-methodology with the same
Barnard et al. (2003) and Krueger & Zhu (2004) sample.

•

TOT effects from Table 7. Same assumptions made as Barnard et al. (2003).

•

Control crossover and voucher take-up rates from p. 156.
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Bitler, Domina, Penner, & Hoynes (2015)
•

Sample sizes all assumed to be the same as Krueger & Zhu (2004).

•

Sample attrition from Panel A of Table A1 (Bitler et al., 2015). For example, year 1 math
attrition was calculated as the difference between the number of students randomized and
the number of students with valid test scores (2,666 – 1,977), divided by the number of
students randomized (2,666).

•

Program attrition: From Panel B of Table A2 (Bitler et al., 2015). For example, in year 1,
1,022 of the 1,292 students randomized were attending a private school, indicating a first
year usage rate of 79.1% and program attrition in the first year of 20.9%.

•

ITT effects from Table 3, last column.

•

TOT effects were calculated from the ITT estimates using the following Bloom
adjustment:

𝑇𝑂𝑇 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 =

𝐼𝑇𝑇 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒

where usage rates were based on Table A2, Panel B. For example, in year 1, 1,022 of the 1,292
students randomized were attending a private school, indicating a first year usage rate of 79.1%.
•

Control crossover rate calculated from Table A2, p. 446.

•

Voucher take-up rate from Table A2, p. 446 (assuming that if in private, they are using
voucher). However, there appears to be an error in Table A2, because the sum of the
private and public students among the treatment group does not add to the 1292 (e.g. 352
+ 1022 does not equal 1292). Table A1 shows the correct total treatment number (1374)
so we use this as the denominator to calculate the take up rates.

Washington Scholarship Fund (WSF)
Peterson, Howell, Wolf & Campbell (2003)
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•

ITT effects: combined African-American and Other Ethnic Group results from Table
4B.2 in Peterson, Howell, Wolf & Campbell (2003) using meta-analytic average.

•

TOT effects: combined African-American and Other Ethnic Group results from Table 4.4
in Peterson, Howell, Wolf & Campbell (2003) using meta-analytic average.

•

ITT treatment and control group sizes after years 1 and 2 based on response rate in each
year times number of vouchers offered. For example: first year treatment group sample
size is the total number of offers times the response rate (809 x 63% = 510) from p. 195
of Howell, Wolf, Campbell, & Peterson (2002)

•

Response rates between treatment and control assumed to be the same according to
Peterson, Howell, Wolf & Campbell (2003), p. 197.

•

The standard error on the three year reading impact for Other Ethnic Groups was not
reported in Peterson, Howell, Wolf & Campbell (2003), but due to uniformity of standard
error patterns across years within each subject, we calculated an average. For example,
the standard errors for DC reading ITT impacts for African-American students were 1.5,
1.4, and 1.5 standard deviations for years 1, 2, and 3). The three year reading ITT
standard error is the average of the one and two year standard errors (8.0 and 9.1).

•

Control crossover rate from Table 6, p. 204 of Howell et al. (2002). No data reported for
third year control crossover rate.

•

Voucher take-up rate from p. 111 of Peterson et al. (2003).
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Appendix E:
Table E1: Effect Sizes (Hedge’s g) and Standard Errors, by Study
ITT Reading
Program Evaluated
Andhra Pradesh School
Choice Experiment

Studies included
Muralidharan &
Sundararaman (2015)

ITT English

0.009

0.022

0.185

0.031

-0.053

0.030

0.101

0.025

0.364

0.036

-0.104

0.036

4

0.131

0.020

0.116

0.032

-0.031

0.031

0.271

0.024

0.229

0.038

-0.061

0.037

SE

Hedge's
g

TOT Math

2

SE

Hedge's
g

TOT English

Hedge's
g

SE

Hedge's
g

TOT Reading

Years of
Treatment

SE

Hedge's
g

ITT Math

SE

Hedge's
g

SE

Charlotte Children’s
Scholarship Fund

Greene (2000); Cowen
(2008)

1

0.168

0.077

0.168

0.077

0.131

0.077

0.217

0.076

0.217

0.076

0.157

0.076

Children's Scholarship
Fund (Toledo, OH)

Bettinger & Slonim
(2006)

3

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

0.005

0.149

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

0.011

0.149

District of Columbia
Opportunity Scholarship
Program (OSP)

Wolf, Kisida,
Gutmann, Puma, Eissa,
& Rizzo (2013)

1

0.030

0.051

0.030

0.051

0.080

0.050

0.039

0.051

0.039

0.051

0.105

0.050

Wolf et al. (2013)

2

0.090

0.052

0.090

0.052

0.010

0.052

0.113

0.052

0.113

0.052

0.013

0.052

Wolf et al. (2013)

3

0.130

0.054

0.130

0.054

0.030

0.053

0.150

0.054

0.150

0.054

0.030

0.053

Wolf et al. (2013)

4

0.110

0.057

0.110

0.057

0.020

0.057

0.130

0.057

0.130

0.057

0.030

0.057

Dynarski, Rui,
Webber, Gutmann, &
Bachman (2017)

1

-0.090

0.062

-0.090

0.062

-0.120

0.062

-0.120

0.062

-0.120

0.062

-0.170

0.062

Wolf, Egalite, & Dixon
(2015)

1

0.005

0.039

0.010

0.056

0.110

0.056

0.010

0.039

0.020

0.056

0.130

0.056

2

0.095

0.044

0.150

0.062

0.070

0.061

0.159

0.044

0.250

0.062

0.120

0.061

Abdulkadiroglu,
Pathak & Walters
(2015); Mills & Wolf
(2017)

1

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

-0.150

0.039

-0.150

0.039

-0.538

0.040

Mills & Wolf (2017)

2

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

-0.181

0.052

-0.181

0.052

-0.337

0.053

Ensure Access to Better
Learning Experiences
(ENABLE)
Louisiana Scholarship
Program (LSP)

-0.140
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Mills & Wolf (2017)

3

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

0.080

0.059

0.080

0.059

0.059

Table E1 Cont’d: Effect Sizes (Hedge’s g) and Standard Errors, by Study
ITT Reading
Program Evaluated
Milwaukee Parental
Choice Program (MPCP)

Parents Advancing Choice
in Education (Dayton, OH)
Programa de Ampliacion
de Cobertura de la
Educacion Secundaria
(PACES)

Studies included
Rouse (1998); Greene,
Peterson & Du (1999)

Peterson, Howell, Wolf
& Campbell (2003)

ITT English

0.070

0.045

0.070

0.045

0.094

0.045

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

2

0.054

0.049

0.054

0.049

0.081

0.049

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

3

0.069

0.057

0.069

0.057

0.123

0.057

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

4

-0.003

0.069

-0.003

0.069

0.263

0.070

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

1

0.137

0.110

0.137

0.110

0.008

0.110

0.008

0.110

0.008

0.110

0.009

0.110

2

0.171

0.112

0.171

0.112

0.117

0.112

0.173

0.112

0.173

0.112

0.118

0.112

3

0.202

0.120

N/A

N/A

0.153

0.120

0.166

0.042

N/A

N/A

0.125

0.059

7

0.700

0.035

N/A

N/A

0.400

0.034

1.400

0.038

N/A

N/A

0.800

0.035

SE

Hedge's
g

TOT Math

1

SE

Hedge's
g

TOT English

Hedge's
g

SE

Hedge's
g

TOT Reading

Years of
Treatment

SE

Hedge's
g

ITT Math

SE

Hedge's
g

SE

Angrist, Bettinger,
Bloom, King &
Kremer (2002)
Angrist, Bettinger, &
Kremer (2006)
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Table E1 Cont’d: Effect Sizes (Hedge’s g) and Standard Errors, by Study
ITT Reading
Program Evaluated
School Choice
Scholarships
Foundation Program
(NYC)

Washington
Scholarship Fund
(WSF)

ITT English

ITT Math

TOT Reading

TOT English

TOT Math

Years of
Treatment

Hedge's g

Peterson, Howell,
Wolf & Campbell
(2003); Barnard,
Frangakis, Hill &
Rubin (2003); Jin,
Barnard & Rubin
(2010)*; Krueger
& Zhu (2004);
Bitler, Domina,
Penner & Hoynes
(2015)

1

-0.008

0.025

-0.008

0.025

0.044

0.025

0.011

0.023

0.011

0.023

0.069

0.023

Peterson et al.
(2003); Krueger &
Zhu (2004); Bitler
et al. (2015)

2

0.027

0.030

0.027

0.030

-0.017

0.030

0.029

0.030

0.029

0.030

-0.037

0.030

Peterson et al.
(2003); Krueger &
Zhu (2004); Bitler
et al. (2015)

3

0.019

0.029

0.019

0.029

0.039

0.029

0.013

0.025

0.013

0.025

0.042

0.029

1

-0.154

0.066

-0.154

0.066

0.144

0.066

-0.156

0.066

-0.156

0.066

0.143

0.066

2

0.173

0.076

0.173

0.076

0.226

0.076

0.172

0.076

0.172

0.076

0.225

0.076

3

-0.060

0.078

-0.060

0.078

0.016

0.078

-0.064

0.078

-0.064

0.078

0.035

0.078

Studies included

Peterson, Howell,
Wolf & Campbell
(2003)

*Jin, Barnard & Rubin (2010) contributes only to TOT effects.

SE

Hedge's g

SE

Hedge's g

SE

Hedge's g

SE

Hedge's g

SE

Hedge's g

SE
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Chapter 3
The juice is worth the squeeze: A cost-effectiveness analysis of the experimental evidence
on private school vouchers around the globe.

M. Danish Shakeel (mdshakee@uark.edu)
Kaitlin P. Anderson (kaitlina@uark.edu)
Patrick J. Wolf (pwolf@uark.edu)

Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the conferences of the Society for Research on
Educational Effectiveness in spring 2017 and the Association for Public Policy and
Management’s International in Brussels, Belgium, July 13-14, 2017.
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1. Introduction
Private school vouchers allow parents to choose any school for their children using
government resources (Wolf, 2008). Parental choice and satisfaction make families active
consumers of education where they can demand quality education in a school market. In the
U.S., both government- and privately-sponsored voucher programs exist. School choice has also
become a topic of high relevance since Donald Trump favored school choice during his recent
successful presidential run and nominated Betsy DeVos—a voucher proponent—as his Secretary
of Education. Chapter 2 of this dissertation shows that experimental studies on school voucher
programs have generally found null to moderately positive achievement effects within the United
States. Evaluations of the Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP) and a recent second evaluation
of the District of Columbia Opportunity Scholarship Program (DC-OSP II) are the only
exceptions; three evaluations have found negative effects of these two school voucher programs
on student achievement in the initial years (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & Walters, 2015; Dynarski
et al., 2017; Mills & Wolf, 2017).
Chapter 3 studies the 11 school voucher programs around the globe (also studied in
chapter 2 of this dissertation) from a cost-effectiveness perspective. This study adds to the
literature on cost effectiveness by combining experimental estimates of the participant effects of
private school vouchers with the estimated cost savings associated with these programs. We
compare the efficiency of vouchers in terms of reading and math gains, for programs within and
outside the U.S., and for publicly- versus privately-funded programs. We argue that null to
positive test score findings from school voucher program evaluations should be viewed from a
cost-effectiveness perspective.
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Two definitions are central to our study. “Effectiveness” is the extent to which a program
accomplishes its intended goals. “Cost-effectiveness” is “the efficacy of a program in achieving
given intervention outcomes in relation to the program costs.” (Rossi, Lipsey & Freeman, 2004,
p. 425) A program can be cost-effective because it generates better outcomes at a similar cost or
because it produces similar outcomes at a lower cost. In the real world of scare resources, either
result relatively benefits society.
The economic theory of vouchers is to increase educational effectiveness through choice
and competition. Chapter 2 of this dissertation showed that the academic achievement effects of
vouchers, though they tend to increase with years of treatment, are generally modest in size.
Outside the U.S., in developing countries, the achievement effects of school vouchers are
generally larger. This differential could be due to a larger gap between public and private school
quality in developing countries compared to the U.S. Some studies on vouchers have found
larger positive effects on graduation rates (Cowen et al., 2013; Wolf et al., 2013; Chingos &
Peterson, 2015) and college enrollment (Cowen et al., 2013; Chingos & Peterson, 2015) while
having null to moderately positive achievement effects on participants. This pattern has led some
education researchers to study non-test score outcomes, which may be affected differently than
cognitive (e.g. test score) outcomes in an education intervention.
Few education interventions produce large positive effects on test scores, according to
experimental evidence. Lipsey et al. (2012) conducted a large-scale meta-analysis of all
education randomized controlled trials (RCTs) since 1995, concluding that the average impact of
an intervention on test scores for a broad-based standardized test was 0.08 standard deviations
(SD) at the elementary level and 0.15 SD at the middle school level. Thus, the meta-analysis in
chapter 2 of this dissertation indicates that school vouchers tend to produce global test score
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effects that are typical of other education interventions. Nevertheless, promising educational
interventions must not only be effective but also efficiently use public resources. Hence, we
study the cost-effectiveness of the experimental evidence on school vouchers.
This study suffers from several concerns. We consider two basic issues concerning the
effectiveness of vouchers at raising student test scores: 1) how to interpret null-effects of voucher
interventions and 2) achievement effects that change in magnitude and statistical significance
over time. Concerning the first issue, Muralidharan (2015) lists five different interpretations of
null-effects. A private school voucher intervention may yield null-effects due to: a) lack of
program fidelity, b) substitution effects as a result of pulling away of schooling inputs in
response to the voucher, c) positive effects for the participants equaled by positive competitive
effects on non-participants, d) lack of administrative reforms that hinder the effectiveness of the
voucher intervention, or e) a true null-effect on all students. Howell et al. (2002) found positive
achievement gains for the African-American subgroup of participants in their evaluation of the
voucher program in Dayton, OH. The same evaluation, however, yielded an overall null
achievement impact on all participants. In case of an overall null impact, a targeted voucher
program may meet its objectives by raising student achievement for the disadvantaged families.
Thus, overall null impacts in a voucher program warrant further analysis.
Second, not all voucher programs show a linear relationship between the effect size and
years of treatment. While few voucher programs have been evaluated for more than a couple
years, the existing evidence in chapter 2 of this dissertation shows that the relation between
effect size and years of treatment may be non-linear. This pattern creates a dilemma for drawing
relevant policy conclusions for the true effect of a voucher intervention, especially if there is
large variation, change in sign or statistical significance of effect size over the different years of
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treatment. Thus, conclusions drawn from the early years of an evaluation may be substantively
different from conclusions drawn from later years of an evaluation, which are arguably more
policy relevant, but more time- and resource-intensive to obtain.
This issue can be understood mathematically by differentiating between the partial and
total derivative of the outcome of interest with respect to the observables. In any voucher RCT, it
is expected that by randomly assigning the observable explanatory variable 𝑋𝑖𝑡 the production
parameter 𝛽 can be efficiently obtained. However, 𝛽 is a partial derivative of the outcome of
𝜕𝑇

interest with respect to the explanatory variable 𝜕𝑋𝑖𝑡 . The partial derivative assumes that the
𝑖𝑡

observable explanatory variable 𝑋𝑖𝑡 remains constant. However, with increases in the length of
treatment, the school and family-level characteristics may endogenously confound 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , resulting
in inaccurate estimates of 𝛽. Instead of the partial derivative, the total derivative

𝑑𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑑𝑋𝑖𝑡

may more

appropriately account for any re-optimization by the school or family agents in response to an
exogenous change in the explanatory variables. Family satisfaction is key to a market oriented
reform like school vouchers and it is expected that changing schools would require some time for
adjusting the household level inputs for the family. Similarly, the schools are also likely to reoptimize their inputs due to competition, entry and exit of students. The latest year of a voucher
intervention may be more policy relevant, especially if a voucher intervention is to be scaled up
based on results from a limited intervention. In some cases vouchers may actually increase the
amount of personal resources that families devote to education. This is clearly the case in the
voucher program of Bogota, Colombia. It allowed families to top up and had incentives for
students to get continued access to their voucher if they passed the exams. Thus, an earlier year
of an evaluation may yield the production function effect while the latest year of evaluation may
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yield the policy parameter effect which accounts for this re-optimization by agents and is more
policy relevant (Das et al., 2013; Glewwe & Muralidharan, 2016).
To draw more policy relevant conclusions concerning achievement effects from a
voucher intervention, six issues must be raised in future studies: 1) long-term voucher
interventions must establish the relation between effect size and years of treatment, 2) the
interventions should address the five points raised above concerning null-effects, 3) the
production function vs. policy parameters dilemma should be emphasized, 4) the last year’s
cognitive effects should be the parameter to compare with non-cognitive outcomes of voucher
interventions, 5) the details of the validation, reliability and construction process of the
achievement test used in the interpretation should be provided in the papers, and 6) researchers
should also study the outcomes from a cost-effectiveness perspective.
Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2015) and Wolf and McShane (2013) argue in favor of
considering the cost-effectiveness of school vouchers as their findings indicate that null-effects
in school voucher settings are achieved at a fraction of the cost of per pupil public school
expenditures. A thorough analysis of the cost-effectiveness of school vouchers across the globe,
conducted here, provides the foundation for a greater scholarly consensus regarding the ability of
school vouchers to improve outcomes for students.
We focus our cost-effectiveness study on RCTs because these are the “gold standard” of
program evaluation in terms of assessing causal relationships (Mosteller & Boruch, 2002; Rossi,
Lipsey & Freeman, 2005). In RCTs, the assignment of a voucher is random, and therefore the
issue of selection bias is resolved, as treatment and control group units should be identical in
expectation. While quasi-experimental design (QED) methods (quasi-experimental designs allow
estimation of the causal impact of an intervention on a targeted population but lack the feature of
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random assignment of program participants to treatment and control groups) are often used to
approximate the causal effect of a program, evidence from a within-study comparison (Anderson
& Wolf, 2017) indicates that QEDs do not necessarily approximate causal estimates from an
RCT, and that even the direction of the selection bias is not consistently predictable. For
example, while it is often thought that more motivated or more able families self-sort into private
schools and/or voucher programs, this is not always the case (Anderson & Wolf, 2017).
In addition to the participant effects of vouchers, the competitive effects of vouchers (the
effect of choice-based competition on the performance of affected public schools) are also
relevant for studying the cost-effectiveness of vouchers. Positive competitive effects of voucher
programs would strengthen the case for the cost-effectiveness of vouchers while negative
competitive effects would make an overall conclusion more difficult. Chakrabarti (2008) showed
that when money follows the student, there are increasing incentives for the improvement in the
traditional public school system. Reviews on competitive effect of vouchers generally indicate
positive or neutral to positive impacts of vouchers on the performance of affected public schools
(Egalite & Wolf, 2016; Forster, 2016). Given the generally positive competitive effects, the
current analysis on the cost-effectiveness of vouchers provides a lower bound on the societal
benefit of vouchers.
The cost-effectiveness analysis proceeds as follows. In section 2, we discuss earlier
studies on school vouchers that have studied the outcomes from a productivity perspective.
Section 3 describes the funding structure of the programs included in the cost-effectiveness
analysis. In section 4, we describe the research methodology and assumptions made. Section 5
presents the results of the cost-effectiveness analysis. Section 6 concludes by discussing the
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policy implications of the cost-effectiveness analysis. We also discuss cautions when drawing
policy implications from the study.
2. Literature review
Earlier studies on the fiscal effects of publicly-funded school vouchers have found
financial benefits for the voucher funding body (i.e. the government). This conclusion is because
the typical per-pupil voucher cost is less than the per-pupil cost had the same student attended a
traditional public school. The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) is the longest
running voucher program in the United States. Costrell (2010) estimated the net fiscal impacts of
MPCP as approximately $52 million per year. With MPS denoting Milwaukee Public Schools,
Costrell (2010, p. 4) relied upon the following:
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 = (𝑀𝑃𝑆 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑙×𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑀𝑃𝑆 𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)
−(𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟×𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑃 𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)
The MPCP program expanded over time. Thus, by comparing the newer estimates of the net
fiscal impact of MPCP with estimates in his earlier evaluation of the MPCP, Costrell found that
the net fiscal impacts of the MPCP were positive and growing over time with program
expansion.
The District of Columbia Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP) is the only federally
funded private school voucher program in the U.S. In a benefit/cost analysis of the DC OSP,
Wolf and McShane (2013) took into account the increase in graduation rate induced by the
program and estimated the economic returns to education attainment. Their estimates suggest
that DC OSP’s impacts on educational attainment generated a return on investment (ROI) of
approximately 162 percent. In other words for the low-income students in DC, for every dollar
spent on the program, a return of $2.62 was estimated.
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In a review of the fiscal benefits of 10 school voucher programs, Spalding (2014)
estimated total savings of $1.7 billion as the lower bound since the inception of the MPCP in
1990-91 through 2010-2011. The calculations also showed an increase of over 230 times in the
enrollment in school voucher programs in the analyzed timeframe. The increase in demand for
school vouchers and the associated cost savings should draw the interest of policymakers for
more experimental testing of voucher programs in the U.S. The contribution of our study relative
to Spalding (2014) is the cost-effectiveness analysis of 11 voucher program around the globe that
have been experimentally evaluated for achievement effects.
Generally, the students leaving the traditional public schools for a voucher-accepting
school generate fiscal benefits for the public school, as the leaving students cost more to educate
than the revenue lost from the state (Scafidi 2012; Trivitt & DeAngelis 2016). This is so as the
cost of educating a child in the school constitutes both variable (such as costs associated with
current instructional expenses, current student support/pupil support, instructional support, and
food service) and fixed costs (such as facilities costs). When a child leaves a school, only the
variable portion of the costs associated with educating the child is lost but there is no effect on
the fixed portion of the cost in the short term. As a result, when a student leaves a public school
via a private school choice program, the remaining students in that school actually have
increased financial resources, on a per-pupil basis. Hence, an average public school district
would generally receive fiscal benefits due to school choice interventions.
Tax-credit scholarship programs, which operate like voucher programs but are funded
through donations to non-profits, also produce fiscal benefits, but these benefits may differ from
the savings associated with vouchers for a variety of reasons. Publicly funded voucher programs
require taxpayers to financially support the voucher amount while tax-credit scholarship
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programs allow taxpayers to receive partial or full tax credits for donating to nonprofits (Lueken,
2016). Some voucher programs involve fixed tuition amounts and regulations that affect
participation by families and schools that prefer tuition top up. As tax-credit scholarship
programs seemingly give more freedom to the taxpayers, they might produce different impacts
than school vouchers due to choice differentiation, in a market where school choice is in high
demand. In addition, tax-credit scholarship programs have proven to be more politically
palatable, as they do not require participation by all taxpayers, as full voucher programs do. On
the other hand, tax-credit scholarship programs, if implemented, may have a lower take-up rate
by donors, since individuals must choose to donate to nonprofits, as opposed to a voucher
program, for example, in which taxpayers are required to contribute and all school-age children
are able to participate at no additional private cost. Lueken (2016) estimated overall savings
between $1,650 and $3,001 per student, on average, for ten tax-credit scholarship programs in
the U.S. The cumulative savings per student to the taxpayers for different tax-credit scholarship
programs ranged between $298 and $8,450.
Fiscal benefits are not restricted to private school choice. Public charter schools also
produce fiscal benefits. Wolf et al. (2014) used two measures for the productivity of public
charter schools. They estimated the gains in the student test scores on the 2010-11 National
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) per a $1,000 investment in education of a student
in charter school in comparison to the traditional public school. In their second measure, they
calculated a return on investment (ROI) by converting the learning gains in the charter and
traditional public school sectors into an estimate of economic returns over a lifetime for the
students. Thereafter, they compared the gains to the revenue amounts that had been invested in
the student’s education. The authors conclude, “the analyses we present in this report indicate
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that charter schools are more productive than TPS, either because they produce higher student
gains at a lower cost or because they produce similar or only slightly lower student gains at a
significantly lower cost.” (Wolf et al., 2014, p. 9).
Positive fiscal impacts of private school vouchers may also be expected in international
contexts where the private schools charge less per-pupil tuition in comparison to the average perpupil government expenditure in the public school system. Muralidharan and Sundararaman
(2015) reported the funded voucher amount to be around 40% of the per-student costs in the
public schools. Due to the larger quality gap between public and private schools in the
developing world, the cost effectiveness of private school vouchers may be higher there in
comparison to voucher interventions in the U.S.
3. Funding structure of the programs included in the analysis
The RCTs of private school vouchers included in our analysis were located in three
countries: the United States of America (U.S.), Colombia and India. Eight out of these eleven
voucher programs analyzed were administered within the U.S. The U.S. studies covered
programs in Charlotte, NC; Dayton, OH; Milwaukee, WI; New York City; Toledo, OH;
Washington, DC (two separate programs) and Louisiana. The participants in the RCTs were
children who were randomized through a lottery to receive (or not) a voucher to attend a private
school. The grades analyzed ranged from K to 12, although most RCTs included a shorter grade
range in their analysis. Most of the private schools that participate in voucher programs in the
U.S. and other countries are relatively low-cost schools with per-student costs below the average
amount spent in area public schools (Sude, DeAngelis & Wolf, 2018). The duration of studies
analyzed ranged from one to seven years. The voucher interventions were targeted towards
disadvantaged sections of the population through income limits and/or program location. Most
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voucher-accepting private schools were already serving disadvantaged students. Often they had a
religious orientation, especially Catholic. With the exception of Louisiana, the U.S. programs
were limited to particular cities.
Table 1 shows the summary of the funding structure for the publicly or privately funded
school voucher or K-12 “scholarship” programs. The costs in Table 1 have been adjusted for
inflation and cost-of-living/purchasing power to 2013 U.S. dollars (as 2013 was the first year of
inception of the LSP program) and account for the variable proportion of the costs in traditional
public schools. We discuss details in the next section. The publicly funded programs were in
Bogota, Colombia; Washington, DC; Louisiana; and Milwaukee, WI; U.S.A. Generally, the
publicly funded programs covered full tuition costs and the privately funded programs covered
varying portions of the full tuition costs, with some combination of the parents or the schools
making up the difference. In addition, we adjust for regional cost-of-living within the U.S. using
a comparable wage approach (Taylor & Fowler, 2006). Our calculations show that the per-pupil
cost differences between the voucher amount and public school variable cost for the publicly
funded programs in the U.S. ranged from around -$1,322 in DC OSP II to -$2,842 in Louisiana;
the unadjusted amounts of the voucher were approximately $5,000 (median award amount) for
Louisiana and $8,000 for grades K-8 and up to $12,000 for grades 9-12 for DC OSP II (Dynarski
et al., 2017; Mills & Wolf, 2016). For the privately funded programs in the U.S., the proportion
of support for the tuition cost varied vastly. While we are unable to determine the exact
proportion and amount of per-pupil top-up (families contributing funds to make up the difference
between the private school tuition and the voucher amount), the per-pupil cost difference
between the voucher amounts (ignoring top-up) and the traditional public school variable cost
ranged between -$8,116 in Toledo, OH to -$4,649 in Charlotte, NC.
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Table 1: Description of 11 Voucher Programs in Cost-effectiveness Analysis
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Funding for the voucher programs in Colombia and India was extremely low. The two
privately-funded voucher programs in India were fully funded and the voucher program in
Colombia allowed top-up and was partly funded by the World Bank. In nominal USD, the
original voucher amounts ranged from about $117 in India (Wolf, Egalite & Dixon, 2015) to
$190 in Colombia (Angrist et al., 2002). Both the privately- and publicly-funded voucher
programs across the globe covered less than half of the per-pupil expenses in nearby public
schools. The international voucher programs served students living in abject poverty (Angrist et
al., 2002; Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2015; Wolf, Egalite & Dixon, 2015). The private
schools accepting voucher students have modest infrastructure, instructional facilities and special
programs for differentiating instruction to students in comparison to the nearby public schools
(Dixon, 2013; Wolf et al., 2013).
4. Research methodology and assumptions
The research design of the studies that inform the cost-effectiveness analysis was random
assignment of children to treatment and control groups.20 Most studies had a one-stage
randomization through administration of a lottery while one study in Andhra Pradesh, India
(Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2015) was based on a two-stage randomization (randomly
assigned students within randomly assigned villages). For this cost-effectiveness analysis, we
relied on estimates of the participant effects of school vouchers from the meta-analysis in chapter
2 of this dissertation. To graphically analyze the productivity of voucher programs, we compare
these experimental estimates of program benefits, in Hedge’s 𝑔 effect sizes (Hedges, 1981),

20

Chapter 2 of this dissertation excluded TOT impacts for Milwaukee as an experimental estimate was not
available. However, ITT impacts for Milwaukee are based on experimental estimates. For allowing comparison of
cost-effectiveness across all voucher interventions, the non-experimental TOT estimates for Milwaukee have been
maintained in this study.
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graphing each effect size within a circle sized according to the treatment sample size. The size of
the treatment sample is the average of treatment samples for math and reading scores for a
particular year of treatment (the treatment sizes do not differ vastly for math and reading scores).
In particular, we use Consumer Price Index (CPI) data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics21 for
the studies within the U.S., CPI data from India’s Open Government Data (OGD) Platform22 for
the studies in India, and CPI data from Colombia’s Banco de la República23 for the study in
Colombia. In addition, all U.S. costs are adjusted for regional differences in cost-of-living using
a comparable wage approach (Taylor & Fowler, 2006), and costs outside of the U.S. are adjusted
to the U.S. cost-of-living using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) data from the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).24 These adjustments allow for more careful
cost comparisons, adjusted for both inflation over time, and the relative value of (purchasing
power) of money in different localities. This approach allows us to analyze the relative
productivity of the voucher in comparison to public school expenditures in the same locality
(district or state).
We focus on the treatment on the treated (TOT), but we also analyze the ITT estimates.25
The TOT informs about the impact of the voucher on voucher winners who actually used it, and
the Louisiana Scholarship Program was a placement lottery that only yielded TOT impacts. The
cost measures for the voucher programs are accumulated from a variety of sources including
program websites, state-level websites, country-level websites, and research evaluations or other
documents. In general, to be conservative, we use the maximum voucher amount available as an

21

Source: https://www.bls.gov/cpi/
Source: https://data.gov.in/catalog/state-level-consumer-price-index-ruralurban
23
Source: http://www.banrep.gov.co/en/prices/consumer-price-index
24
Source: https://data.oecd.org/conversion/purchasing-power-parities-ppp.htm
25
Results are available from the authors on request.
22
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upper limit on the cost of the voucher, when available. Exceptions are the voucher amounts for
the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) (Rouse, 1998; Greene, Peterson, & Du, 1999;),
the LSP (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & Waters, 2015; Mills & Wolf, 2017), the Programa de
Ampliación de Cobertura de la Educación Secundaria (PACES) program in Bogota, Colombia
(Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King, & Kremer, 2002; Angrist, Bettinger, & Kremer, 2006) and the
Andhra Pradesh (AP) School Choice Experiment (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2015) where
the upper limit was not publicly available. In the first three cases, we use average voucher
amounts instead. In the fourth case (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2015) we calculate the
average voucher amount as 40 percent of the average public school expenditure per child (p.
1031, 1058). We obtain the per-pupil expenditure in public schools for Delhi, India from an
Economic Survey of Delhi, 2016-2017.26 The per-pupil expenditures for public schools in
Bogota, Colombia is obtained from Angrist et al. (2002, p. 1537).
For the U.S. studies, we subtract from the voucher costs the variable per pupil costs
associated with public school education in the same locality. Only variable expenditures are
subtracted, as the local public school system should theoretically be able to reduce costs by this
amount, while being unable to affect fixed costs in the short term. The cost measures for the
traditional public school system come from the per-pupil expenditures in a given locality in a
given year, adjusted to September 2013 dollars. These expenditures are primarily obtained from
the Census Bureau databases,27 supplemented with state-level databases from Ohio (Ohio

26
27

Source: http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/category/15375/publisher/government-of-nct-of-delhi/
Source: https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/school-finances.html
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Department of Education)28 and the National Center for Education Statistics Common Core of
Data State Fiscal Reports,29 as needed.
We use conservative guidance from Spalding (2014) to determine which public school
costs are considered variable. Specifically, we include (on a per-pupil basis) only current
instructional expenses, current student support/pupil support, instructional support, and food
service. Other fiscal effect studies have included enterprise operations (school bookstore,
interscholastic activities, etc.) as variable costs as well (Scafidi, 2012), but Spalding assumes that
as the costs associated with certain enterprise operations rise or fall, so would the associated
revenues. The removal of these would have no net fiscal difference, and we exclude these from
our lower bound estimates of the variables cost in the local TPS system. Therefore, we are
assuming only a lower bound on the potential savings from the TPS system. In one study
location and year combination (MPCP, 1990-1991), the corresponding traditional public school
expenditures were not available, so we assumed that these costs were the same as the 1991-1992
Milwaukee TPS costs, adjusted to 2013 dollars.
The public school costs outside of the U.S. are not reported in the same level of detail,30
so we are unable to differentiate between the variable and fixed components of these costs.
Therefore, when calculating the net “savings” from voucher programs outside the U.S., we make
assumptions about the proportion of total TPS costs that are variable, beginning with an
assumption based on this proportion calculated from the U.S. studies. For example, we calculate,
the percent of TPS expenditures that is considered variable for the last evaluation year for each

28

Source: http://education.ohio.gov/Topics/Finance-and-Funding/Finance-Related-Data/Expenditure-andRevenue/Expenditure-Revenue-Data
29
Sources: https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2016/2016301.pdf and https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2015/2015301.pdf
30
http://ccs.in/sites/default/files/research/research-per-child-funding-model-for-schools-in-india.pdf
http://www.accountabilityindia.in/sites/default/files/state-report-cards/paisa_report_2012.pdf
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U.S. voucher program.31 Across all U.S. programs, this percentage ranged from 64% to 79%, and
on average was 69%. This average is the typical percentage of total TPS expenditures that are
considered variable in the U.S. localities with voucher evaluations included here. We use this
number to estimate variable public school costs for the non-US studies. This decision is based on
the assumption that non-U.S. governments allocate the same proportion of their per-student
public expenditures to variable costs as in the U.S. voucher settings. This might be a strong
assumption, so we report a breakeven point at which there would be no potential savings to the
non-U.S. governments. The breakeven point is the percentage equivalent to the voucher amount
divided by the total per-student public school expenditures in non-U.S. contexts. The breakeven
points for Delhi, Andhra Pradesh and Bogota occur at 25, 40 and 54 percent, respectively. In
other words, in Delhi, India, if 25% of the traditional public school costs are variable (and
therefore represent savings from a voucher program), the program would break even, as the
average per-pupil variable cost savings would equal the average voucher amount.
The National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) created a Comparable Wage Index
(CWI) as a measure of “systematic, regional variations in the salaries of college graduates who
are not educators.” The CWI is used to make financial comparisons in terms of cost of living, or
wages demanded across geographic regions within the U.S. (Bush School of Government and
Public Service, 2016). For the U.S. studies, we utilize the CWI to adjust for regional differences
related to cost of living. Due to the lack of a similar index for the two regions in India (urban
Delhi and rural Andhra Pradesh), we are not able to adjust for cost of living differences across
those areas. For comparing the cost differences across countries we utilize the purchasing power

31

For LSP and DC OSP II, we do not have public school expenditures for 2014-2015 (not published yet by NCES)
so we use the 2013-14 expenditures instead.
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parity (PPP) conversion factor32 from the World Bank. This tool allows us to adjust for the
difference in costs that are affected by the exchange rates of currencies across the countries.
Public school expenditures are generally reported as elementary and secondary
expenditures combined. Since secondary education tends to be more expensive, we may be
overstating the comparable TPS cost for the typical student in these voucher studies, who tends
to be younger than the average K-12 student. Only one U.S. study, the DC OSP evaluation,
included students through grade 12, and the second PACES study (Angrist, Bettinger, & Kremer,
2006) included students in grades 6 to 11.
If a voucher program accepts students who were not already attending public schools
(i.e., already attending private schools), then there is no corresponding savings for the public
school system. However, few voucher/scholarship programs in the U.S. serve students already
enrolled in private school, as most are limited to public school students or rising kindergarteners
(EdChoice, 2017). In some developing countries, the public schools are often of low quality and
teacher absenteeism is high (Chaudhury et al., 2006). It is possible that vouchers in developing
countries may induce kids who are not attending a public school due to no learning to attend a
private school. Three publicly funded U.S. programs in Table 1 have already been evaluated
regarding their cost-effectiveness (Costrell, 2010; Wolf & McShane, 2013; Trivitt & DeAngelis,
2016). All three concluded that the voucher programs were more cost-effective than their TPS.
The total savings for a voucher program for the last year of treatment in each program
can be calculated33 from Table 1 as:

𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑣𝑜𝑢𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟−𝑇𝑃𝑆) ×𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑇𝑂𝑇

32
33

Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PA.NUS.PPP
Size of treatment sample may differ from the number of compliers.
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The cumulative savings associated with a voucher program can be calculated by multiplying the
above equation by the number of years of treatment for these students in Table 1. This formula
would generate a lower bound on the cumulative savings as the treatment sample for the last year
is generally the lowest for any year of evaluation due to attrition. The savings can then be
summed up across programs to generate net social savings due to these voucher programs. These
calculations should not be viewed as net fiscal impacts or benefit/cost analysis of these voucher
programs. Instead, they are a lower bound of the savings from these programs, as they represent
only the savings for students who were randomly assigned and evaluated within an RCT, and
only for certain years of the program. The overall savings from these programs accrue in part to
the government and in part to society, although the savings that we estimate are limited in that
we are unable to account for top-up in the privately-funded programs. In the privately funded
programs, while savings accrue to the government as students leave public schools, private funds
do represent a cost to society at large, and we are also ignoring additional private or social costs
related to top-up amounts. We could think of the privately funded program as providing seed
money with the later intention that funds would be public.
5. Results
We present the results graphically with the per-pupil cost difference between the voucher
amount and the TPS variable cost on the horizontal-axis of our figures. A negative cost
difference means that the voucher amount is less than the local TPS variable costs saved. In other
words, negative cost differences indicate net savings from the voucher. On the vertical axis, we
plot the effect size weighted by the size of the treatment group obtained from the meta-analysis
in chapter 2 of this dissertation. Statistically significant (at the 95% confidence interval) effect
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sizes are in bold circles. The location of each program is connected to its effect size (center of
the circle) with a line. The center of the circle above (below) the horizontal-axis represents a
positive (negative) effect size which means that treatment (voucher) students had higher (lower)
reading or math test scores, relative to their TPS peers in the same RCT study.
First, we present the overall results for reading and math (TOT) for the last year of
evaluation of the programs. Then we show the results by the type of funding received by the
program (public vs. private), and finally we graph the results by years of the treatment.
5-A. Overall impacts
The overall results for the last year evaluation of the programs for reading in Figure 1 and
for math in Figure 2 show that, generally, the productivity of vouchers is greater than that of
traditional public schools. In fact, in all cases, the cost savings are positive (all centers of circles
lie in the left two quadrants). The generally null effects come at a lower per-student cost in
comparison to per-student variable cost in public schools. In only two programs (LSP and the
second DC OSP evaluation), and only in math, were the effects of vouchers negative, and even
in these cases, the voucher programs were operating at savings relative to the TPS system. Thus,
while vouchers tend to be at least as effective as public schools, their cost-effectiveness tends to
be consistently higher. Generally, the U.S. programs seem to save more money than the non-U.S.
programs, however this is misleading given the stark differences in the level of spending
between the U.S. and non-U.S. contexts.

133

Vouchers perform better than public schools
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Figure 1: Overall impacts – TOT Reading.
Note: On the vertical axis, we plot the effect sizes, Hedges’ g estimates based on the final year
for each study from chapter 2 of this dissertation. The size of the circle corresponds to the
number of treatment students in each study. Statistically significant effect sizes are in bold
circles. The location of each program is connected to its effect size (center of the circle) with a
line. The center of the circle above/below the horizontal axis represents a positive/negative effect
size, which means that vouchers produce better/worse outcomes than the local TPSs. No reading
estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test outcomes. Reading estimate for
Delhi, India includes an overall estimate for English and Hindi. Reading estimate for Andhra
Pradesh, India includes an overall estimate for English, Hindi, and Telugu. Reading estimate for
Bogota, Colombia is for Spanish. TOT impacts for Milwaukee are non-experimental. The
variable costs for non-U.S. programs are calculated based on 69% as the typical percentage of
total TPS expenditures that are considered variable in the U.S.
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Figure 2: Overall impacts – TOT Math.
Note: On the vertical axis, we plot the effect sizes, Hedges’ g estimates based on the final year
for each study from chapter 2 of this dissertation. The size of the circle corresponds to the
number of treatment students in each study. Statistically significant effect sizes are in bold
circles. The location of each program is connected to its effect size (center of the circle) with a
line. The center of the circle above/below the horizontal axis represents a positive/negative effect
size, which means that vouchers produce better/worse outcomes than the local TPSs. TOT
impacts for Milwaukee are non-experimental. The variable costs for non-U.S. programs are
calculated based on 69% as the typical percentage of total TPS expenditures that are considered
variable in the U.S.
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5-B. Overall impacts by funding type
In Figures 3 through 6 we plot results by the type of funding received by the voucher
program. The funding source is defined as public if a voucher program received any portion of
the voucher amount from the government. Our results are limited in that they do not account for
voucher top-up, which is quite common in the case of small, privately funded vouchers, and thus
we are not able to determine which type of funding is more cost-effective among the publicly
and privately funded programs. Generally, the privately funded vouchers in the U.S. cover only
part of the private school tuition amount. The results show that even publicly-funded voucher
programs are more cost-effective than the local public school system.
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Figure 3: Overall impacts – TOT Reading (Privately Funded).
Note: On the vertical axis, we plot the effect sizes, Hedges’ g estimates based on the final year
for each study from chapter 2 of this dissertation. The size of the circle corresponds to the
number of treatment students in each study. Statistically significant effect sizes are in bold
circles. The location of each program is connected to its effect size (center of the circle) with a
line. The center of the circle above/below the horizontal axis represents a positive/negative effect
size which means that vouchers produce better/worse outcomes than the local TPSs. No reading
estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test outcomes. Reading estimate for
Delhi, India includes an overall estimate for English and Hindi. Reading estimate for Andhra
Pradesh, India includes an overall estimate for English, Hindi, and Telugu. TOT impacts for
Milwaukee are non-experimental. The variable costs for non-U.S. programs are calculated based
on 69% as the typical percentage of total TPS expenditures that are considered variable in the
U.S.
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Figure 4: Overall impacts – TOT Reading (Publicly Funded).
Note: On the vertical axis, we plot the effect sizes, Hedges’ g estimates based on the final year
for each study from chapter 2 of this dissertation. The size of the circle corresponds to the
number of treatment students in each study. Statistically significant effect sizes are in bold
circles. The location of each program is connected to its effect size (center of the circle) with a
line. The center of the circle above/below the horizontal axis represents a positive/negative effect
size which means that vouchers produce better/worse outcomes than the local TPSs. No reading
estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test outcomes. Reading estimate for
Bogota, Colombia is for Spanish. TOT impacts for Milwaukee are non-experimental. The
variable costs for non-U.S. programs are calculated based on 69% as the typical percentage of
total TPS expenditures that are considered variable in the U.S.
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Figure 5: Overall impacts – TOT Math (Privately Funded).
Note: On the vertical axis, we plot the effect sizes, Hedges’ g estimates based on the final year
for each study from chapter 2 of this dissertation. The size of the circle corresponds to the
number of treatment students in each study. Statistically significant effect sizes are in bold
circles. The location of each program is connected to its effect size (center of the circle) with a
line. The center of the circle above/below the horizontal axis represents a positive/negative effect
size which means that vouchers produce better/worse outcomes than the local TPSs. TOT
impacts for Milwaukee are non-experimental. The variable costs for non-U.S. programs are
calculated based on 69% as the typical percentage of total TPS expenditures that are considered
variable in the U.S.
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Figure 6: Overall impacts – TOT Math (Publicly Funded).
Note: On the vertical axis, we plot the effect sizes, Hedges’ g estimates based on the final year
for each study from chapter 2 of this dissertation. The size of the circle corresponds to the
number of treatment students in each study. Statistically significant effect sizes are in bold
circles. The location of each program is connected to its effect size (center of the circle) with a
line. The center of the circle above/below the horizontal axis represents a positive/negative effect
size which means that vouchers produce better/worse outcomes in comparison than the local
TPSs. TOT impacts for Milwaukee are non-experimental. The variable costs for non-U.S.
programs are calculated based on 69% as the typical percentage of total TPS expenditures that
are considered variable in the U.S.
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5-C. Overall impacts by years of treatment
In Figures 7 through 14 we plot the previous results by the duration of treatment (one,
two, three and four or more years). Both the math and reading results show that treatment
duration is positively related to voucher cost-effectiveness, as evidenced by the circles lying to
the left of the origin and generally having null to positive achievement impacts. While we cannot
determine the exact form of this relationship, generally a positive relation is visible in the graphs.
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Figure 7: Impacts for Year 1 – TOT Reading.
Note: On the vertical axis, we plot the effect sizes, Hedges’ g estimates based on the final year
for each study from chapter 2 of this dissertation. The size of the circle corresponds to the
number of treatment students in each study. Statistically significant effect sizes are in bold
circles. The location of each program is connected to its effect size (center of the circle) with a
line. The center of the circle above/below the horizontal axis represents a positive/negative effect
size which means that vouchers produce better/worse outcomes than the local TPSs. No reading
estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test outcomes. Reading estimate for
Delhi, India includes an overall estimate for English and Hindi. TOT impacts for Milwaukee are
non-experimental. The variable costs for non-U.S. programs are calculated based on 69% as the
typical percentage of total TPS expenditures that are considered variable in the U.S.
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Figure 8: Impacts for Year 2 – TOT Reading.
Note: On the vertical axis, we plot the effect sizes, Hedges’ g estimates based on the final year
for each study from chapter 2 of this dissertation. The size of the circle corresponds to the
number of treatment students in each study. Statistically significant effect sizes are in bold
circles. The location of each program is connected to its effect size (center of the circle) with a
line. The center of the circle above/below the horizontal axis represents a positive/negative effect
size which means that vouchers produce better/worse outcomes than the local TPSs. No reading
estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test outcomes. Reading estimate for
Delhi, India includes an overall estimate for English and Hindi. Reading estimate for Andhra
Pradesh, India includes an overall estimate for English, Hindi, and Telugu. TOT impacts for
Milwaukee are non-experimental. The variable costs for non-U.S. programs are calculated based
on 69% as the typical percentage of total TPS expenditures that are considered variable in the
U.S.
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Figure 9: Impacts for Year 3 – TOT Reading.
Note: On the vertical axis, we plot the effect sizes, Hedges’ g estimates based on the final year
for each study from chapter 2 of this dissertation. The size of the circle corresponds to the
number of treatment students in each study. Statistically significant effect sizes are in bold
circles. The location of each program is connected to its effect size (center of the circle) with a
line. The center of the circle above/below the horizontal axis represents a positive/negative effect
size which means that vouchers produce better/worse outcomes than the local TPSs. No reading
estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test outcomes. Reading estimate for
Bogota, Colombia is for Spanish. TOT impacts for Milwaukee are non-experimental. The
variable costs for non-U.S. programs are calculated based on 69% as the typical percentage of
total TPS expenditures that are considered variable in the U.S.
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Figure 10: Impacts for Year 4 or more – TOT Reading.
Note: On the vertical axis, we plot the effect sizes, Hedges’ g estimates based on the final year
for each study from chapter 2 of this dissertation. The size of the circle corresponds to the
number of treatment students in each study. Statistically significant effect sizes are in bold
circles. The location of each program is connected to its effect size (center of the circle) with a
line. The center of the circle above/below the horizontal axis represents a positive/negative effect
size which means that vouchers produce better/worse outcomes than the local TPSs. No reading
estimates are reported for Toledo, OH as it had only math test outcomes. Reading estimate for
Bogota, Colombia is for Spanish. TOT impacts for Milwaukee are non-experimental. The
variable costs for non-U.S. programs are calculated based on 69% as the typical percentage of
total TPS expenditures that are considered variable in the U.S.
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Figure 11: Impacts for Year 1 – TOT Math.
Note: On the vertical axis, we plot the effect sizes, Hedges’ g estimates based on the final year
for each study from chapter 2 of this dissertation. The size of the circle corresponds to the
number of treatment students in each study. Statistically significant effect sizes are in bold
circles. The location of each program is connected to its effect size (center of the circle) with a
line. The center of the circle above/below the horizontal axis represents a positive/negative effect
size which means that vouchers produce better/worse outcomes than the local TPSs. TOT
impacts for Milwaukee are non-experimental. The variable costs for non-U.S. programs are
calculated based on 69% as the typical percentage of total TPS expenditures that are considered
variable in the U.S.
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Figure 12: Impacts for Year 2 – TOT Math.
Note: On the vertical axis, we plot the effect sizes, Hedges’ g estimates based on the final year
for each study from chapter 2 of this dissertation. The size of the circle corresponds to the
number of treatment students in each study. Statistically significant effect sizes are in bold
circles. The location of each program is connected to its effect size (center of the circle) with a
line. The center of the circle above/below the horizontal axis represents a positive/negative effect
size which means that vouchers produce better/worse outcomes than the local TPSs. TOT
impacts for Milwaukee are non-experimental. The variable costs for non-U.S. programs are
calculated based on 69% as the typical percentage of total TPS expenditures that are considered
variable in the U.S.
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Figure 13: Impacts for Year 3 – TOT Math.
Note: On the vertical axis, we plot the effect sizes, Hedges’ g estimates based on the final year
for each study from chapter 2 of this dissertation. The size of the circle corresponds to the
number of treatment students in each study. Statistically significant effect sizes are in bold
circles. The location of each program is connected to its effect size (center of the circle) with a
line. The center of the circle above/below the horizontal axis represents a positive/negative effect
size which means that vouchers produce better/worse outcomes than the local TPSs. TOT
impacts for Milwaukee are non-experimental. The variable costs for non-U.S. programs are
calculated based on 69% as the typical percentage of total TPS expenditures that are considered
variable in the U.S.
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Figure 14: Impacts for Year 4 or more – TOT Math.
Note: On the vertical axis, we plot the effect sizes, Hedges’ g estimates based on the final year
for each study from chapter 2 of this dissertation. The size of the circle corresponds to the
number of treatment students in each study. Statistically significant effect sizes are in bold
circles. The location of each program is connected to its effect size (center of the circle) with a
line. The center of the circle above/below the horizontal axis represents a positive/negative effect
size which means that vouchers produce better/worse outcomes than the local TPSs. TOT
impacts for Milwaukee are non-experimental. The variable costs for non-U.S. programs are
calculated based on 69% as the typical percentage of total TPS expenditures that are considered
variable in the U.S.
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There are two main takeaways from the preceding figures. First, school vouchers are
consistently more cost-effective than the public schools, even if most of the achievement effects
are null. Second, the dilemma of the production function vs. policy parameter effect does not
produce substantively different conclusions about voucher cost-effectiveness, as for all years of
treatment, the voucher programs produced savings. While voucher effectiveness based on test
scores may vary between worse and better (the effect size on test scores can change between
positive and negative and between statistically significant to null effects) from the earliest year of
an evaluation to the latest year, voucher cost-effectiveness consistently remains positive (in DC
OSP II and LSP negative impacts were obtained at lower costs). Hence, regardless of whether
one uses estimates from the early years of treatment or later years, the conclusion is still that
voucher programs save money.
The total savings to the government from these voucher programs is high. Summing over
the costs obtained from the voucher program yields savings worth $54,786,267 for the U.S.
programs, $3,610,992 for the Colombia program, and $1,718,796 for the India programs. Overall
the voucher interventions saved the governments $60,116,057 globally. This number does not
adjust for student top-ups, per-student costs in elementary and secondary grades and cost of
living differences across Delhi and Andhra Pradesh, India. This number is only for the students
that were part of the RCTs and only for the number of years that an evaluation was conducted;
hence it is a lower bound on the overall savings from the program. A program may have students
that were not randomized and still participated. Furthermore, programs may not have been
evaluated for all years of operation (e.g., the DC OSP). Nevertheless, aligning our analysis with
previous voucher productivity studies of MPCP (Costrell, 2010), DC OSP (Wolf & McShane,
2013) and LSP (Trivitt & DeAngelis, 2016), we conclude that voucher programs tend to save the
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government money. Further investment in voucher programs may be a cost-effective policy tool
as these programs are generally at least as effective as the public schools in raising student
outcomes on math and reading.
6. Conclusions and policy implications
This cost-effectiveness analysis contributes to the field of school choice by combining
rigorous evidence from RCT studies on school vouchers with actual public school expenditures.
While voucher programs are growing across the globe, a cost-effectiveness analysis of the effect
of vouchers internationally was lacking. There is variation across programs in both costeffectiveness and impacts. No clear relationship has emerged between the cost and estimated
impacts of a program from our analysis. As hypothesized, interpreting null student test-score
impacts from a cost-effectiveness perspective reveals that private school vouchers generally
produce student test scores similar to those in the local public school system, but at a lower cost.
Our findings generally accord with Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2015) and Wolf and
McShane (2013).
The evidence suggests that all programs pass the cost-effectiveness test for reading test
score impacts, while only two evaluations had a more ambiguous overall effect (slightly negative
test scores alongside lower costs in the LSP and DC OSP-II). A meta-analysis of the
experimental studies on private school vouchers in chapter 2 of this dissertation has shown
generally higher impact of voucher programs on participants’ reading scores in comparison to
math scores. In the future, it would be interesting to see how the impacts and cost-effectiveness
of LSP and DC OSP II change with later years of evaluation of the program. Although we
distinguished between publicly- and privately-funded voucher programs, our study is limited
with the difficulty to directly compare the cost-effectiveness of these two types of funding
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mechanisms, as they differ in terms of who pays, and generally only privately-funded programs
allow top-up. This area requires further exploration.
In terms of policy recommendations, the government could save money by investing in
private school vouchers without generally losing student effectiveness. For an education
intervention to be promising, it must not only improve student outcomes, but also be costeffective. On the first measure, voucher programs, based on experimental evidence, are at least
as effective as public schools, with the exception of two U.S. programs in Louisiana and
Washington, D.C. On the second measure, they are substantially more cost-effective than public
schools. Before scaling up a voucher program, policymakers should consider funding more
experimental evaluations of school vouchers. Test scores and cost-effectiveness cover only part
of the effects of voucher programs. For scaling up voucher programs, re-optimization of
household and school level inputs deserve more exploration. It would also be important to assess
how instructional time is spent in public and private schools in voucher settings. Future studies
should also use productivity measures based on unit of instructional time spent to address the
education gap (Muralidharan, Singh & Ganimian, 2016).
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Chapter 4
Who is more free? A comparison of the decision-making of private and public school
principals

M. Danish Shakeel (mdshakee@uark.edu)
Corey A. DeAngelis (cadeange@uark.edu)

1. Introduction
While the public school principal is bound most by red tape, the private school principal
is bound most by his or her conscience.
—John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe, 1988, p. 1076
School choice has emerged as a key intervention in school reform globally. President
Donald Trump promised massive expansion of private school choice through a reallocation of
$20 billion in federal funding to school choice initiatives. Evidence suggests that private schools
slightly outperform public schools on improving student achievement within the US and
internationally (Forster, 2016; Greene, 2005; Tooley, 2005; Tooley et al., 2011). Chapter 2 of
this dissertation showed that children using voucher programs to attend private schools do
slightly better in achievement outcomes than comparison kids in public schools. Of the sixteen
experimental studies of private school choice in the United States, only three studies have shown
consistent negative findings for test scores in math, reading, or both in the early years of
evaluation (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, & Walters, 2015; Dynarski et al., 2017; Mills & Wolf,
2016).
Most school choice studies focus on student achievement (West & Woessmann, 2010;
Witte, 2001; Witte et al., 2014; Wolf et al., 2013). Other studies on private and charter schools
examine impacts on the long-term outcomes such as student attainment (Booker et al., 2008;
Cowen et al., 2013; Wolf et al., 2013; Zimmer, 2009) and criminal activity (Deming, 2011;
DeAngelis & Wolf, 2016; Dobbie & Fryer, 2015). While this evidence is limited, existing
research suggests that access to school choice reduces criminal activity and teen pregnancy while
increasing the likelihood of graduating from high school. Additionally, access to private school
choice may increase performance in public schools through competitive effects (Egalite, 2013;
Egalite, 2016; Figlio & Hart, 2014; Greene & Winters, 2003; Sandström & Bergström, 2005) and
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increase civic skills such as voting, volunteering, charitable activity, and tolerance of others
(Bettinger & Slonim, 2006; Campbell, 2002; Fleming, 2014; Fleming, Mitchell, & McNally,
2014).
Though many studies have examined whether private schools outperform public schools,
few address possible mediating factors. For example, Wolf and Hoople (2006) closely examine
the Washington Scholarship Fund, finding that the successful private schools allocated fewer
resources to facilities and programs. They also find suggestive evidence that more committed
teachers and more challenging homework made a difference. Our study fits into the literature by
examining a potential explanation for why school choice seemingly produces (modestly) positive
outcomes for students.
We examine the differences in the autonomy of school leaders, since such autonomy may
enable leaders to respond to the changing needs of students and staff within their schools.
Empowering principals to act on their superior knowledge of and interest in school level
outcomes may facilitate the creation of successful education for children (Ouchi, 2009). For
example, Grissom, Loeb and Master (2013) find that principals spending time on curricula can
positively influence student achievement. Conversely, principals allocating more time on
activities such as classroom walkthroughs may have a negative impact on student growth. Ouchi
(2009) and Hess (2013) point out that student learning cannot be improved unless school leaders
have control over important school-level activities such as curriculum, personnel, and the budget.
In schooling, it is axiomatic that leaders that are free to influence important decisions can
ameliorate inefficiencies (Tekleselassie & Villarreal III, 2011). In contrast, schools with
constrained leadership have less capacity to act in response to school level knowledge. It is
possible that principals with a lot of freedom may use it poorly or engage in corrupt practices
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such as rewarding their friends. Branch, Hanushek and Rivkin (2013) pointed out that highly
effective principals increase student learning by two to seven months within a single school year.
Chubb and Moe (1988, p. 1065) found that the public and private schools were “distinctively
different in environment and organization.” They theorized that greater autonomy would exist in
private schools with respect to structure, goals and school operations; though they did not test
this specific hypothesis. Private school principals had more teaching experience than public
school principals.
We provide an empirical test of the hypothesis that the private schooling sector allows for
more leadership autonomy than traditional public schools, using nationally representative survey
data of principals in the United States for the 2011-12 school year from the School and Staffing
Survey. We compare the reported differences between public and private school principals’
influence on decision-making activities within their schools.34
2. Theory
Families attending private schools face fewer transaction costs associated with school
exit because public schools are typically residentially assigned. This difference makes private
school operators more prone to the threat of closure (Friedman, 1955; West, 1981). Shorter term
enrollment, and thus monetary loss, can, over the medium and longer term, damage brand name,
threaten teachers’ jobs, and discourage future clients. Since families are more apt to leave private
schools if they are dissatisfied, school leaders must have the power to change schooling to
maintain customer satisfaction (West, 1997). If a private school principal is able to make the
decisions necessary to respond to the signals transmitted by his or her clients, the families would

34

Since sector is our key hypothetical independent variable, we do not examine subcategories of private schools and
public schools.
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find a better match between their needs and schools’ quality. Since public schools often have a
monopoly on public funding, and their customers are normally assigned residentially, their
leaders may face less pressure to respond to dissatisfaction (Hoxby, 2007; Peterson, 1998;
Peterson & Hassel, 1998). In other words, the transaction costs for a customer leaving a public
school are much higher, typically requiring Tiebout choice (Tiebout, 1956) or paying for a
private school out of pocket (Friedman & Friedman, 1990; Merrifield, 2008).
Public school families are less able to just pick up and leave a school. Thus, high levels
of principal autonomy can be undesirable in that sector (Neal, 2002). If a malicious, or simply
ineffective, principal leads a school, we may not want them making school-level decisions that
could negatively affect students (Murphy, 2017). If the ineffective principal is free to make bad
decisions, many students may be harmed without an exit option, especially if they come from
disadvantaged families unable to seek a wide range of options or push for modifications within
the system (Lerner, 1934; Ong-Dean, 2009). Thus, the public sector may limit the principals’
power to make decisions. As a result, central office officials may be more likely to control
important school-level decisions.
Public school principals operate under increased political constraints as they are
accountable to their school boards. Due to fewer political and bureaucratic constraints, the
private school principal is likely to have more influence in decision-making and enjoy more
autonomy in selection of students and daily administration than his or her public school
counterparts (Firestone & Shipps, 2005; Shipps & White, 2009; White, 2006). Since private
school principals do not require public funding, they are less likely to feel political pressures than
their public school peers. Hence, they may have greater influence over school-level activities.
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Additionally, private school principals may face a stronger dismissal threat than their
public school counterparts. If private school boards have fewer costs associated with dismissing
their principals, they will be more likely to be able to hold them accountable for their actions.
Possible dismissal either through boards or other superiors or via school closure due to family
exits could make private school principals more motivated to make effective decisions. On the
other hand, if a school principal is protected through unionization or civil service rules, they will
be less likely to face accountability, and perhaps less apt to perform effectively (Chubb & Moe,
1986). Since it is more difficult to fire a principal in the public sector, we expect that district
bureaucrats will reduce their autonomy in order to limit negative outcomes for students (Hess,
2013). Furthermore, public school principals theoretically have an incentive to maximize
budgets. This condition suggests central offices will not grant them much autonomy over finance
decisions (Niskanen, 1971; for schooling, see Levenson, 2012).
3. Data
The data for the public and private school principals comes from the School and Staffing
Survey (SASS) 2011-2012 questionnaire. SASS was developed by the National Center for
Education Statistics (NCES) and it has been administered seven times from 1987-88 to 20112012. Table 1 lists the question categories and what they measure.35 The public school principal
data file contained 7,510 records while the private school principal data file contained 1,720
records. There were some additional questions for public school principals, but in this study, we
compare only the common questions related to decision making. As the sample is nationally

35

For more information, see
http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sass/pdf/1112/SASS2A.pdf (for public school principals) and
http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sass/pdf/1112/SASS2B.pdf (for private school principals).
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representative, systematic differences across public and private schools after controlling for
relevant characteristics may indicate benefits of school leadership in one sector over the other.
Our dependent variables come from questions on decision-making in SASS 2011-2012.
These variables measure the influence principals perceive to have on setting performance
standards, establishing curriculum, determining content for professional development, evaluating
teachers, hiring teachers, setting discipline policy, and deciding how the budget will be spent.
This section asks the principals to rate their ability to influence seven school related activities on
a four-item Likert scale (no influence, minor influence, moderate influence and major influence)
and it includes a not applicable option for each activity (Table 1). We choose these variables as
they are proxies for autonomy and earlier work has shown that bureaucratization in public
schools acts as a hindrance for a school principal’s ability to influence school-level activities
(Chubb, & Moe, 1988; Ouchi, 2009; Hill, Pierce, & Guthrie, 2009; Nadelstern, 2013). Hence, we
expect to find increased decision making ability of the private school principal to influence the
above mentioned school-level activities in comparison to the public school principal.
Table 1: School-Related Activities over Which the Principal Has Influence
Category School-related activities
A
Setting performance standards for students of this school
B
Establishing curriculum at this school
C
Determining the content of in-service professional development programs for
teachers of this school
D
Evaluating teachers of this school
E
Hiring new full-time teachers of this school
F
Setting discipline policy at this school
G
Deciding how your school budget will be spent
We utilize questions from the survey gauging principals’ demographics and academic
and professional background for summary statistics. Tables 2A and 2B show the population
weighted summary statistics expressed as percentages for the principals in public and private
schools. Overall, private school principals report more years of principal experience but lower
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education levels in comparison to the public school principals. This result is consistent with the
findings of Hill et al. (2016). The proportion of private school principals reporting greater than
10 years of experience as a principal or school head is almost double that of public school
principals. The proportion of private school principals involved in teaching in addition to their
task as a principal or school head is also about twice that for public school principals.
A higher proportion of public school principals report having previous experience as a
department head, assistant principal or program director and participation in a school training or
development program in comparison to their private counterparts. The proportion of public
school principals holding a school administration license is about twice as large as the proportion
of private school principals. Almost all public school principals earned an MA or higher degree
while only 76% of the private school principals report doing so. The racial composition of
principals is largely white36 in both the sectors (86% in public schools and 90% in private
schools). Lastly, private schools have a larger share of females in their leadership in comparison
to the public schools.

36

This excludes mixed race, so it is a lower bound.
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Table 2A: Summary Statistics for Principal Characteristics
Measure
Public Private
Years principal or school head at this or any school prior to this year
no experience
8.32
8.78
low experience 1-3
24.55
18.82
medium experience 4-10
43.79
30.97
high experience 10+
23.34
41.43
Years principal or school head at this school prior to this year
no experience
16.46
14.52
low experience 1-3
38.83
27.62
medium experience 4-10
36.07
32.92
high experience 10+
8.64
24.94
Years of elementary or secondary teaching before becoming principal or
school head
no experience
1.70
18.51
low experience 1-3
2.79
7.99
medium experience 4-10
47.34
32.79
high experience 10+
48.16
40.71
Years of elementary or secondary teaching since becoming principal or
school head
no experience
90.41
49.69
low experience 1-3
5.42
21.87
medium experience 4-10
3.30
15.87
high experience 10+
0.87
12.56
Currently teaching at school
37.37
71.89
Notes: Summary statistics presented using population weighted percentages for each italicized
category.
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Table 2B: Summary Statistics for Principal Characteristics
Measure
Public Private
Prior to becoming a principal or school head
Worked as department head
40.4
35.3
Worked as an assistant principal or program director
73.9
43.8
Participated in school training or development program
55.3
31.4
Previous management experience outside education
40.3
46.4
Currently holding license in school administration
95.9
43.4
Having a bachelor’s degree
99.9
88.5
Bachelor degree awarded by a university’s department or college of education
81.9
67. 8
Having a master’s degree
97.6
76.3
Master’s degree awarded by a university’s department or college of education
97.4
85.4
Earned a MA and higher degree
97.8
68.9
Participated in any professional development activity related to principal or school head in last 12 months
99.3
89.6
Race (white)
86.4
90.2
Gender (male)
48.4
44.6
N
7,510 1,720
Notes: Summary statistics presented using population weighted percentages for each category.
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We also present summary statistics on the percent of private and public school principals
to state that they have a major influence on the seven outcome categories in Table 3. More than
two-thirds of private school principals state having a major influence on establishing curriculum
in their schools whereas less than half of public school principals state the same. A slightly
higher proportion of private school principals than public school principals state having a major
influence on setting performance standards, professional development and discipline policy in
their schools. On the other hand, a greater proportion of public school principals than private
school principals state having a major influence on teacher evaluation, hiring teachers and
spending budget in their schools.
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Principals’ Self-Reported Major Influence on Outcome
Variables
Measure
Public
Private
Performance Standards
73.3
80.4
Establishing Curriculum
42.6
69.1
Professional Development
69.5
74.2
Teacher Evaluation
95.3
82.1
Hiring Teachers
84.3
83.7
Discipline Policy
79.4
81.5
Budget Spending
63.8
62.1
N
7,510
1,720
Notes: Summary statistics presented using population weighted percentages for each category.
4. Methods
Since the survey responses related to decision-making are ordinal and have four
categories (from “No Influence” to “Major Influence”), the analytic technique we employ is an
ordered logistic regression (Borooah, 2001; Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003) of the form:
𝐷𝑀𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝜇i

Equation (1)

167

The dependent variable of interest DM, is the reported decision-making ability of a given
principal, i, for the following school-level activities: setting student performance standards,
establishing curriculum, determining teacher professional development content, evaluating
teachers, hiring new full-time teachers, setting discipline policy and deciding how the budget
will be spent. The decentralized nature of private schools is likely to induce better decision
making ability for the private school principal in comparison to the public school principal to
decide what is best for their schools. The dependent variable DM is likely to differ across public
and private schools due to the former’s increased centralization and bureaucratization (Chubb, &
Moe, 1988; Hill, Pierce, & Guthrie, 2009; Nadelstern, 2013; Ouchi, 2009). This variable takes
the value 1 for the least influence and the value 4 for the most influence.37 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 is a dummy
variable of value 1 if the principal is in a private school and 0 if the principal is in a public
school. The coefficient of interest, 𝛼1 , measures the mean difference of the decision-making
influence reported by private school principals relative to public school principals. The constant,
𝛼0 , measures the average principal decision-making influence reported by public school
principals.
Since we want to examine the differences between principals based solely on the type of
institution they are in, this initial model does not control for any principal or school-level
differences. In order to have a conservative estimate of the association between institution-type
and decision-making freedom, we analyze the following model that also includes school and
principal characteristics as controls:
𝐷𝑀𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼2 𝑃𝐶𝑖 + 𝛼3 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜇 i

Equation (2)

37

Since the dependent variable is ordinal, we use ordered logit regression and report average marginal effects for the
likelihood of reporting “major influence.”
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PC is a vector of controls which includes the following principal characteristics: race,
gender, education level, years of experience as a principal or school head, years of experience as
a teacher in elementary or secondary school, any experience as a department head, any
experience as an assistant principal, participation in professional development or training
programs, management experience outside of education, and whether the principle holds a
license in school administration. Vector X also includes these school-level characteristics: school
size, school level, number of full-time teachers, student/teacher ratio, percent of minority
teachers, and percent of minority students. This second model includes school and principal level
controls in order to examine if the effects are significant after accounting for differences in the
types of schools and principals hired across the two institutions.
The restricted use data provided by the NCES are imputed and adjusted for nonresponse.38 Based on the stratified probability proportionate to size sampling strategy used by
NCES in the SASS, we use the balance repeated replication (BRR) bootstrap methodology39 so
that the results reflect the true population values and not just the sampled units. This
methodology does not change our final estimates, but rather corrects the formula for the
calculation of the standard errors.

38

There are two types of non-response in the SASS survey. The unit-level non-response rates represent a fully or
partially incomplete response for the key questionnaire items on the survey. If the key questionnaire items are not
filled out, the entire survey is discarded. Additionally at least 10 percent of the remaining items should be completed
to meet the threshold for inclusion. The weighted unit-level non-response rate is approximately 73 percent for the
public school principal and it is approximately 65 percent for the private school principal. The item-level nonresponse rates represent missing items in a questionnaire that has passed the threshold to be considered complete.
Approximately 96 percent items on the survey for the public school principal and 94 percent items on the survey for
the private school principal had a response rate of 85 percent or more. Thus, the item-level non-response rate that
may affect the analysis in our study, is not high.
39
Details can be found in the User’s Manual for the 2011–12 Schools and Staffing Survey:
https://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sass/methods0708.asp
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5. Results
We now present the results for our models with and without controls in Table 4. The first
row presents results without any controls, the second includes principal-level controls, and the
third includes all school and principal-level controls. The results are robust across models,
though the model without controls only finds statistical significance for the first four categories.
The model with all controls indicates that private school principals are more likely to
report having a major influence on 6 out of 7 types of school decisions. When controlling for
school and principal-level differences across sectors, we find evidence that private school
principals exercise significantly more influence over decision-making activities. In particular,
private school principals have a higher likelihood of reporting major influence over performance
standards, curriculum, professional development, hiring teachers, discipline policy, and budget
decisions. However, private school principals have a 3.9 percentage point lower likelihood of
reporting to have a major influence on the evaluation of teachers; we will discuss this further
below. Since private school principals have a 4.9 percentage point higher likelihood of having a
major influence over the hiring of teachers, they may not need to provide as much direct
feedback. In addition, since private school principals have a 14.4 percentage point higher
likelihood of having a major influence on the content of their teacher professional development
programs, they may provide feedback through that channel instead. Notably, private school
principals have a 20-percentage point higher likelihood of reporting that they have a major
influence on establishing their school’s curriculum. Furthermore, private school principals have a
14 percentage point higher likelihood of reporting that they have a major influence on their
students’ performance standards. Having a major influence on their students’ performance
standards may be especially important for the ability of the principal to positively impact student
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achievement. Based on our results, we expect that the reduced regulatory burden found in private
schools (Chubb & Moe, 1988) grants the principals the ability to exercise more influence related
to school activities in comparison to public school principals. To explore our analysis further, we
examine the coefficients on the control variables for our preferred model, found in Table 5.
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Table 4: Results Based on Model Used
Performance
Standards
0.072***
(0.018)

Establishing
Curriculum
0.247***
(0.017)

Professional
Development
0.126***
(0.019)

Teacher
Evaluation
-0.064***
(0.009)

Hiring
Teachers
0.019
(0.014)

Discipline
Policy
0.018
(0.014)

Budget
Spending
0.001
(0.017)

Principal Controls

0.146***
(0.017)

0.259***
(0.018)

0.141***
(0.017)

-0.034***
(0.009)

0.050***
(0.014)

0.060***
(0.017)

0.049**
(0.021)

Principal and School Controls

0.140***
(0.018)

0.200***
(0.019)

0.144***
(0.016)

-0.039***
(0.009)

0.049***
(0.014)

0.067***
(0.017)

0.071***
(0.021)

9,230

9,230

9,230

9,230

9,230

9,230

9,230

No Controls

Observations

Notes: Table reports average marginal effects of private on the “major influence” category, estimated after running ordered logit
models. Demographic variables, academic training, professional development and educational attainment levels are included as
controls. Estimates use balanced repeated replication (BRR) bootstrap population weights. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Likelihood of Reporting Major Influence (All Controls)

Private School Principal
School Size
School Level
Number of Full Time Teachers
Student/Teacher Ratio
Percent of minority teachers
Percent of minority Students
Low principal Experience
Low Teaching Experience
Department Head
Assistant Principal/Program Director
School Training/ Development
License in School Administration
Management Experience
Master’s Degree or Higher
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Performance
Standards
0.140***
(0.018)
0.009*
(0.005)
0.018*
(0.010)
-0.000
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.002)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.060**
(0.025)
-0.042
(0.035)
0.034***
(0.012)
-0.027*
(0.015)
0.044***
(0.013)
0.045**
(0.022)
0.005
(0.014)
0.062**
(0.030)

Establishing
Curriculum
0.200***
(0.019)
-0.011*
(0.006)
0.073***
(0.008)
-0.001**
(0.001)
-0.002*
(0.001)
0.001***
(0.000)
-0.001**
(0.000)
-0.053**
(0.023)
-0.064
(0.040)
0.052***
(0.012)
-0.046***
(0.013)
0.015
(0.013)
0.032
(0.023)
0.012
(0.014)
-0.004
(0.028)

Professional
Development
0.144***
(0.016)
0.009
(0.007)
0.017
(0.011)
-0.001*
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.002)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.037
(0.029)
0.069
(0.076)
0.039***
(0.012)
0.001
(0.013)
0.018*
(0.011)
0.022
(0.023)
-0.023*
(0.014)
-0.024
(0.047)

Teacher
Evaluation
-0.039***
(0.009)
0.000
(0.003)
-0.003
(0.004)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.016)
-0.034**
(0.016)
0.003
(0.005)
-0.004
(0.006)
0.007
(0.005)
0.031***
(0.009)
0.002
(0.007)
0.007
(0.011)

Hiring
Teachers
0.049***
(0.014)
0.004
(0.004)
-0.001
(0.006)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.002)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.001**
(0.000)
0.015
(0.022)
-0.050*
(0.029)
0.034***
(0.011)
0.007
(0.013)
-0.006
(0.009)
0.004
(0.013)
0.001
(0.011)
0.035*
(0.019)

Discipline
Policy
0.067***
(0.017)
0.007
(0.006)
-0.017**
(0.008)
-0.000
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.002)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.085***
(0.026)
-0.049*
(0.029)
0.024**
(0.012)
-0.029*
(0.015)
0.015
(0.010)
0.037*
(0.020)
0.017
(0.012)
0.051*
(0.027)

Budget
Spending
0.071***
(0.021)
-0.006
(0.008)
-0.044***
(0.010)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.000
(0.003)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.095***
(0.023)
0.028
(0.043)
0.041***
(0.015)
0.032**
(0.013)
0.016
(0.012)
0.019
(0.031)
-0.006
(0.014)
0.075**
(0.033)

Table 5 (Cont’d): Likelihood of Reporting Major Influence (All Controls)

Professional Development
White
Female
Observations

Performance
Standards
0.146***
(0.046)
-0.006
(0.018)
0.022
(0.015)
9,230

Establishing
Curriculum
0.148***
(0.057)
-0.041*
(0.023)
0.022
(0.014)
9,230

Professional
Development
0.034
(0.126)
0.010
(0.019)
0.052***
(0.015)
9,230

Teacher
Evaluation
0.019
(0.020)
0.002
(0.009)
0.020***
(0.006)
9,230

Hiring
Teachers
0.059
(0.056)
0.035**
(0.015)
0.015
(0.011)
9,230

Discipline
Policy
0.054
(0.036)
0.051***
(0.016)
0.015
(0.012)
9,230

Budget
Spending
0.076
(0.062)
0.020
(0.021)
0.034**
(0.014)
9,230

Notes: Table reports average marginal effects for the “major influence” category, estimated after running ordered logit models.
Estimates use balanced repeated replication (BRR) bootstrap population weights. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Most of our school-level controls are unrelated to the seven outcome measures of
interest; however, some statistical significance emerges. Principals within larger schools are
more likely to report having a major influence on performance standards, but less likely to report
so for establishing curriculum. Principals in secondary schools are more likely to report having a
major influence in performance standards and curriculum, but less likely to report having
influence over discipline and budget decisions. Being in a school with a more diverse set of
teachers is associated with a higher likelihood of reporting a major influence on performance
standards and curriculum.
The coefficient on the principal’s previous experience as a department head is significant
and positive in all cases except for the case of teacher evaluation, where it is not statistically
different from zero. Hence, previous leadership experience has a systematic positive relationship
with the principal’s ability to influence school level activities. Lower levels of previous principal
experience and previous teaching experience are associated with a lower likelihood of reporting
to have an influence on most categories.
The coefficient on female is positive throughout and statistically significant for three of
the seven activities. Females seem to have systematic advantages over males in their perception
of influence over school-related activities, even after controlling for background and types of
school. Since about three-fourths of all elementary and secondary-level teachers are female,
female principals may be more able to have a strong connection with their employees (Goldring
et al., 2013). Female principals are also more apt to have a background in curriculum than their
male counterparts, and to stay longer in the principal post rather than seeing it as a stepping stone
to the superintendency (Maranto et al., 2016). Minority principals have a lower likelihood of
reporting that they have an influence over hiring teachers and setting discipline policy, but a
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higher likelihood of reporting that they have an influence over student performance standards
and curriculum. This finding may reflect the tendency of such principals to be overrepresented in
more bureaucratized, unionized urban school districts (Moe, 2011; Payne, 2008).
6. Conclusion and policy implications
Private and public school principals differ significantly in their influence on school-level
activities. Private school principals may have an advantage over their public school counterparts
in affecting student success by having significantly more influence on almost all the school
related activities. Principal characteristics, like previous experience as a department head and
having a masters or higher degree, play a positive role in their ability to exercise higher influence
on school activities. Nevertheless, the private school sector may be able to learn from the public
school sector in evaluating teachers. Female principals appear to have a systematic advantage
over their male counterparts in reporting more school-level influence.
Regarding policy implications, private school principals report having more autonomy
than public school principals on every aspect of decision-making ability except the evaluation of
teachers. This finding could reflect the emphasis that the Obama administration’s Race to the
Top program placed on teacher evaluations in public schools, though there are indications that
these provisions in fact had little impact on personnel decisions (Maranto, McShane, &
Rhinesmith, 2016).
This result could also mean that private school principals have less need for direct teacher
observation and evaluation since they have more autonomy in hiring decisions and more
involvement in the schools generally, as Chubb and Moe (1988) find. If principal autonomy is
associated with enhanced educational experiences for children, and the private sector allows for
more decision-making freedom, we should increase access to private school choice. However,
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these policy decisions would benefit substantially from additional research linking principal
autonomy to student-level outcomes.
Ouchi (2009) has emphasized the importance of principal autonomy, arguing that
principals know more and have greater interest in what happens at the school-level than do their
central office superiors (see also Nadelstern, 2013). Perhaps the relatively short tenure but
greater credentialing of public school principals, as well as larger school size may suggest that
they are climbers; that is, they see the principal position as a stepping-stone to the
superintendency and focus on pleasing superiors rather than serving kids (Downs, 1967; Maranto
et al., 2016). Cheng (2015) finds that schools where principals have more autonomy over
personnel have greater mission coherence, though his sample only includes public schools.
Principals with more autonomy in schools with greater mission coherence may be able to focus
on student success differently than principals in schools with no mission coherence.
There are, however, limitations of this analysis. Since we have relied on self-reported
measures in school surveys, the results are prone to social desirability bias as well as reference
group bias (Dobbie & Fryer, 2015; West et al., 2016). Although SASS is a nationally
representative sample and stable results over time can have good external validity, future studies
should utilize other measures like value-added measures related to school’s graduation rates and
teacher turnover to study principal’s leadership qualities.
Prior research theorized that placing decision making power at the school level may work
better (Chubb & Moe, 1988; Hill, Pierce, & Guthrie, 2009). Principals are those administrators
most aware of the daily issues at the school level: more autonomy may help them address the
issues faster. Due to the heavy bureaucratization and centralized functioning of the public school
system, principal autonomy is more robust in private schools.
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Who stays, who leaves? Determinants of principal attrition across school sectors.
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1. Introduction
Principal attrition poses a challenge to the field of educational leadership. School
principals play an important role in a schools’ performance and, presumably, they are most
informed about the issues that affect a school’s environment (Hess, 2013; Ouchi, 2009).
Principal turnover likely generates short-term shocks into the school system, which in turn may
affect school environment and student learning (Branch, Hanushek, & Rivkin, 2013; Burkhauser
et al., 2012; Mascall & Leithwood, 2010; Miller, 2013). High turnover may make it difficult for
schools to effectively implement policies (Miller, 2013), improve school environment and lay
out a plan (Day, Gu, & Sammons, 2016; Hitt & Tucker, 2016; Robinson, Lloyd, & Rowe, 2008)
and it may also affect hiring and retaining effective teachers (Baker & Cooper, 2005; Burkhauser
et al., 2012; Ronfeldt, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2013). The School Leaders Network (2014) estimates
that it costs $75,000 for a district to hire and nurture a principal. Expenses on principals’
nurturing extend beyond salary, and include costs related to participation in professional
development activities. The cost of turnover is likely to be higher for districts as the loss incurred
is on a school’s human resources and student learning. A reduction in turnover of effective
principals is likely to benefit high poverty districts, where the turnover rates are high.
Alternately, in some cases where student learning is on the decline and teachers are dissatisfied
with the school environment, the turnover of ineffective principals may yield benefits.
Nevertheless, principal turnover appears to be very important for educational leadership.
Earlier studies found heterogeneity in the types of principals who exit their schools, such
as the satisfied and the disaffected principals. For example, the majority of the satisfied
principals are pulled out of their job as they move on to better jobs with increased salary and
professional benefits, and the low performing disaffected principals are pushed out of their
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positions (Boyce & Bowers, 2016; Farley-Ripple, Raffel, & Welch, 2012; Farley-Ripple, Solano,
& McDuffie, 2012). Principal satisfaction may be related to principals’ intention to stay in the
profession as disaffected principals are more likely to return to teaching (Boyce & Bowers,
2016). Finally, their actual decisions to stay in the profession may vary based on their experience
as school leaders.
Estimates using state-level data find average principal turnover for public schools as 30
percent for Texas between 1995 and 2001 (Branch, Hanushek, & Rivkin, 2009) and 21 percent
for Illinois between 2001 and 2008 (DeAngelis & White, 2011). Using Texas state data between
1995 and 2008, Fuller and Young (2009) find that almost half of newly hired principals leave
within three years and more than two-thirds leave within five years. The nationally representative
2012-13 Principal Follow-up Survey (PFS) shows that 78 percent of school principals (public
and private) continued to be in the same school, while 12 percent left the principalship and 6
percent moved to a different school in the following year (Goldring, Taie, & Owens, 2014).
Similar statistics for the 2008-09 Principal Follow-up Survey (PFS) that also included Bureau of
Indian Education schools are 80 percent, 12 percent and 6 percent (Battle, 2010). Studying
principal turnover is important as in the 2012-2013 PFS among the principals who left the
principalship, more than 60 percent of public school principals and 70 percent of private school
principals did not leave due to retirement.
Although some research has explored the determinants of principal turnover in traditional
public schools40 using nationally representative samples (Boyce, & Bowers, 2016; Mitani, 2017;
Sun & Ni, 2016; Tekleselassie & Villarreal, 2010), a comparative analysis of the attrition
patterns of public and private school principals using nationally representative samples does not

40

Sun and Ni (2016) studied turnover behavior between charter and traditional public schools.
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exist (Rangel, 2018). A comparative analysis of attrition patterns of school principals may be
informative of the underlying school-level mechanisms that differentiate public schools from
private schools, which in turn may offer explanations for intersectoral differences in student
learning.
Private school choice has gained attention with Betsy Devos as the Secretary of
Education. The effectiveness of private schools in general and private school choice in particular
is debated (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Coleman, Hoffer, & Kilgore, 1982; Doolittle & Connors, 2001;
Lubienski & Lubienski, 2014; Ravitch, 2013). Chapter 2 of this dissertation showed that
experimental evidence indicates moderate positive effects of private school vouchers over time
on student achievement in the U.S., especially for students who remain in the program for more
than two years. However, much less is known about the mechanism through which private
schools may produce different outcomes than public schools. Differences in principals across
sectors may explain some of the observed differences between public and private schools.
Research shows that public school principal stability is positively associated with work-related
autonomy (Farley-Ripple, Raffel, & Welch, 2012; Tekleselassie & Villarreal, 2010). Some
studies argue that there is increased principal autonomy in the private school sector (Chubb &
Moe, 1988; chapter 4 of this dissertation). Yet, prior work has not explored whether more
autonomy for private school principals explains achievement or attainment differences across
school sectors.
This study utilizes nationally representative datasets to study the determinants of attrition
for public and private school principals. For this study attrition is defined as a principal leaving
the profession.41 The hypothesis tested in the study is H0: Private school principals are more

41

The questions asked to principals at baseline year of survey (to be discussed in section 3 of this study) ask about
their intentions to stay in or leave the profession. One could also study attrition as attrition from schools. The policy
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likely to remain in the profession. Private school principals may be more likely to remain in the
profession as they enjoy increased autonomy over managing a school (Chubb & Moe, 1988;
chapter 4 of this dissertation) and self-selection of private school principals based on school
mission and community orientation (Brinig & Garnett, 2014; Bryk, Lee, & Holland, 1993). On
the other hand, the existence of tenure related job security, higher average salaries for principals
in public schools than private schools, availability of professional development opportunities
(that may strengthen their resume and facilitate principals’ promotion to superintendent), may
make public school principals more likely to stay in the profession than private school principals,
posing a challenge to the hypothesis. The availability of more resources in the public school
districts may incentivize public school principals to stay in the profession. Thus, the stay of
private school principals in the profession may be socially conditioned whereas the stay of public
school principals in the profession may be vocationally conditioned. Presumably, socially
conditioned motivations are ideological in nature and the principals may be actively making
informed selections for long-term consequences, whereas vocationally conditioned motivations
are based on an expectation of availability of better professional opportunities that may not
actually be available. Thus, socially conditioned motivations may translate into smaller
differences in stated versus revealed preferences than vocationally conditioned responses. Hence,
the study anticipates a larger gap between stated and revealed preferences of principals in public
school than of principals in private schools. Due to distinct environment and organization, daily
internal administrative and paperwork related requirements concerning principalship may be less

implications of studying attrition from principal profession versus studying attrition from schools would be more
conservative in relation to effects on student outcomes at the school-level. However, in the current study, it is less
concerning as the rates of attrition between schools are similar across sectors. Merely seven and two percent of
principals within the public and private school sectors moved from their original school to another school in the
following year. Seventy-seven percent and 80 percent of principals in the public and private sector schools stayed in
the same school in the following year. Hence, attrition from the principal profession is not vastly different in
magnitude than attrition from original schools.
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demanding in private schools than public schools (Chubb & Moe, 1988). The study expects to
find internal administrative pressures as a destabilizing force for public school principals.
There could be heterogeneity in principal turnover even within the public and private
sectors. Principal turnover in public charter schools, due to their mission orientation and relative
decentralized models in comparison to traditional public schools, may resemble differences in
turnover between public and private schools. It is also possible that principal turnover rates may
differ within the private sector. For example, a majority of private schools have a religious
mission orientation whereas the non-sectarian private schools have a money or status driven
orientation. These differences may be associated with principal satisfaction and their desire to
stay in/exit from the profession. In a Catholic school network, a priest or nun leading a school
may be transferred by the Archdioceses to a school (or a role other than principal) where they are
needed more, particularly if they have trained a successor. In this way Catholic private schools,
at least those connected to an archdiocese rather than independent, might resemble well run
school districts. Thus, the study briefly tests the within school sector hypotheses: a) public
charter school principals are more likely to remain in the profession that traditional public school
principals and b) religious school principals are more likely to remain in the profession that nonsectarian school principals.
Using data from the School and Staffing Survey 2011-2012 and the Principal Follow-up
Survey 2012, the study analyzes principal attrition between public and private schools.
Principals’ stated preferences in 2011-2012 are compared to their revealed status a year later.
The study is relevant to the fields of educational leadership, school choice and education policy.
As a good proportion of teachers take the route to become school principals, the study
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contributes to our understanding of the journey of those who choose to become a principal by
determining who chooses to stay and who decides to leave.
2. Literature review
Research on principal turnover has gained prominence in the area of educational
leadership, primarily due to the high rates of turnover and the impact generated by turnover on
schooling and principal labor markets. Rangel (2018) conducts a systematic review of 36
empirical studies on principal turnover. Studies measure turnover in many ways, ranging from
amount of time principals stay or have tenure in a given school (Baker, Punswick, & Belt, 2010;
Fuller & Young, 2009) to leaving a school (Li, 2015; Loeb, Kalogrides, & Horng, 2010). Other
studies on principal turnover analyze career changes (Farley-Ripple, Raffel, & Welch, 2012; Li,
2015), effectiveness of the principal in improving student achievement (Branch, Hanushek, &
Rivkin, 2009) and job satisfaction (Boyce & Bowers, 2016). Turnover can be based on a
principal’s stated decision (Tekleselassie & Villarreal, 2010) to leave a school/principalship or
their revealed status later on (Goldring, Taie, & Owens, 2014; Li, 2015).
The definition of turnover depends on the policy question being answered. For example,
if a principal leaves a school but remains within a school district, the policy implications of
turnover would be different from a principal leaving the district. Similarly, the policy
implications for retirement related turnover would be different from job dissatisfaction related
turnover. Policymakers may also be interested in turnover that affects principals after their initial
hiring year (Burkhauser et al., 2012).
Due to a lack of experimental studies and variation in the definition of principal turnover
across studies, it is difficult to comment on the causal determinants of principal turnover. Rangel
(2018) notes that the different factors vary in their importance for determining principal turnover,
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and the determinants can be classified as relatively weak and relatively strong. A caveat with this
classification as weak and strong is the low number of studies on principal turnover and
differences in contexts, definitions and methodologies employed across studies. Relatively weak
and relatively strong determinants of principal turnover are discussed below for potential
inclusion in the analytical models employed in this study. For example, relatively weak
determinants of turnover include principal characteristics such as gender (Fuller, Young, & Orr,
2007, Ni, Sun, & Rorrer, 2015; Sun & Ni, 2016), race (Baker, Punswick, & Belt, 2010; Fuller,
Young, & Orr, 2007), age (Fuller & Young, 2009; Tekleselassie & Villarreal, 2010), principal
experience (DeAngelis & White, 2011; Podgursky et al., 2016; Tran & Buckman, 2017) and
principal education (Baker, Punswick, & Bel, 2010; Gates et al., 2006; Tekleselassie &
Villarreal, 2010).
Analysis of a nationally representative sample shows a higher likelihood of minority
principals intending to leave the principalship in comparison to their white counterparts (Carroll
et al., 2018; Tekleselassie & Villarreal, 2010). Some African American principals might use
principalship as a stepping stone to get better jobs elsewhere. They may see other employment
markets as racist and hence may be more likely to go into public education (Carroll et al., 2018;
Maranto et al., 2017). Evidence also suggests a non-linear relationship between principal age and
turnover (Rangel, 2018). Younger and older principals are more likely to move or leave in
comparison to middle-aged principals. The opportunity cost of changing profession may be
lower for young principals than middle age principals. Old age principals may leave the
profession due to accrual of adequate social security and retirement related benefits.
Work related conditions such as principal satisfaction (Boyce & Bowers, 2016;
Tekleselassie & Villarreal, 2010), principal autonomy (Farley-Ripple, Raffel, & Welch, 2012;
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Tekleselassie & Villarreal, 2010), relationships with superiors, peers and subordinates (FarleyRipple, Raffel, & Welch, 2012) and the changing nature of principalship (Oberman, 1996) are
weakly related to turnover. Participation in professional development activities has become an
important component of the principal profession. Such changes in the nature of principalship
have been building for a long time (Rousmaniere, 2013). One experimental study found that
participation in professional development leads to a decline in principal turnover (Jacob et al.,
2015). As participation in professional development seems to be the norm for educational
leadership, the quality and type of professional development may be more relevant for principal
satisfaction than mere availability of professional development activities.
School characteristics such as school level (Baker, Punswick, & Bel, 2010; Fuller,
Young, & Orr, 2007; Ni, Sun, & Rorrer, 2015), percent of students at the school qualifying for
special education services (Solano et al., 2010; Ni, Sun, & Rorrer, 2015) and urbanicity (Gates et
al., 2006; DeAngelis & White, 2011; Tekleselassie & Villarreal, 2010) are relatively weak
determinants while the school size (Baker, Punswick, & Bel, 2010; Podgursky et al., 2016),
school’s performance (Cullen & Mazzeo, 2007; Béteille, Kalogrides, & Loeb, 2012; Podgursky
et al., 2016; Tran & Buckman, 2017), conditions (Béteille, Kalogrides, & Loeb, 2012; Sun & Ni,
2016; Tekleselassie & Villarreal, 2010), and some student demographics such as race/ethnicity
and level of poverty (Gates et al., 2006; Loeb, Kalogrides, & Hong, 2010; Podgursky et al.,
2016) are relatively strong determinants of turnover. Teacher characteristics such as certification
(DeAngelis & White, 2011; Sun & Ni, 2016) are weakly related to principal turnover. Large
districts are their own job market. Hence, within district turnover may not be a first order issue in
principal turnover for larger districts, unless it leads to geographical stratification of lower
quality schools. It is interesting to note that across the studies, increased school size seems to add
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to principal stability. Perhaps large school size permits more division of labor. The findings may
also hold for principals in charter school networks as opposed to individual schools (Foreman &
Maranto, 2017).
The policies related to flexibility from the district central office over human resources,
such as hiring and firing of teachers (Oberman, 1996; Sun & Ni, 2016), and state’s accountability
policy (DeAngelis & White, 2011; Li, 2015; Mitani, 2017) are relatively strong determinants of
principal turnover. The relation between principal salary and turnover is the most researched and
has generally showed that increased salary adds to principal stability (Baker, Punswick, & Bel,
2010; Cullen & Mazzeo, 2007; Ni, Sun, & Rorrer, 2015; Solano et al., 2010; Tekleselassie &
Villarreal, 2010). Oberman (1996) found principal attrition positively related to early retirement
options in Chicago Public Schools. Finally, district expenditures are weakly related to principal
turnover (Solano et al., 2010). Boyce and Bowers (2016) show that among principals satisfied
with jobs, salary is not related to turnover. Hence, beyond a mere increment in salary, factors
such as school quality, school climate, working conditions and professional development of
principals should be analyzed for policy relevant conclusions.
Overall effect sizes across studies show that school performance, accountability policy
and professional development are consistently strong determinants of principal turnover (Rangel,
2018). Differences in school performance are related to principal turnover with as low as 3% to
as high as 350% change in the likelihood of turnover. Two studies found significant differences
in principal turnover in traditional public and charter schools (Ni, Sun, & Rorrer, 2015; Sun &
Ni, 2016); however, no study has yet examined the differences between public and private
schools in a nationally representative sample. Findings from two studies caution us to account
for principal effectiveness at improving student achievement (Branch, Hanushek, & Rivkin,
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2009) and satisfaction based on work-related conditions (Boyce & Bowers, 2016) when
comparing principals who either stay or leave.
3. Data
The data come from the Public School Principal Status and Private School Principal
Status Data Files of the 2012–13 Principal Follow-up Survey (PFS). The survey is developed by
the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) and it assesses principal attrition and
mobility after a survey conducted in 2011-2012. The survey is informative of 1,720 records
(Catholic, other religious and non-sectarian schools) for private school principals and 7,510
records (traditional public schools (TPS) and public charter schools) for public school principals.
Principal switching between either school type does not seem to be a first order issue in principal
turnover as approximately 1 percent of principals switched from public to private schools and
approximately 5 percent moved vice versa. Two definitions of principal turnover are central to
this study. A principal is a: a) stayer if they stayed as a principal and b) leaver if they left
principalship altogether.
Tables 1A and 1B present information on principals’ experience, training and
professional development. A greater proportion of private than public school principals report
ten or more years of experience as a principal at their current school or any school. Just nine
percent of public school principals report being principal at their current school beyond ten or
more years, while 23 percent report so for any school. Comparable statistics for private school
principals are 25 and 41 percent. The findings may be associated with a socially versus
vocationally conditioned response of leaders between private and public school sectors, wherein
public school leaders may lose the vocational incentive to continue in the same school and
generally in the principal profession for more than 10 years. Thus principal experience may be
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weakly related to turnover (DeAngelis & White, 2011; Podgursky et al., 2016; Tran & Buckman,
2017) especially after 10 years in the profession. Public schools are more hierarchical (Gerth &
Mills, 1946) than private schools. There are very few superintendents of private school systems
but many more superintendents of public school systems. For most private school
administrators, school principal is the highest ranking they might attain, but that is not true for
most public school principals. Public school administrators may view the principalship as just
another temporary step towards the ultimate prize: superintendent.
Among principals having four or more years of teaching experience, a higher percentage
of public school principals have teaching experience before becoming a principal but the relation
is the opposite for principals having teaching experience since their principalship. This finding
could be due to the distinct nature of private schooling where a higher proportion of principals
(72 percent) currently teach at school in comparison to principals at public schools (37 percent).
A higher percentage of public school principals have higher education, a license/certificate in
school administration and previous experience and training in school administration in
comparison to their public school counterparts (Hill et al., 2016). A higher proportion of public
school principals participated in professional development activities in the past 12 months. This
finding could be due to the availability of extra resources and administrative requirements for
professional development laid down by public authorities.
As professional development is a strong determinant of principal stability (Jacob et al.,
2015; Rangel, 2018), increased opportunities for professional development in the public schools
may add to higher satisfaction for a principal and consequently they may be more likely to stay
in comparison to their private counterparts. If professional development is a source of
satisfaction to the principal profession, more public school principals are likely to be stayers than
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are private school principals. A majority of the public school principals currently hold a
license/certificate in school administration. As licensure/certification may be relevant to the
principal profession in public schools, it may incentivize principals to stay in the profession
(DeAngelis & White, 2011; Sun & Ni, 2016). Finally, most principals in either school sector
have white ethnicity and female gender; the proportions are higher for private school principals.
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Table 1A: Summary statistics for principal experience and training
Measure
Public Private
Years principal or school head at this or any school prior to this year
no experience
8.3
8. 8
low experience 1-3
24.6
18.8
medium experience 4-10
43.8
30.9
high experience 10+
23.3
41.4
Years principal or school head at this school prior to this year
no experience
16.5
14.5
low experience 1-3
38.8
27.6
medium experience 4-10
36.1
32.9
high experience 10+
8.6
24.9
Years of elementary or secondary teaching before becoming principal or school head
no experience
1.7
18.5
low experience 1-3
2.8
7.9
medium experience 4-10
47.3
32.8
high experience 10+
48.2
40.7
Years of elementary or secondary teaching since becoming principal or school head
no experience
90.4
49.7
low experience 1-3
5.4
21.9
medium experience 4-10
3.3
15.9
high experience 10+
0.8
12.6
Years of total elementary or secondary teaching
no experience
1.4
11.1
low experience 1-3
2.5
7.1
medium experience 4-10
45.5
25.4
high experience 10+
50.6
56.4
Currently teaching at school
37.4
71.9
N
7,510 1,720

Notes: Summary statistics presented using population weighted percentages for each category.

Table 1B: Summary statistics for principal experience and training
Measure
Public Private
Prior to becoming a principal or school head
Worked as department head
40.4
35.3
Worked as an assistant principal or program director
73.9
43.8
Participated in school training or development program
55.3
31.4
Previous management experience outside education
40.3
46.4
Currently holding license/certificate in school administration
95.9
43.4
Having a bachelor’s degree
99.9
88.5
Bachelor degree awarded by a university’s department or college of education
81.9
67.8
Having a master’s degree
97.6
76.3
Master’s degree awarded by a university’s department or college of education
97.4
85.4
Earned a MA and higher degree
97.8
68.9
Participated in any professional development activity related to principal or school head in last 12 months
99.3
89.6
Race (white)
86.4
90.2
Gender (male)
48.4
44.6
N
7,510 1,720
Notes: Summary statistics presented using population weighted percentages for each category.
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Table 2 shows that, in general, a greater proportion of private school principals report a
specialized status for their schools. This difference could be due to an often alluded to consumer
oriented nature of private schools. Specialized schools may attract leaders wanting to work in
specialized environments. Conversely, specialized schools may pose challenges to leaders, and
require leadership qualities that are different than the ones required for regular schools.
Table 2: Summary statistics for school’s specialization
Measure
Public
Private
Program type of school
Regular
88.4
81.1
Montessori
5.2
Special program emphasis
3.1
1.8
Special Education
1.3
6.6
Career/Technical/Vocational Education
1.1
Alternative
6.3
4.8
Early Childhood Program/Daycare Center
0.5
Notes: Summary statistics presented using population weighted percentages for each category.
Table 3 presents the average statistics for principals’ working conditions. The average
statistics do not show a meaningful difference in the principals’ working conditions related to
hours spent on school related activities and number of days per year required to work under their
current contract. Thus, internal administrative pressures may be generally similar for the
principal profession, regardless of sector. The average salary for a public school principal is one
and a half times that of a private school principal. Also, on average, the public school principal is
slightly younger than his/her private school counterpart. If salary is a source of satisfaction for
the principalship (Baker, Punswick, & Bel, 2010; Cullen & Mazzeo, 2007; Ni, Sun, & Rorrer,
2015; Solano et al., 2010; Tekleselassie & Villarreal, 2010), the public school principal is more
likely to be a stayer. On the other hand, the religious, mission and community orientation of
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private schools (Brinig & Garnett, 2014; Bryk, Lee, & Holland, 1993; Chubb & Moe, 1988) may
incentivize private school leaders to stay for reasons unrelated to salary.
Table 3: Summary statistics (mean) for principals’ working conditions
Measure
Public Private
Hours spent on all school-related activities during a typical full week
58.1
53.2
Hours spent interacting with students during a typical full week
22.5
21.2
Number of days per year required to work under current contract
230.8
230.9
Current annual salary (without tax and deductions)
90,510 57,560
Age
48.0
51.7
Notes: Summary statistics presented using population weighted percentages for each category.
Salaries are rounded to nearest dollars.
The SASS data allow for looking at principal turnover from principals’ stated preferences
in 2011-2012 and revealed status at follow-up in 2012-2013 (table 4A). For the SASS 2011-2012
baseline year, the principals were asked to select from among eight categories as the projected
duration for them to remain as principal, such as: as long as able to, until eligibility for
retirement from current/previous job, until eligible for social security benefits or occurrence of a
special life event, until more desirable job opportunity comes along, plan to leave as soon as
they can or undecided. For this study, the categories are recoded as a stayer for as long as able
to, leaver for intending to leave for any reason and the last category remains undecided. As the
questions at the baseline year do not ask the principals if they want to stay in the same school,
the stayer category represents principals’ intention to stay in the profession.
Principals’ revealed status at the follow-up year in 2012-2013 PFS was based on a four
category status for schools in which the 2011-2012 SASS survey was carried out. The four
categories were: stayer (principals who stayed in the same schools), mover (principals who were
principals in a different school), leaver (principals who left the profession) and other (principals
for whom it was not possible to determine a mover or leaver status). For this study, the PFS
2012-2013 definitions of stayer and mover at the follow-up year are recoded as stayer in the
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principal profession and the other category is recoded as missing. Thus, comparisons can be
made among the intended stayers at the base year and actual stayers at the follow-up year. Table
4B shows that among the stated baseline category of leaver, most principals (more among the
public schools) continued to be stayers at the follow-up year.
Table 4A: Summary statistics for principals’ turnover from SASS and PFS
Measure
Public
Private
Length planned to remain principal (stated at base year)
Intended Stayer
42.7
56
Intended Leaver
32.2
15.7
Undecided
25.1
28.3
Four category principal status (revealed at follow-up)
Actual Stayer
84.4
82
Actual Leaver
11.5
11.6
Other
4.2
6.4
Notes: Summary statistics presented using population weighted percentages for each category.
Table 4B: Summary statistics for principals’ stated vs. revealed preferences
Actual Stayer
Length planned to remain principal
All schools
Public
Private
Intended Stayer
91.5
91.4
91.9
Intended Leaver
85.7
86.5
79.4
Undecided
83.9
84.3
82.6
Notes: Summary statistics presented using population weighted percentages for each category.

Over half of private school principals and less than half of public school principals stated
they expected to remain principals the following year unconditionally. The revealed status at the
follow-up year shows that more than two-thirds of principals continued to be stayers. The
percent of actual stayers at the follow-up year doubled in comparison to the percent of intended
stayers at the base year (84% versus 42%) for public schools. A smaller gap (82% versus 56%) is
observed for intended stayers and actual stayers for private schools. There is a disconnect
between principals’ stated preferences at the base year and their revealed status at follow-up. It
could be that principals wanted to leave but they ended up staying because of the high
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opportunity cost of selecting alternatives. The larger gap between principals’ stated versus
revealed preferences for public schools in comparison to private schools may be related to the
former’s vocationally conditioned response versus the latter’s socially conditioned response.
Chubb and Moe (1988) and chapter 4 of this dissertation argue that there is increased
principal autonomy in the private schools. Principal autonomy is weakly associated with
turnover in public schools (Farley-Ripple, Raffel, & Welch, 2012; Tekleselassie & Villareal,
2010). Work related barriers; especially barriers related to poor human resources that affect
student learning, are likely to be a source of dissatisfaction for principals (Oberman, 1996; Sun
& Ni, 2016). Table 5 shows a greater proportion of public school principals report barriers
related to human resources and bureaucracy. Private school principals report more stress and a
higher resistance from parents in the firing and replacement of teachers. This pattern could be
due to a higher degree of parental involvement in private schools (Hiatt-Michael, 2017) and
presumably high opportunity cost of replacing teachers that may be self-selecting into the private
school sector.
Table 5: Summary statistics for principals’ working barriers
Measure
Public
Private
Barriers to dismissal of poor-performing teachers
Personnel policies
52.6
19.1
Termination decisions not upheld
20.3
7.9
Length of time required for termination process
61.8
14.2
Effort required for documentation
65.7
27.7
Tight deadlines for completing documentation
32.2
8.7
Tenure
69.4
13.0
Teacher associations or unions
60.2
5.9
Dismissal is too stressful and/or uncomfortable
11.5
13.2
Difficulty in obtaining suitable replacements
11.4
23.4
Resistance from parents
3.6
11.3
Notes: Summary statistics presented using population weighted percentages for each category.
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Principal turnover is likely to be affected by school climate. Table 6 shows that principals
report less crime in private schools (Andrade, 2013; Brinig & Garnett, 2012; Waasdorp et al.,
forthcoming, 2017; Zhang, Musu-Gillette, & Oudekerk, 2016). This difference could be due to
possible student selection, smaller school size, mission orientation and the higher degree of
parental involvement in private schools.
Table 6: Summary statistics for frequency of school problems (never occurring)
Measure
Public Private
Physical conflicts among students
4.7
27.3
Robbery or theft
16.2
52.5
Vandalism
20.4
54.4
Student use of alcohol
69.4
85.3
Student use of illegal drugs
63.4
86.1
Student possession of weapons
58.2
93.5
Physical abuse of teachers
79.6
93.7
Student racial tensions
54.7
78.8
Student bullying
3.7
19.0
Student verbal abuse of teachers
31.2
71.0
Widespread disorder in classrooms
72.2
85.3
Student acts of disrespect for teachers
12.4
36.0
Gang activities
80.4
97.7
Notes: Summary statistics presented using population weighted percentages for each category.

Lower salaries and lower availability of professional development opportunities may put
the private school principal at a comparative disadvantage. Conversely, increased autonomy,
lower barriers related to human resources that affect student learning and a perceived safer
school environment may put the private school principal at a comparative advantage. A
comparative disadvantage/advantage would mean the private school principal is less/more likely
to be a stayer in comparison to the public school principal. It remains to be seen if self-perceived
comparative advantages/disadvantages by school principals in either sector actually translate to
similar revealed status at follow-up year after controlling for various covariates.
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4. Research design
The study utilizes multinomial logistics regressions to analyze the determinants for the
dependent variable 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟: a) for the 2011-2012 baseline year as the length planned to
remain principal expressed: stayer, leaver or undecided and b) for the 2012-2013 follow-up year
as a stayer or leaver. The baseline category stayer/leaver is comparable to the stayer/leaver
category at the follow-up year. The undecided category at baseline year is not comparable with
any category at the follow-up year. Hence, results for the undecided category are not reported.
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖

Equation (1)

𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖

Equation (2)

Equation (1) is run separately for the public and private school samples to examine the
within sector determinants of turnover. Additionally equation (2) includes a school type dummy
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 to study if the turnover rates are consistently higher in the private sector than in the
public sector. For within public school (public charter and traditional public schools) and private
school (religious, Catholic and non-sectarian) sector analyses, the dummy Private is replaced by
dummies Public charter, Private religious and Private Catholic in equation (2).
In equation (1), coefficient 𝛽1 measures the likelihood of principal turnover for a unit
increase in the control vector X. 𝜇 contains the unobserved error term. In equation (2),
𝛽1 measures the likelihood of difference in principal turnover between private and public schools
after controlling for vector X. 𝜇 contains the unobserved error term. The determinants of
principal staying in or leaving the profession are contained in the control vector X. X comprises
several measures that include principal-level characteristics such as principals’ total experience,
race, gender, salary and age and school-level characteristics such as school size, school level,
percent of minority students and percent of minority teachers. The variables are shown in detail
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in table 7. When multiple survey items were listed under a broad theme of questions in the SASS
survey, the items were combined into factors using a factor analysis. Average marginal effects
for equations (1) and (2) are reported in the regression coefficients. All regressions are weighted
using the survey weights provided in the principal status data files (the weights are the same for
baseline year and the follow-up survey). As principal labor markets are likely to differ by state,
state dummies are included in all models.
Table 7: Measures used as controls in multinomial regression models
Measure
Variables
Total experience (dummies as per table 1) as a principal, teacher, and
previous experience as a department head, assistant principal or program
Total experience
director, participated in school training program, holding a
license/certificate and management experience
Race and gender Race and gender
Salary in log, age (dummies created for young age ≤40, 41≤medium
Other variables
age≤60 and old age≥61)
School size, school level (dummies for elementary, secondary and
combined), total school enrollment, number of full-time teachers, studentteacher ratio, percent of minority teachers, percent of minority students,
School controls
urbanicity (dummies for city, suburban, town and rural) and percentage of
enrolled students approved for the National School Lunch Program (NSLP)
at school, dummies for states.
School
Dummy variable for specialized schools (for equation 2, the dummy is
specialization
recoded for only comparable categories in table 3)
Factor variable of school problems (loads onto two factors with Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.8526). Frequency of physical conflict among students, physical
abuse of teachers, student bullying, student verbal abuse of teachers,
School problems widespread disorder in classroom and student acts of disrespect for
teachers load on to factor 1 whereas frequency of robbery or theft,
vandalism, student use of alcohol, illegal drugs, possession of weapons,
racial tensions and gang activities load on to factor 2.
Factor variable of principal's decision making (loads onto two factors with
Cronbach’s alpha = 0.6095). Determining content of in-service
Principal
professional development programs for teachers, evaluating and hiring
autonomy
teachers, setting discipline policy and deciding how to spend school budget
load on to factor 1 whereas setting performance standards for students and
establishing curriculum at school load on to factor 2.
Work conditions Weekly hours spent on all school-related activities, avg. percent time spent
(bureaucratic)
on internal administrative tasks
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Table 7 (Cont’d): Measures used as controls in multinomial regression models
Measure
Variables
Factor of variables related to barriers faced by principals in incompetent
teacher dismissal (loads onto two factors with Cronbach’s alpha = 0.7352).
Personnel policies, termination decisions not upheld, length of time required
Barriers
for termination process, effort required for documentation, tight deadlines for
(teacher
completing documentation, tenure and teacher associations or unions load on
dismissal)
to factor 1 whereas dismissal is too stressful and/or uncomfortable, difficulty
in obtaining suitable replacements and resistance from parents load on to
factor 2.
5. Results
For the 2011-2012 baseline year, the dependent variable has three categories: stayer,
leaver and undecided. The results for stayers generally mirror leavers. For findings where results
for stayers and leavers mirror each other, the discussion focuses only on stayers. For the 20122013 follow-up year, the dependent variable is dichotomous: stayers and leavers. Hence, the
discussion focuses only on stayers.
5.1 Determinants of principals’ stay in the profession and attrition based on principals’ stated
preferences
Results for different models are shown in table 8A. At the 2011-2012 baseline year, the
significantly positive determinants of a private school principal to intend to remain as principal
are principal autonomy, low principal experience (reference category experience>10 years), no
teaching experience (reference category experience>10 years) and previous management
experience outside education. Results for autonomy being perceived as a stabilizer by principals
accord with Chubb and Moe (1988) and chapter 4 of this dissertation. It could be that private
school principals with no teaching experience may be using the principalship as a route to
teaching. Conversely, the significantly negative determinants for private school principals’
intention to stay as principal are average percent of time spent on internal administrative tasks,
medium principal experience (reference category experience>10 years), having worked as a
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department head, being white, principal salary, principals’ young age≤40 (reference category
age>60) and elementary school level (reference category combined school level). Furthermore,
school’s location in a city (reference category rural) and increase in the frequency of school
problems is associated with private school principals’ intention to leave. As urbanicity is a weak
determinant of principal turnover (Gates et al., 2006; DeAngelis & White, 2011; Tekleselassie &
Villarreal, 2010), the results may be policy relevant if they remain statistically significant at the
follow-up year.
The results for the average percent of time spent on internal administrative tasks suggest
that private sector institutions face administrative pressures similar to public institutions. It is
surprising to note that a percent increase in principal salary is associated with a 10 percentage
point increase in the likelihood of a private principal to state their intention to leave the
principalship. The negative coefficient on salary suggests that private schools attract principals
for reasons other than salary. The change in sign of principal experience from positive to
negative with an increase in experience (low: 1-3 years to medium: 4-10 years) indicates lesser
opportunities for professional development or incentives for private school principals.
The significantly positive determinants of a public school principal to intend to remain as
principal are principal autonomy, working in a specialized school, no and low (1-3 years)
principal experience (reference category experience>10 years), no and medium (4-10 years)
teaching experience (reference category experience>10 years), participation in a school training
or development program and currently holding a license/certificate in school administration.
Seemingly public school principals have slightly lower autonomy (Chubb & Moe, 1988; chapter
4 of this dissertation) than their private counterparts, hence, they perceive increased autonomy
positively (Farley-Ripple, Raffel, & Welch, 2012; Tekleselassie & Villarreal, 2010). The
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significantly negative determinants of public school principals’ intention to stay as principal are
barriers to dismissal of poor-performing teachers (Oberman, 1996; Sun & Ni, 2016), average
percent of time spent on internal administrative tasks and principals’ medium (41≤medium≤60)
age (reference category age>60). It seems that the bureaucratic environment of principals’ office
concerning paperwork, human resource and job related constraints adds to public school
principals’ negative perception to remain as principals. Furthermore, the frequency of school
problems, principals’ white race, principal salary, previous management experience outside
education and percent of minority students at the school are associated with public school
principals’ intention to leave. Results for principal race stand in contrast to earlier research
(Rangel, 2018).
When we compare the results for public and private schools, principal autonomy is a
positive determinant for principals’ intention to stay as principal for both public and private
school principals. However, principals in either sector value different factor loadings of principal
autonomy. The private principals value autonomy concerning the setting of performance
standards for students and establishing curriculum whereas the public principals value autonomy
related to determining the content of professional development programs for teachers, evaluating
and hiring teachers, setting the discipline policy and deciding how to spent the school budget. In
both school sectors, the average percent of time spent on internal administrative tasks is a
significantly negative determinant of principals’ intention to stay as a principal. Low (1-3 years)
principal experience (reference category experience>10 years) and no teaching experience
(reference category experience>10 years) are significantly positive determinants of public and
private school principals to state the desire to remain as principal. The combined model in
column 3 yields a statistically significant and positive coefficient on the dummy Private. On

207

average, the private school principal is 12 percentage points more likely to state the intention to
stay as principal after controlling for principal background, school and work related
characteristics.
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Table 8A: Results for principals’ stated status at baseline year
Intended Stayer
Intended Leaver
Private
Public
Pri / Pub Private
Public
Pri / Pub
Variables
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Private
0.118***
-0.075*
(0.039)
(0.041)
Days/year required to work
-0.000
0.000
0.000
-0.000
-0.000
-0.000
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Teacher dismissal barrier 1
-0.024
-0.032*** -0.031***
0.007
0.038*** 0.037***
(0.032)
(0.010)
(0.009)
(0.027)
(0.009)
(0.008)
Teacher dismissal barrier 2
-0.010
0.006
0.002
-0.011
0.005
0.006
(0.023)
(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.015)
(0.009)
(0.008)
Weekly hrs. spent on all school
-0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
-0.001*
-0.001
related activities
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
Avg. percent time spent on
-0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003***
0.001
0.002*** 0.002***
internal administrative tasks
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Principal autonomy 1
0.130***
0.016
0.020** -0.070***
0.011
0.007
(0.028)
(0.010)
(0.010)
(0.015)
(0.009)
(0.008)
Principal autonomy 2
0.064
0.033*** 0.035*** -0.065*** -0.024*** -0.025***
(0.040)
(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.023)
(0.008)
(0.007)
School problems 1
-0.001
-0.012
-0.012
0.035*
0.025*** 0.026***
(0.025)
(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.019)
(0.009)
(0.008)
School problems 2
-0.037
-0.017
-0.019*
-0.011
0.015
0.014
(0.046)
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.035)
(0.011)
(0.010)
Specialized school
-0.102
0.061*
0.053
-0.124
-0.007
-0.010
(0.111)
(0.036)
(0.034)
(0.086)
(0.034)
(0.032)
Principal experience (no)
0.072
0.132*** 0.123***
-0.133* -0.123*** -0.118***
(0.090)
(0.036)
(0.034)
(0.069)
(0.037)
(0.035)
Principal experience (low: 1-3 years)
0.219***
0.068**
0.068***
-0.133*
-0.067** -0.062**
(0.078)
(0.028)
(0.026)
(0.076)
(0.027)
(0.026)
Principal experience (medium: 4-10 years)
-0.167***
0.007
-0.006
0.120***
-0.020
-0.009
(0.055)
(0.023)
(0.022)
(0.039)
(0.021)
(0.020)
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Table 8A (Cont’d): Results for principals’ stated status at baseline year
Intended Stayer
Intended Leaver
Private
Public
Pri / Pub Private
Public
Pri / Pub
Variables
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Total teaching experience (no)
1.009***
0.139**
0.121*
-1.996***
-0.012
-0.034
(0.199)
(0.068)
(0.064)
(0.269)
(0.066)
(0.062)
Total teaching experience (low: 1-3 years)
0.128
-0.057
-0.038
0.118
-0.006
0.005
(0.102)
(0.049)
(0.047)
(0.073)
(0.048)
(0.046)
Total teaching experience (medium: 4-10 years)
-0.038
0.056*** 0.049***
-0.045
-0.020
-0.021
(0.058)
(0.019)
(0.018)
(0.040)
(0.017)
(0.017)
Worked as department head
-0.096*
0.020
0.013
0.108***
-0.017
-0.011
(0.049)
(0.017)
(0.017)
(0.036)
(0.016)
(0.016)
Worked as an assistant principal
0.026
0.003
0.001
-0.039
0.032
0.027
or program director
(0.048)
(0.021)
(0.020)
(0.038)
(0.020)
(0.019)
Participated in school training
-0.045
0.068*** 0.060***
-0.021
-0.020
-0.019
or development program
(0.048)
(0.017)
(0.017)
(0.041)
(0.016)
(0.016)
Currently holding license/certificate
0.060
0.118**
0.087**
0.006
-0.031
-0.026
in school administration
(0.054)
(0.046)
(0.036)
(0.044)
(0.046)
(0.037)
Previous management experience
0.104**
0.018
0.025
-0.062
-0.035** -0.036**
outside education
(0.048)
(0.017)
(0.016)
(0.039)
(0.016)
(0.015)
Race (white)
-0.157*
-0.027
-0.023
0.046
0.050*
0.047*
(0.093)
(0.029)
(0.028)
(0.071)
(0.028)
(0.027)
Gender (male)
0.011
-0.014
-0.011
-0.052
-0.005
-0.004
(0.053)
(0.018)
(0.017)
(0.042)
(0.016)
(0.016)
Principal salary (log)
-0.123**
-0.092
-0.094** 0.102***
0.097*
0.102**
(0.052)
(0.057)
(0.042)
(0.040)
(0.056)
(0.043)
Principal age (young≤40)
-0.248***
-0.031
-0.033
0.049
0.050
0.042
(0.087)
(0.038)
(0.035)
(0.059)
(0.038)
(0.035)
Principal age (41≤medium≤60)
-0.039
-0.056*
-0.050*
0.015
0.104*** 0.088***
(0.054)
(0.030)
(0.028)
(0.043)
(0.030)
(0.028)
School size
-0.021
0.002
0.007
-0.021
0.004
-0.000
(0.035)
(0.011)
(0.010)
(0.026)
(0.011)
(0.010)

210

Table 8A (Cont’d): Results for principals’ stated status at baseline year
Intended Stayer
Intended Leaver
Private
Public
Pri / Pub Private
Public
Pri / Pub
Variables
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
School level (elementary)
-0.309***
0.020
-0.010
0.133**
-0.030
-0.018
(0.072)
(0.030)
(0.028)
(0.058)
(0.028)
(0.026)
School level (secondary)
-0.126
0.023
0.000
0.057
-0.022
-0.013
(0.078)
(0.029)
(0.027)
(0.061)
(0.027)
(0.026)
Total school enrollment
0.000
-0.000
-0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Number of full time teachers
-0.000
0.002
0.002*
-0.000
-0.001
-0.001
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.001)
Student/teacher ratio
-0.003
0.004
0.004
0.006
-0.003
-0.002
(0.008)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.006)
(0.004)
(0.003)
Percent of minority teachers
-0.001
-0.000
-0.000
-0.001
0.000
0.000
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
Percent of minority students
-0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
-0.001** -0.001**
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.000)
City
0.036
0.016
0.019
-0.124*
-0.035
-0.036
(0.091)
(0.028)
(0.026)
(0.070)
(0.026)
(0.025)
Suburban
-0.004
0.018
0.014
-0.053
-0.033
-0.030
(0.093)
(0.025)
(0.024)
(0.067)
(0.023)
(0.022)
Town
-0.050
-0.002
-0.007
-0.036
-0.002
0.002
(0.088)
(0.024)
(0.023)
(0.063)
(0.023)
(0.022)
Percentage of enrolled students approved for the
-0.000
-0.000
-0.000
0.001
0.000
0.000
National School Lunch Program (NSLP) at school
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Observations
420
6,970
7,380
420
6,970
7,380
All models include controls for state dummies. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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5.2 Determinants of principals’ stay in the profession and attrition based on principals’ revealed
preferences
For the revealed status at follow-up year in table 8B, principals’ young and medium age
(reference category age>60) are the only significantly positive determinants of a private school
principal to stay as a principal. Average percent of time spent on internal administrative tasks,
frequency of school problems and low principal experience (reference category experience>10
years) are negative determinants of a private school principal to stay as a principal. Principals
aged 40 or lower are associated with a 22 percentage point increased likelihood for the private
school principal to remain as a principal at the follow-up year when compared to principals aged
60 or more. The coefficient for medium age principal diminishes in magnitude as compared to
the coefficient for young age principal indicating that with an increase in age, the private school
principal may be less likely to stay in the profession.
Comparing the private principals’ responses at the baseline and the follow-up year shows
a contradiction between their stated versus revealed preferences. The sign on the coefficient of
low principal experience (reference category experience>10 years) and principal age change at
the baseline versus follow-up year. The only consistent determinant for baseline and follow-up
years is average percent time spent on internal administrative tasks. Principal autonomy, low
principal experience (reference category experience>10 years), participation in school training or
professional development, currently holding license/certificate in school administration and
principals’ young and medium age (reference category age>60) are strong positive determinants
while average percent of time spent on internal administrative tasks is a negative determinant of
a public school principal to stay as a principal. Comparing results for public principals at
baseline and follow-up years shows that average percent of time spent on internal administrative
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tasks, principal autonomy, low principal experience (reference category experience>10 years)
and principals’ young age (reference category age>60) remain consistent determinants of the
public school principal to remain a stayer at both stages.
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Variables
Private

Table 8B: Results for principals’ revealed status (Actual stayer) at follow-up year
Private
Public
(1)
(2)

Days/year required to work
Teacher dismissal barrier 1
Teacher dismissal barrier 2
Weekly hrs. spent on all school
related activities
Avg. percent time spent on internal administrative tasks
Principal autonomy 1
Principal autonomy 2
School problems 1
School problems 2
Specialized school
Principal experience (no)
Principal experience (low: 1-3 years)
Principal experience (medium: 4-10 years)

0.000
(0.000)
0.017
(0.024)
0.005
(0.015)
0.001
(0.002)
-0.002*
(0.001)
0.016
(0.021)
-0.008
(0.033)
-0.034*
(0.019)
-0.054**
(0.024)
0.038
(0.079)
-0.096
(0.072)
-0.120**
(0.061)
-0.072
(0.048)

0.000
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.007)
-0.005
(0.005)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.001*
(0.000)
0.005
(0.006)
0.009*
(0.005)
0.001
(0.006)
-0.000
(0.007)
-0.019
(0.027)
0.039
(0.029)
0.054***
(0.019)
0.022
(0.014)

Private / Public
(3)
0.029
(0.028)
0.000
(0.000)
0.001
(0.007)
-0.005
(0.005)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.001**
(0.000)
0.006
(0.006)
0.010*
(0.005)
-0.001
(0.006)
-0.003
(0.007)
-0.024
(0.025)
0.022
(0.027)
0.041**
(0.019)
0.016
(0.013)
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Table 8B (Cont’d): Results for principals’ revealed status (Actual stayer) at follow-up year
Private
Public
Private / Public
Variables
(1)
(2)
(3)
Total teaching experience (no)
0.026
0.039
0.041
(0.111)
(0.050)
(0.046)
Total teaching experience (low: 1-3 years)
-0.026
-0.030
-0.023
(0.091)
(0.038)
(0.037)
Total teaching experience (medium: 4-10 years)
-0.013
0.019
0.018
(0.052)
(0.012)
(0.012)
Worked as department head
-0.057
0.015
0.010
(0.043)
(0.012)
(0.012)
Worked as an assistant principal or program director
-0.036
0.003
0.001
(0.045)
(0.013)
(0.013)
Participated in school training or development program
0.032
0.019*
0.017
(0.040)
(0.012)
(0.011)
Currently holding license/certificate in school administration
0.018
0.063**
0.042
(0.043)
(0.032)
(0.026)
Previous management experience outside education
0.049
0.001
0.005
(0.039)
(0.012)
(0.012)
Race (white)
0.026
-0.015
-0.013
(0.098)
(0.019)
(0.018)
Gender (male)
-0.004
-0.002
-0.001
(0.046)
(0.012)
(0.012)
Principal salary (log)
-0.005
-0.016
-0.014
(0.043)
(0.039)
(0.026)
Principal age (young≤40)
0.223***
0.120***
0.122***
(0.081)
(0.023)
(0.022)
Principal age (41≤medium≤60)
0.141***
0.111***
0.107***
(0.039)
(0.016)
(0.015)
School size
-0.029
-0.003
-0.002
(0.040)
(0.008)
(0.007)

215

Table 8B (Cont’d): Results for principals’ revealed status (Actual stayer) at follow-up year
Private
Public
Private / Public
Variables
(1)
(2)
(3)
School level (elementary)
-0.023
0.014
0.011
(0.063)
(0.023)
(0.021)
School level (secondary)
0.079
-0.006
-0.002
(0.053)
(0.020)
(0.019)
Total school enrollment
0.000
0.000
0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Number of full time teachers
0.001
-0.000
-0.000
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.001)
Student/teacher ratio
0.007
-0.001
-0.001
(0.010)
(0.002)
(0.001)
Percent of minority teachers
0.002
0.000
0.000
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Percent of minority students
-0.001
-0.000
-0.000
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.000)
City
-0.106
0.012
0.005
(0.067)
(0.018)
(0.017)
Suburban
-0.082
0.017
0.014
(0.064)
(0.015)
(0.015)
Town
-0.068
0.019
0.015
(0.067)
(0.017)
(0.016)
Percentage of enrolled students approved
0.001
0.000
0.000
for the National School Lunch Program (NSLP) at school
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Observations
400
6,730
7,120
All models include controls for state dummies. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Young and medium age of principals are significantly positive determinants whereas
average percent time spent on internal administrative tasks is a significantly negative determinant
for both public and private school principals to stay as principal at the follow-up year. Low
principal experience is a negative determinant for the private school principal but a positive
determinant for the public school principal to remain a stayer at the follow-up year. The overall
model with the dummy Private in column 3 has a positive coefficient but is not statistically
significant. Although the private school principals were more likely to express their intention to
stay as principal at the baseline year in comparison to public school principals, their stated
intentions do not translate to the follow-up year in a statistically significant way. The results hint
towards context dependent complexity in the nature of attrition and principal satisfaction (Boyce
& Bowers, 2016; Farley-Ripple, Raffel, & Welch, 2012; Farley-Ripple, Solano, & McDuffie,
2012). In general, there is a disconnect between principals’ stated versus revealed preferences.
Results indicate that public school principals might be climbers (Downs, 1967) who may stay in
the profession for a few years and then get promoted into higher administration. Some principals
may stay in the profession to gain teaching experience and later on go to teaching (Boyce &
Bowers, 2016).
Comparing principals’ responses at the baseline and the follow-up year shows that the
average percent of time spent on internal administrative tasks, low principal experience
(reference category experience>10 years) and principals’ medium age (reference category
age>60) are the only significantly consistent determinants of private principals leaving the
profession. Whereas average percent of time spent on internal administrative tasks, principal
autonomy, low principal experience (reference category experience>10 years) and principals’
medium age (reference category age>60) are the only significantly consistent determinants of
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public principals leaving the profession. In the overall model, the dummy Private loses statistical
significance at follow-up as compared to the baseline year.
5.3 Within school sector comparisons
Tables 9A and 9B show results for within school sector comparisons between public
charter and traditional public school (TPS) (dummy Public charter), religious and non-sectarian
(dummy Private religious) and Catholic and other private schools (dummy Private Catholic).
For within public school sector comparisons, the stated preferences at the baseline year show that
public charter school principals are significantly more likely to intend to remain principals and
much less likely to leave the profession in comparison to TPS principals. However, their
revealed preferences at the follow-up year show a loss of statistical significance for the Public
charter dummy. Results for within private sector comparisons yield statistically null coefficients
on the dummy Private religious and Private Catholic. Principals’ stated preferences at the
baseline year suggest that religious school principals are more likely to leave the profession in
comparison to non-sectarian school principals, however the revealed status at the follow-up year
indicates the contrary. Catholic school principals are less likely to intend to stay and also less
likely to intend to leave the profession at the baseline year in comparison to other private school
principals. At the follow-up year Catholic school principals are less likely to stay and more likely
to leave the profession. The results reflect the high rate of closing of Catholic schools across the
country (Brinig & Garnett, 2014). Thus, Catholic school principals would be more likely to
expect to leave the profession and also be more likely actually to leave it, as for some of them
their school closed in the meantime.
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Table 9 A: Results for principals’ stated status (Intended stayer) at baseline year
Intended Stayer
Intended Leaver
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Public charter
0.075*
-0.081*
(0.040)
(0.042)
Private religious
-0.040
0.053
(0.093)
(0.080)
Private Catholic
-0.072
-0.021
(0.061)
(0.048)
Observations
6,970
420
420
6,970
420
420
All models include controls for covariates in table 7 and also for state dummies.
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 9 B: Results for principals’ revealed status (Actual stayer) at follow-up year
VARIABLES
(1)
(2)
(3)
Public charter
0.001
(0.028)
Private religious
0.024
(0.086)
Private Catholic
-0.023
(0.049)
Observations
6,730
400
400
All models include controls for covariates in table 7 and also for state dummies.
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
At the overall level, the dummy variables indicate that within school sector differences
are similar to between school sector differences at the follow-up year. However, at the baseline
year only the within public school sector differences are similar to differences between the public
and private school sectors. The overall results do not dismiss the possible heterogeneity that
could exist within school sectors. Future research should consider the role of sector variables
interacted with control variables in drawing policy relevant conclusions for across school sector
differences.
6. Conclusions
This study contributes to fields of educational leadership, school choice and education
policy by presenting a comparative analysis of the determinants of principal attrition in public
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and private schools in a nationally representative sample. There is a mismatch between
principals’ stated preferences and revealed status for both public and private school principals.
About one-third of control variables lose statistical significance at the follow-up year in
comparison to the baseline year. Principals’ stated intentions to leave the principalship or not are
more predictable, based on descriptive characteristics, than their subsequent revealed behaviors.
Thus, there is a need to understand the mechanism that contributes to the disconnect between
principals’ stated preferences versus their revealed status. The findings call for more research on
principal satisfaction as a key determinant of principal turnover (Boyce & Bowers, 2016; FarleyRipple, Raffel, & Welch, 2012; Farley-Ripple, Solano, & McDuffie, 2012).
The study finds moderate evidence that private school principals are more likely to
remain in the profession in comparison to public school principals and charter school principals
are more likely to remain in the profession in comparison to TPS principals. Charter school
principals are often the founder of their school so they may feel a personal attachment to it. The
findings for a greater likelihood of religious school principals to remain in the profession in
comparison to non-sectarian school principals are seen at the follow-up year but they contradict
the results for principals’ stated preferences. The larger gap between public school principals’
stated preferences versus actual status suggest that private school principals provide a socially
conditioned response whereas their public school counterparts provide a vocationally
conditioned response. As a greater proportion of principals in private schools currently teach at
their school, they are more likely to switch to teaching at their schools in the future (Chubb &
Moe, 1988). A move from principalship to teacher is relatively easier for the private school
principal than public school principal due to the existence of bureaucratic rules and
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specialization (Gerth & Mills, 1946) that limit such a transition and greater social distance
between principals and teachers in public schools (Ingersoll, 2003).
Participation in professional development activities, currently holding a license/certificate
in school administration and principal autonomy are found to be significant determinants only
for a public school principal to remain in the profession. Similarities in results at the follow-up
year indicate that principals in both school sectors perceive the average percent of time they
spend on internal administrative tasks as negative for their stay in the profession. Thus, internal
administrative pressures are innate to the principal profession. Both young and medium age
principals are more stable in the profession in comparison to old age principals. The results
contrast with those of Rangel (2018) where the relation between age and turnover hints that
younger and older principals are more prone to turnover in comparison to middle aged
principals. Low principalship experience adds to the likelihood of public school principals to
remain in the profession whereas it weakens the likelihood of private school principals to remain
in the profession. This pattern could be due to presumably better opportunities for professional
growth and job related stability for leaders in public schools.
The current study has some limitations. For example, it did not differentiate between
various types of attrition. Inclusion of variables related to school performance, accountability,
parental involvement, teacher turnover and the role of sector variables interacted with control
variables may offer opportunities for better understanding the relative importance of underlying
mechanisms that affect turnover in each school sector. Researchers may investigate if principal
training programs could address their common concerns related to average percent of time spent
on internal administrative tasks. Replication of a similar analysis using different datasets may
help policymakers and educators address issues of principal attrition in a better way.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This dissertation presented evidence from four studies of differences between the public
and private school sectors. Two studies combined causal evidence from studies on school
vouchers globally to test the competing claims concerning the efficiency of public versus private
schools at generating test scores. The overall evidence on student achievement in math and
reading scores from all available experimental studies on school vouchers was analyzed. The
findings were also explored from a cost-effectiveness perspective. Beyond voucher interventions,
nationally representative datasets for school principal surveys were analyzed. Two studies
separately examined principal autonomy and principal attrition between the public and private
school sectors. This concluding chapter of the dissertation summarizes the findings from
chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5. The study limitations and policy implications are discussed.
Summary of findings
Evidence is presented from experimental studies on private school vouchers and
educational leadership. Four key issues analyzed in the dissertation relate to: a) achievement
effects of vouchers, b) cost-effectiveness of vouchers, c) comparative autonomy and d)
comparative attrition of school leaders in private versus public schools.
Chapter 2 is a global meta-analysis that combined evidence on student math and reading
test scores from 20 randomized control trial (RCTs) on school vouchers. Sixteen studies took
place in the U.S. whereas two studies each took place in India and Colombia. The 20 studies
represent 11 distinct voucher programs. For each study, the level of randomization was at the
child/family level. The voucher programs targeted low-income students through either income
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limits and/or program location. The meta-analytic effects represent the achievement effects of
low-cost private school vouchers on low-income, primarily urban minority children.
The findings from the meta-analysis show a statistically null impact of the use of school
vouchers on student achievement in math and reading inside the U.S. Overall impacts inside the
U.S. for reading are 0.03 standard deviation (SD) whereas for math it is 0.01 SD. However,
outside the U.S., the impacts are significantly positive: the reading impact is 0.51 SD and the
math impact is 0.35 SD. The large impacts outside the U.S. are driven by the voucher program in
Colombia that represents a combination of student incentives, additional education spending and
private school productivity (Glewwe & Muralidharan, 2016). When the findings are analyzed by
years of treatment, initially a decline in test scores impacts is seen but, by year 3 and beyond, the
test scores catch up and improve, more so for reading scores.
Chapter 3 analyzed the voucher studies from the perspective of cost-effectiveness. The
programs were categorized as either publicly or privately funded, with the former defined as a
program that received any public funds. Furthermore, some programs required participating
private schools to accept the cost of the voucher as the full amount for educating students in their
schools. Such programs were labelled ‘fully funded.’ Other programs covered only partial tuition
costs and allowed the parents to top-up with extra amounts to cover the remaining cost of
educating their children.
The results of the cost-effectiveness analysis do not establish whether publicly versus
privately funded programs are more efficient, as it is difficult to directly compare the costeffectiveness of these two types of funding mechanisms, as they differ in terms of who pays, and
generally only privately-funded programs allow top-up. However, in accord with prior findings
(Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2015; Wolf & McShane, 2013) the cost-effectiveness analysis
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found that generally, private school vouchers save money, even in cases where the voucher
impacts are statistically null for student achievement in math and reading. The lower bound net
savings for US programs was approximately $55 million. The lower bound net savings for the
program in Colombia was $4 million and for the programs in India was $2 million. Globally the
voucher interventions resulted in a lower bound net savings of approximately $60 million.
Assuming the results for a modest private school advantage in student achievement with
time hold across contexts, we want to know why they do so. Chapter 4 analyzed differences in
private and public sector principals’ responses to having control over seven school level
activities. In six out of seven activities such as hiring and firing teachers and having autonomy
over spending the budget, the private school principals reported having significantly more
autonomy than their public counterparts. The results comport with Chubb and Moe (1988) who
theorized there was increased autonomy for leaders in the private school sector in comparison to
leaders in the public school sector.
Chapter 5 investigated whether private school principals are more likely to stay in the
profession than public school principals. Principals’ stated preferences at the baseline year
showed that principals in private schools are 12 percentage points more likely to intend to remain
in the profession in comparison to principals in public schools. A year later, the differences in
principals’ revealed status loses statistical significance. The determinants of principal attrition at
the baseline year stand in contrast to determinants of attrition at the follow-up year.
Study limitations
The first two studies presented in this dissertation suffer from some limitations. For
example, the meta-analysis examined 11 voucher programs, three of which are outside the U.S.,
thereby limiting its global scope. There is a dearth of causal studies on school vouchers,
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especially outside the U.S., in developing countries having a larger gap between public and
private institutions. A second issue is that most voucher programs have not been evaluated for
three years or more, thus, severely restricting the ability of researchers to test dosage effects of
voucher use. Thirdly, limited data does not establish differences between publicly and privately
funded programs. More granular data related to funding is necessary for a more precise
benefit/cost analysis of vouchers. Fourthly, most voucher programs included in the meta-analysis
are small scale interventions. Programs with more participants may allow a better understanding
of issues that relate to the scaling up of vouchers. Lastly, the data do not allow us to examine
how voucher impacts differ between lower, middle and high grade levels.
Some limitations also concern the last two studies in this dissertation. Private institutions
tend to have less public accountability than public institutions. Hence, increased autonomy for
private school principals needs to be connected to educational outcomes for establishing its role
in producing educational benefits. Furthermore, the dissertation did not test if principal
autonomy is a moderator of student achievement, attainment or civic outcomes. Whether
increased autonomy for school principals is an educational good or if principals’ self-perceived
increased autonomy actually translates into revealed practices of education innovation needs to
be studied. Similarly, the dissertation did not test if principals’ longer stay in the profession is
good or bad. The results show no statistically significant difference between principals’ revealed
attrition status in the public and private sectors. Lastly, the findings from leadership studies are
not causal. More studies are needed in different contexts to establish differences in leadership
between public and private institutions.
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Important lessons for policy
The general pattern of the results indicates that vouchers tend to increase reading scores
more than math scores. The initial decline in test scores could be due to the school switch which
most voucher participants experience at the start of their participation in the program. Students
may require time to adjust to their new private schools. Conversely, the private schools that
participate in voucher programs may require time to adjust to an influx of disadvantaged students
(Wolf, 2018). Thus, longer term achievement effects are more relevant for drawing policy
conclusions (Das et al., 2013; Glewwe & Muralidharan, 2016).
Generally, school vouchers are cost-effective as they tend to generate student
achievement outcomes either as good as or somewhat better than traditional public schools, at a
fraction of the cost (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2015; Wolf & McShane, 2013). Thus null
achievement impacts in voucher programs, if obtained at lower per-student expense than public
schools, may have a net benefit. For policy, results establish that vouchers are generally costeffective and produce moderate effects over time.
Results also establish a private school leadership advantage in autonomy over schoollevel activities such as establishing curriculum and setting the discipline policy of the school. At
the baseline year, private school principals are much more likely to perceive that they will stay in
the principalship than are public school principals. The study on principal attrition yields a
private sector advantage for principals’ perceptions but not for their revealed status. Overall, the
leadership research shows a private school advantage for school principals’ autonomy and
modest advantage for principals to remain in the profession. Results indicate that the response of
private school principals to questions about their continuance in the job is socially conditioned
whereas the response of public school principals is vocationally conditioned.
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This dissertation presents research showing a clear and consistent but moderate benefit of
school vouchers on student test scores that is also cost-effective. Second, research shows a more
free private school principal, who is not bound by as much red tape of bureaucracy. The impacts
may vary across contexts so more research is needed. Nevertheless, private schools offer a hope
for educational improvement. Use of empirical data in educational research is both wonderful
and helpful for a graduate student. However, Hess (2017) informs is in his book Letters to a
Young Education Reformer that even educated and well-trained researchers may look and
interpret the data in opposing ways.
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